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Abstract
Despite substantial progress, gender gaps in labour market outcomes persist. Sev-
eral key factors help explain remaining gaps. First, men and women continue to
work in different jobs. Second, parenthood appears to be a crucial point in the life
course at which gender gaps widen. Third, traditional beliefs and norms about the
appropriate roles of men and women, particularly in the context of parenthood, are
obstacles to closing remaining gender gaps. At the same time, advancements in
automation technologies are transforming the world of work and may have gender-
specific impacts.
Motivated by these observations, this thesis advances understanding of several
factors related to gender inequality in the labour market. These factors are gendered
university major choices, attitudes towards gender roles in the context of parent-
hood, and effects of recent transformations in labour markets on the gender gap in
pay. The thesis consists of four empirical papers.
The first paper studies the role of intergenerational transmission for gendered
university major choices of young adults. Using regression analysis and exploit-
ing survey data from a recent cohort of university students in Germany, the paper
investigates to what extent and why gender-typicality of mother’s and father’s oc-
cupation affect the gender-typicality of their child’s university major. Results show
significant intergenerational associations and indicate that parental resources and
a transmission of gender roles are both relevant transmission channels, particularly
for sons’ major choices.
The second and third paper examine how gender role attitudes are shaped in the
context of parenthood. The second paper analyses effects of the 2007 paid parental
leave reform (Elterngeld) in Germany on parents’ gender role attitudes; specifically,
attitudes towards the gender division of work, towards the roles of fathers, and
towards the labour force participation of mothers. Exploiting the reform as a natural
experiment, results indicate that men affected by the reform hold more traditional
attitudes towards the role of fathers, whereas there is no effect on the other two
iv
outcomes.
Focusing on the UK, the third paper explores whether parenting daughters affects
attitudes towards a traditional male breadwinner model in which it is the husband’s
role to work and the wife’s to stay at home. Using panel data and individual fixed
effects models, the results indicate that fathers are less likely to hold traditional
views on the gender division of work if they raise a girl. No robust effects on
mothers’ attitudes are found. Results from the second and third paper inform the
broader literature on attitudinal change, suggesting that gender role attitudes are
not stable throughout the life course and can be significantly shaped by adulthood
experiences.
The final paper studies whether technological change increases gender inequality.
Using individual-level data from around 28 million individuals in 20 European coun-
tries and an instrumental variable strategy, the study provides the first large-scale
evidence concerning the impact of industrial robots on the gender gap in earnings.
Findings indicate that robot adoption increases both male and female earnings but
also increases the gender pay gap. These results are driven by countries with high
initial levels of gender inequality and can be explained by the fact that men in
medium- and high-skilled occupations disproportionately benefit from robotization,
through a productivity effect.
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This thesis focuses on three aspects of gender inequality in the labour market. These
aspects are gendered university major choices, traditional attitudes towards gender
roles in the context of parenthood, and the gender gap in pay. The thesis consists of
four stand-alone empirical papers. The common motivation behind all papers is to
improve understanding of some key sources of gender differences in labour market
outcomes.
Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls is one of the
17 UN Sustainable Development Goals adopted in 2015. Equality in the labour
market constitutes a key part within this goal of gender equality. However, it is
not only from a fairness perspective that women and men should have the same set
of opportunities in the labour market. Research shows that greater gender equality
also increases competitiveness and economic growth (Cuberes & Teignier 2016, Hsieh
et al. 2019).
This introductory chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 situates the pa-
pers in the broader economics literature by highlighting some key areas and factors
relevant to remaining gender gaps in the labour market. It does not, however, at-
tempt to provide a comprehensive review of the literature on the sources of gender
gaps.1 Section 1.2 states the aims of the thesis and provides relevant definitions.
1For recent reviews see, for example, Blau & Kahn (2017), Kunze (2018), and Bertrand (2020).
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1.1. Background 2
Section 1.3 gives an outline of the remaining thesis chapters and a summary of each
of the papers.
1.1 Background
Progress towards closing gender gaps in the labour market
The convergence in the roles of men and women constitutes one of the most signif-
icant changes of the twentieth century (Goldin 2014, Olivetti & Petrongolo 2017).
Dramatic shifts in women’s educational and labour market behaviour have resulted
in the narrowing of gender gaps in labour force participation, earnings, educational
levels, university majors, and occupations. At the same time, differences between
men and women in time spent on paid and unpaid work have declined (Gimenez-
Nadal & Sevilla 2012).
This narrowing of gender gaps has continued into the 21st century. For example,
the average OECD gender employment gap decreased from 17 percentage points in
2000 to 11 percentage points in 2018 (OECD 2020). Moreover, young women today
are more likely to possess a tertiary qualification than young men in every OECD
country (OECD 2020).
Despite this progress, substantial gender differences in labour market outcomes
remain. In 2018, the average unadjusted gender gap in median earnings of full-time
employees across OECD countries was still at 13 percent (OECD 2020). That is,
for every Euro earned by the median man, the median woman earned 87 cents. The
gender pay gap can be interpreted as a summary statistic reflecting many aspects
and underlying layers of gender inequality. These aspects include, among others,
women’s underrepresentation in high-paying occupations and in top positions, dis-
crimination, the part-time pay penalty, and career costs associated with having
children.
There is also evidence suggesting that progress towards closing remaining gender
gaps has slowed over the last two to three decades. For example, the increase in
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women’s labour force participation and the reduction in occupational sex segregation
have slowed or plateaued since the 1990s (Goldin 2014, Blau & Kahn 2017).
Key areas of remaining gender differences
Recent research emphasises two key contributing factors for why women’s labour
market outcomes still lag behind those of men (see Bertrand 2020). Both of these fac-
tors highlight that the different choices that men and women pursue at key stages in
the life course translate into important gender inequalities in labour market achieve-
ments.
First, despite the fact that young women in OECD countries today are more
likely to obtain a tertiary degree than young men, they continue to choose different
university majors (Ponthieux & Meurs 2015, OECD 2020). Men tend to select
high-paying STEM fields. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to choose
lower-paying fields such as humanities. These university major choices account for a
sizeable part of subsequent gender earnings gaps (Brown & Corcoran 1997, Machin
& Puhani 2003, Black et al. 2008). A recent study based on data from the US shows
that the degree choices (combination of highest degree and university major for those
with at least a four-year college degree) of women born in 1985 map into 6 percent
lower average earnings and 10 percent lower 90th percentile earnings compared to
men (Bertrand 2018). Moreover, Bertrand’s (2018) study shows that the gender
gap in expected earnings based on educational degree has remained more or less
unchanged since birth cohorts of the late 1960s.
Such horizontal segregation is not limited to those with university degrees. Across
educational levels, women and men continue to work in different occupations. De-
spite a substantial decline since the 1970s, occupational sex segregation remains
large (Blau & Kahn 2017). US data indicates that occupational differences between
women and men explain roughly one third of the gender wage gap in 2010 and thus
remain important for explaining remaining pay gaps (Blau & Kahn 2017).2
2On the other hand, human capital factors such as educational level and labour market expe-
rience explained little of the gender pay gap by 2010 (Blau & Kahn 2017).
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A second and widely discussed key factor preventing progress towards achieving
gender equality is the unequal effect of parenthood on men’s and women’s labour
market outcomes (e.g. Waldfogel 1998, Angelov et al. 2016, England et al. 2016).
This is commonly referred to as the ‘motherhood penalty’. When entering par-
enthood, men’s labour market behaviour remains largely unchanged. In contrast,
women drastically adjust their labour market behaviour, for example, by exiting the
labour force or working fewer hours (Angrist & Evans 1998). These behavioural
changes translate into large and long-lasting pay penalties for women.
For example, a recent study estimates the effect of the birth of a first child on
parental earnings across six different countries (Kleven et al. 2019). Results show a
large and persistent drop in the earnings of mothers that occurs after the birth of the
first child while leaving fathers’ earnings largely unchanged. The long-run penalty
(defined as the average loss in gross labour earnings unconditional on employment
status) five to ten years after the first birth ranges from 21 percent in Denmark to
61 percent in Germany. These figures highlight the importance of motherhood pay
penalties for remaining gender inequalities in labour market outcomes.
Traditional gender roles as an explanation for gendered choices
The discussion of two important areas in which gender gaps are particularly apparent
highlights that these gaps are caused by the different choices that men and women
make at key stages throughout the life-course. This leads to the question of what
the underlying sources for such different choices are. In the case of the motherhood
pay gap, evidence suggests a surprisingly limited role of traditional economic factors,
such as relative education, as well as a limited role of family policy (Kleven et al.
2019).
A more recent strand of research focuses on gender differences in psychological
traits and preferences (Niederle 2017). For example, women are less likely to nego-
tiate over salaries, have a lower inclination for competitiveness, and are on average
more risk averse than men (Croson & Gneezy 2009, Bertrand 2011, Niederle 2017).
Another explanation for gender differences in labour market outcomes, which
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is now widely discussed in the economics literature, is the persistence of gender
social norms and traditional gender role attitudes (e.g. Bertrand 2014, Ponthieux
& Meurs 2015). This strand of research was in part sparked by the fact that a
sizeable component of gendered labour market outcomes and behaviour could not
be explained by ‘traditional’ factors considered in economics (Blau & Kahn 2017).
Much of the empirical research on gender norms within economics draws on the
work of Akerlof & Kranton (2000) on social identity. Their work brought the concept
of social identity, originally developed as a theory of intergroup conflict within social
psychology (Tajfel & Turner 1979), into mainstream economics by incorporating
identity into the framework of individual utility. The basic idea is that people make
economic choices not only based on monetary considerations, but also based on their
social identity and the norms that prescribe appropriate behaviour. Applications
of the concepts of social identity and social norms are now found in many areas
in economic research, for example, attitudes towards redistribution (Costa-Font &
Cowell 2015), savings behaviour (Costa-Font et al. 2018), and partnership formation
rates (Gimenez-Nadal et al. 2012).
Several studies demonstrate the relevance of gender social norms and gender
beliefs for gendered labour market behaviour. For example, traditional attitudes
towards gender roles are associated with lower female labour force participation and
higher gender pay gaps across a sample of OECD countries (Fortin 2005). Similarly,
women with more traditional gender role attitudes are less likely to enter and more
likely to exit the labour force (Khoudja & Platt 2018). Moreover, cultural proxies
from second-generation immigrant American women’s country of ancestry affect
their work and fertility behaviour (Fernández & Fogli 2009). Bertrand et al. (2015)
show that the traditional belief that a wife should not earn more than her husband
affects the relative income within households, which suggests that couples try to
avoid a situation in which the wife earns more than her husband. Moreover, if
the situation in which the wife earns more than her husband arises, women exhibit
compensating behaviour such as spending more time on household tasks, and they
are more likely to exit the labour force. These findings illustrate that the presence
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of social norms is an important concern, not only because of their effect on pay gaps,
but also because seemingly voluntary choices can perpetuate gender differences.
Traditional gender roles and norms may help explain why women and men con-
tinue to choose different university majors and occupations. These factors may also
explain part of the persistence of motherhood pay penalties. In line with this pos-
sibility, Kleven et al. (2019) show a strong correlation between traditional attitudes
towards gender roles and long-run motherhood pay penalties across countries, while
the latter do not appear to be driven by family policy.
One’s adherence to traditional gender social norms does not need to be conscious.
Nevertheless, the narrowing of gender gaps has gone hand in hand with trends in
stated gender beliefs. Individuals’ attitudes towards the appropriate roles of men and
women concerning paid work and non-paid domestic work have substantially mod-
ernised. For example, the share of West Germans supporting a gender-egalitarian
division of roles in paid and domestic work increased from 61 percent in 2000 to
86 percent in 2016 (Blohm & Walter 2018). These common trends in attitudes and
behaviour suggest that individuals act upon their less traditional views and that the
increasing incidence of less gender traditional division of roles influences gender role
attitudes (Blau & Kahn 2017).
The persistence of traditional gender roles and the role of exogenous
events for triggering change
The evidence on the relevance of gender norms for gender inequality in labour market
outcomes raises the question of what determines the formation of such norms and
beliefs, and how they can be changed.
Some work suggests the persistence of norms in the long term. For example,
Alesina et al. (2013) present evidence that countries in which forms of plough cul-
tivation that were less suited to female labour were prevailing, still exhibit greater
gender inequality and less egalitarian attitudes towards gender roles today. In line
with the notion that norms persist in the long run, research suggests that gender role
attitudes are transmitted intergenerationally. Such intergenerationally transmitted
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attitudes, formed during childhood and youth, have consequences for later labour
market behaviour (Farré & Vella 2013, Platt & Polavieja 2016). In addition to the
role of parental attitudes, parents’ labour market behaviour is also an important
predictor of children’s gender role attitudes (Platt & Polavieja 2016). Similarly,
Fernández et al. (2004) show that men who grew up with a working mother are
more likely to have working wives. These men may have less traditional gender role
attitudes concerning the gender division of roles within the household. All of this
evidence points to a formation of gender role attitudes early in life.
In contrast, other work shows that exogenous events can contribute to fairly
rapid changes in gender norms. For example, Goldin & Katz (2002) demonstrate
that the invention of the birth control pill altered women’s career and marriage
decisions. The findings suggest that this innovation in contraception contributed to
a change in women’s gender role identity (Bertrand 2014). Another recent study
demonstrates that exposure to gender-egalitarian settings can change traditional
behaviour (Boelmann et al. 2020). The paper provides evidence that mothers who
grew up in the gender-traditional West German culture and who migrated to the
more gender-egalitarian East Germany after reunification adjust their post-birth
labour supply behaviour to that of their East German colleagues. That is, they
return to work faster and work longer hours.
A reversal of progress and a reinforcement of traditional gender roles triggered
by exogenous events is also possible. New research shows that Covid-19 lockdowns
increased gender inequalities in unpaid work in Spain (Farré et al. 2020) and in
England (Andrew et al. 2020). While men are found to increase their time spent on
childcare and housework, mothers were still shouldering most of the burden.
Exogenous events do not only affect gender inequality via their effect on gender
roles and social norms. Existing gender inequalities can also be directly impacted by
such ‘demand-side factors’ (Blau & Kahn 2017). Technological change is a promi-
nent example. The slowing progress towards closing the remaining gender pay gap
coincided with rapid changes in the nature of work and the demand for skills due to
technological advances. Paying attention to these profound changes in labour mar-
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kets is important when it comes to providing solutions to closing remaining gender
gaps. Moreover, it is possible that contexts in which gender norms and attitudes are
less traditional are better equipped for the gendered impacts of exogenous shocks to
labour markets.
1.2 Aims and relevant definitions
The discussion in Section 1.1 demonstrates that despite progress, gender differences
in labour market outcomes remain ubiquitous. While by no means a comprehensive
list, two important aspects of these gaps are the fact that men and women continue
to choose different jobs, and the gendered career consequences of parenthood. To
explain these phenomena, the literature has increasingly focused on the role of tra-
ditional norms and attitudes. While traditional norms can persist in the long run,
there is also evidence that exogenous events can trigger fairly rapid change. Against
this background, the empirical papers in this thesis take these insights as starting
points and explore one or more of them in-depth. Specifically, the thesis papers
focus on the following important areas of remaining gender differences as outcome
variables: gender-typical university major choices, attitudes towards gender roles,
and gender gaps in earnings.
In so doing, a first aim is to improve understanding of some of the factors that
help explain the persistence of gender differences in the labour market. A second
aim is to examine whether gender role attitudes adapt to changes in social policy and
experiences. The overall motivation is to improve knowledge of important underlying
sources for why men and women continue to have different career outcomes.
Given the importance of gender social norms identified in the literature, the
papers in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 focus on gender roles, at three distinct life course
stages: entry to university, transition to parenthood, and parenting school-aged
daughters. The final paper focuses on a demand-side factor potentially impacting the
gender pay gap, motivated by recent changes in labour markets due to technological
advancements.
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The research questions and contexts for each paper were chosen independently
from each other. Each paper is based on different datasets, using the best available
data for the respective research question. The papers are written with a social
science audience in mind. They use econometric methods and are motivated by the
economics literature discussed in Section 1.1. Given the interdisciplinary nature of
the topics, I also draw on literature from the fields of sociology and social psychology.
The terms gender role attitudes and gender (social) norms are used throughout
the thesis and are therefore defined here.3 Gender norms and gender roles in this
thesis refer to the appropriate roles of men and women concerning the gender division
of work and the consequences of parental labour force participation for children’s
wellbeing. I use the definition of gender norms from Pearse & Connell (2016), who
define them as “collective definitions of socially approved conduct [...] applied to
groups constituted in the gender order - mainly, to distinctions between men and
women” (p. 31). Hence, norms signal to other members of a group or society
how they should behave (Schwartz 2012). Similarly, psychologist Alice Eagly uses
the term ‘injunctive norms’ to speak about “consensual expectations about what a
group of people ought to do or ideally would do” (Eagly & Karau 2002, p. 574). The
concept of gender norms is related but different to that of stereotypes, understood
as ‘consensual expectations about what members of a group actually do’ (Eagly and
Karau, 2002), or gender ideologies, used to ‘justify the gender imbalance in power
and resources’ (Seguino 2007).
By attitudes I understand evaluations of behaviour or people as good or bad;
they vary on a positive/negative scale and can be expressed by statements such
as ‘I like/dislike’or ‘I agree with/disagree with’ (Schwartz 2012, Bicchieri 2017).
Therefore, attitudes towards gender roles are individual evaluations of these gender
roles and norms; and a positive attitude would reflect an endorsement of the col-
lective gender norm in the society. Gender role attitudes encompass beliefs about
“the assignment of different adult social responsibilities to men and women” (Pleck
1977, p.182). I use the terms ‘attitudes towards gender roles’ and ‘attitudes towards
3These definitions are the same as the ones that appear in the published version of Chapter 4.
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gender norms’ interchangeably.
I distinguish between the terms gender and sex throughout the thesis. I follow
the definitions by Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (2013) who state that “sex is a bio-
logical categorization based primarily on reproductive potential, whereas gender is
the social elaboration of biological sex. [. . . ] Gender builds on biological sex, but
it exaggerates biological difference, and it carries biological difference into domains
in which it is completely irrelevant. There is no biological reason, for example,
why women should mince and men should swagger, or why women should have red
toenails and men should not” (p. 2). Gender is therefore a social construct and
“refers to the attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with
a person’s biological sex” (APA 2021).
While I acknowledge that the appropriate use of terminology can be context-
specific and the distinction is not always clear-cut (as reflected in the evolving and
differing use of terms among different fields and scholars)4, I follow the recommen-
dations set out in APA (2021) by using the term gender when referring to people as
social groups, and using the term sex when the biological distinction of sex assign-
ment is predominant. As the focus of my thesis is on advancing the understanding
of factors related to the inequality between women and men in the labour market
that are socially constructed rather than biological, this is reflected in my predom-
inant use of the term gender compared to sex. To give a few specific examples, I
use the terms gender pay gap, gender division of labour, gender differences in oc-
cupations, gender differences in the labour market, gender roles, gender norms, and
gender-typical choices, and I use the terms occupational sex segregation, sibling sex,
same-sex parent, and sex composition within an occupation. I thereby follow the
practice of several sociologists, economists and gender scholars (see e.g. Charles &
Bradley 2009, Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 2013, Gangl & Ziefle 2015, Blau & Kahn
4See also Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (2013, p.2): “while we think of sex as biological and gender
as social, this distinction is not clear-cut. People tend to think of gender as the result of nurture
– as social and hence fluid – while sex is the result of nature, simply given by biology. However,
nature and nurture intertwine, and there is no obvious point at which sex leaves off and gender
begins”.
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2017).
1.3 Thesis outline
The remainder of the thesis consists of four empirical papers associated with the
issues and motivations set out above, and a conclusion chapter that summarises
the findings and discusses common limitations, implications, and areas for future
research. The second Chapter explores the role of intergenerational transmission
for gendered university major choices of young adults. The third Chapter estimates
the impact of a parental leave policy reform on parents’ attitudes towards gender
roles. The fourth Chapter studies whether parenting daughters, as opposed to sons,
changes parental attitudes towards the gender division of work. The fifth Chapter
analyses the impact of industrial robots, a specific type of automation, on the gender
gap in earnings.
In Chapter 2, I explore the role of intergenerational transmission for gendered
university major choices of young adults in Germany. Major choices have immediate
consequences on occupational segregation and wage gaps (Ponthieux & Meurs 2015).
Motivated by this observation, I study to what extent and why gender-typicality of
parents’ occupation affect the gender-typicality of the university major their adult
children choose. Using regression analysis and survey data from a recent cohort of
university students in Germany, I examine the association between gender-typicality
of mothers’ and fathers’ occupation and gender-typicality of their children’s univer-
sity major.
Results reveal significant associations between the gender-typicality in parents’
occupations and their children’s majors. This is especially evident in sons choosing
less typically male majors if, when growing up, their fathers worked in less typi-
cally male occupations. Results point to two underlying transmission channels: the
transfer of occupation-specific resources and the transmission of gender roles. The
paper highlights the relevance of parental resources and parental socialisation for
gendered university major choices.
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Parenthood is often the starting point of persistent gender inequalities in earnings
(Budig & Hodges 2010, Kleven et al. 2019). This is partly because the behaviour of
parents is rooted in traditional gender norms and beliefs about the appropriate roles
of men and women concerning the gender division of responsibilities (Aisenbrey et al.
2009, Schober 2013). Therefore, Chapters 3 and 4 study whether external events
and experiences affect such traditional attitudes towards gender roles in the context
of parenthood.
Parental leave policy, which can provide incentives concerning the gender division
of paid and unpaid work in the early years of parenthood, plays an important role.
However, in order to achieve behavioural changes, policy reforms need to be accom-
panied by attitudinal changes (Farré 2016). Therefore, Chapter 3 analyses effects
of the 2007 paid parental leave reform (Elterngeld) in Germany on parents’ gender
role attitudes; specifically, attitudes towards the gender division of work, towards
fathers’ roles, and towards the consequences of mothers’ labour force participation
for child wellbeing. The policy reform intended to increase fathers’ involvement in
childcare and to speed up mothers’ return to work after childbirth.
I find that the reform increased support for traditional gender roles for fathers
among parents affected by the reform, compared to parents before the reform. I
find no effect on the other two outcomes: attitudes towards the gender division of
work, and attitudes towards the consequences of mothers’ labour force participation.
I also find that the reform did not impact the sharing of household and childcare
activities.
Focusing on the UK, Chapter 4, jointly written with Mireia Borrell-Porta and
Joan Costa-Font, also studies the impressionability of parental gender role atti-
tudes. Specifically, the paper explores whether parenting daughters affects attitudes
towards the traditional male breadwinner norm in which it is the husband’s role to
work and the wife’s to stay at home. The paper is motivated by the broader question
of whether gender role attitudes are stable over the life course of an individual or
whether parenting daughters – as opposed to sons – changes them.
Using panel data and individual fixed effects models, the results show that fathers
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are less likely to hold traditional views on the gender division of work if they raise a
girl. We find no robust effects on mothers’ attitudes. We conclude that gender role
attitudes are not stable throughout the life-course and can be significantly shaped
by adulthood experiences.
Chapter 5, jointly written with Cevat Giray Aksoy and Berkay Özcan, studies
whether technological change increases gender inequality. Despite the fact that
automation is one of the most profound changes that labour markets are facing,
there is strikingly little empirical research on how automation might affect gender
equality. Motivated by this gap, the paper studies the impact of industrial robots,
a specific type of automation, on the gender pay gap. Using individual-level data
from around 28 million individuals in 20 European countries, the paper provides the
first large-scale evidence on the impact of industrial robots on the gender pay gap.
Using an instrumental variable strategy, findings indicate that robot adoption
increases both male and female earnings but also increases the gender pay gap.
These results are driven by countries with high initial levels of gender inequality
and can be explained by the fact that men at medium- and high-skilled occupations
disproportionately benefit from robotization, through a productivity effect.
In the final Chapter of the thesis (Chapter 6), I summarise the findings and
contributions of each of the four empirical papers. I also discuss policy implications,
limitations, common threads that emerge from taking the findings of the papers
together, and useful directions for future research.
Chapter 2
Gendered university major choice:
The role of intergenerational
transmission
Abstract
In this paper, I study to what extent and why the degree of femininity of mothers’
occupation and the degree of masculinity of fathers’ occupation affect whether their
adult children choose typically male or female majors at university. To do so, I
introduce a novel measure to operationalise the extent to which majors and occu-
pations are ‘typically female’ or ‘typically male’ and I use data on a recent cohort
of university students in Germany. Results reveal that sons choose less typically
male majors if their fathers worked in less typically male occupations. Moreover,
the major choices of sons are not associated with their mothers’ occupation. On the
other hand, daughters choose more typically female majors if their fathers worked in
less typically male occupations and if their mothers worked in more typically female
majors. The mother-daughter correlation is observed only if mothers possess ter-
tiary education, while fathers’ occupation is significantly associated with children’s
choices independently of their educational level. As to why these effects occur, re-
sults support the transfer of occupation-specific skills, resources, and networks from
parents to their children. The results also suggest that at least some of the father-son
associations are due to a transmission of gender roles.1
1Note on data used: This chapter uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS):
Starting Cohort First-Year Students, doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC5:14.0.0. as well as Starting Cohort
Grade 9, doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC4:10.0.0. From 2008 to 2013, NEPS data was collected as part
of the Framework Program for the Promotion of Empirical Educational Research funded by the




Gender differences in the labour market persist, despite narrowing gaps between
men and women in labour force participation, earnings, and occupations since the
mid-twentieth century. The gender earnings gap in particular has received increased
attention over the past decade. One fact emerging from research is that the gender
gap in earnings tends to be wider among university graduates, compared to those
with lower education levels (Goldin et al. 2017, OECD 2020).
Existing literature suggests that an important part of the gender pay gap among
university graduates stems from choices made earlier in the life course. That is,
gender differences in university majors (Brown & Corcoran 1997, Charles & Bradley
2002, Machin & Puhani 2003, Black et al. 2008). Men are more likely than women
to study STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) fields. Women are
overrepresented in humanities, social sciences, and educational sciences (Leuze &
Strauß 2009).
Women are more likely to choose majors that typically lead to occupations with
lower earnings and fewer opportunities for career progression (Charles & Bradley
2002, Blau & Kahn 2017). Gendered major choices thus have direct consequences
on occupational segregation, on wage gaps, and on so-called glass ceilings - the idea
that there are invisible barriers that prevent women from achieving top incomes and
positions (Ponthieux & Meurs 2015, Bertrand 2018). Sex segregation by university
major also has important indirect consequences. For example, it may reinforce
existing gender norms and stereotypes, thereby limiting the perceived educational
choices of future generations (Charles & Bradley 2009).
Most research seeking to explain the determinants of gendered major choices
privileges one of two types of factors. Some show the relevance of individual-level
characteristics. These include personality traits such as competitiveness, beliefs
about enjoying coursework, and preferences over expected jobs (Antecol & Cobb-
Clark 2013, Zafar 2013). Others focus on the role of the social environment such as
by the Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi) at the University of Bamberg in
cooperation with a nationwide network.
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teacher role models or sex of high school peers (Carrell et al. 2010, Brenoe & Zoelitz
2019). However, few studies have investigated the role of parents in shaping the
choice of university major (e.g. Humlum et al. 2018, Vleuten et al. 2018). This is
despite the fact that parents transmit occupation-specific resources to their children
(Vleuten et al. 2018). Moreover, children observe and learn from the gender roles
enacted by their parents (Crouter et al. 1995, Platt & Polavieja 2016). For example,
children learn about the degree to which their parents follow traditional gender roles
by observing their occupations (Polavieja & Platt 2014). This is because occupations
differ in the degree to which they are regarded as typically female or typically male.
The aim of this paper is to analyse whether the degree of femininity of mothers’
occupation and the degree of masculinity of fathers’ occupation affect whether their
adult children choose gender-typical majors at university and to study underlying
transmission channels, using Germany as a case study. Specifically, I distinguish
between the transmission of occupation-specific parental resources from the trans-
mission of gender norms. To capture the degree to which a mother’s occupation is
regarded as typically female, I construct a rank-based measure based on the share
of women in the occupation she held when her child was aged 15. I call this measure
‘femininity rank of mothers’ occupation’ or ‘mothers’ rank’. Similarly, I construct
masculinity rank in fathers’ occupations (fathers’ rank), masculinity rank in sons’
majors (sons’ rank), and femininity rank in daughters’ majors (daughters’ rank). I
use the term ‘gender-typicality rank’ to refer to masculinity and femininity rank at
the same time. Similarly, I use ‘gender-typical’ when referring to typically male and
typically female majors simultaneously.
I exploit unique survey data of a nationally representative cohort of first-year
undergraduate students in Germany in 2010. Using regression analysis, I examine
the association between femininity rank of mothers’ occupation and masculinity
rank of fathers’ occupation on the one hand and the gender-typicality rank of young
adults’ university majors on the other hand. I thereby capture intergenerational
positional changes in each person’s position relative to others of the same cohort
and sex.
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Germany is an important case study because its labour market exhibits low oc-
cupational mobility. This means that initial major choices at university have long-
lasting effects on career outcomes, such as lifetime earnings (Aisenbrey & Brückner
2008). Moreover, the gender pay gap in Germany is particularly high among uni-
versity graduates. In 2006, women with Abitur (school-leaving certificate) and a
vocational qualification earned 38 percent less than equally qualified men, while
tertiary-educated women earned 42 percent less than men with comparable qualifi-
cations (OECD 2008a).
I find that sons choose less typically male majors if their fathers worked in
less typically male occupations, as measured by their respective ‘masculinity rank’.
Sons’ choice is not correlated with their mother’s occupation. Daughters choose more
typically female majors if their fathers worked in less typically male occupations and
if their mothers worked in more typically female occupations. While the father-son
and father-daughter associations hold generally, the mother-daughter association
is statistically significant only under certain conditions: if mothers possess tertiary
education, if mothers were in employment, and among those living in East Germany.
Moreover, results from quantile regressions and heterogeneity analyses show that
the significant effects appear to be driven by parents and students in less gender-
typical occupations and university majors, suggesting that fathers in gender-atypical
occupations can help break gender stereotypes and that the findings of the paper are
at least partially driven by sons and daughters who defy gender-stereotypical major
choices. In terms of effect size, a one standard deviation increase in masculinity
rank in fathers’ occupation is associated with a 3 percent decrease in daughters’
femininity rank and a 5 percent increase in sons’ masculinity rank in major.
As to why these effects2 occur, a large part of the results appears to be driven
by children choosing a major that is closely related to parental occupation. This
supports a ‘direct transfer of resources’ channel, that is, the transfer of occupation-
specific skills, resources, and networks from parents to their children. The results
2I use the verbs ‘associated with’ or ‘correlated with’ when describing regression results in this
paper as the results cannot be interpreted as causal effects. I use the noun effect in a non-causal
way throughout the paper.
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also suggest that at least some of the father-son associations are due to a transmission
of gender roles.
The findings from this study have important implications. First, the relevance
of parental socialisation points to the importance of policies that address early roots
of gendered major choices. Second, the interactive effect of parental education with
masculinity/femininity in parental occupation implies that role models are impor-
tant and that their status may matter more than their sex for young people to iden-
tify with them. Third, the finding that intergenerational transmission is strongest
between fathers and sons points to a need for policy to focus on men (and not
predominantly on women) when attempting to tackle sex segregation in the labour
market. While it is important to encourage women to enter highly paid STEM fields,
policy should also aim at changing men’s attitudes and encouraging them to enter
traditionally female-dominated fields. The finding that sones with fathers in less
gender-typical occupations choose less typically male university majors is therefore
encouraging.
I make three contributions to existing literature. First, the paper improves the
understanding of gendered major choices by providing the first analysis on the role
of gender-typicality of parental occupation in Germany. Second, I introduce a new
rank-based measure, which is used in research on intergenerational income mobility
(Chetty et al. 2014), but has not been applied to gendered occupational and major
choices. This is unfortunate because previously used measures, based on the share
of women in an occupation/major, are affected by changes in the sex composition
of the workforce as a whole. Instead, rank measures capture positional mobility be-
tween parents and their children, whereby each person’s position is relative to others
of the same cohort and sex. Finally, I am able to distinguish between two different
transmission channels, by disentangling the transmission of parental resources from
that of gender norms. I thereby contribute to the literature on the intergenerational
transmission of gender norms, which mainly draws evidence from intergenerational
associations in female labour force participation and does not allow for such a dis-
tinction. Identifying transmission channels is important for the design of effective
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policies to address sex segregation in university majors.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews existing
evidence on the determinants of gender differences in university major choice, and
describes how university major choice operates in Germany. Section 2.3 presents the
data and methods. Section 2.4 reports the results, Section 2.5 studies transmission
channels, and the last section concludes.
2.2 Gender differences in university major
2.2.1 Determinants of gender differences in major choices
University major choice is complex and influenced by many factors, including ex-
pected earnings, perceived own ability, and exposure to a given major, among others
(see Altonji et al. 2016 for a recent review). A subset of this literature studies the
drivers behind gender differences in major choices. Empirical research interested in
the determinants of gendered major choices tends to focus on one of two types of
factors.
Some argue that individual-level factors determine gendered major choices. For
example, research has shown that gender differences in personality traits such as
competitiveness, beliefs about enjoying coursework, and preferences over expected
jobs all contribute to the gender gap in majors (Antecol & Cobb-Clark 2013, Zafar
2013). While important, these papers ignore that gendered preferences and self-
conceptions are a result of gender socialisation processes (Cech 2013).
Other research studies the role of the social environment for the probability to
choose specific groups of majors. This strand of research shows that the social
environment directly affects gendered major choices in many cases. For example,
a recent paper finds that a higher proportion of female high school peers reduces
women’s probability and increases men’s probability to choose a STEM major (Bre-
noe & Zoelitz 2019). Having female teachers increases women’s likelihood to choose
a STEM degree (Carrell et al. 2010, Bottia et al. 2015). And having a sister increases
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men’s likelihood to study Economics, Business, or Engineering (Anelli & Peri 2015).
While important in its own right, using STEM as an outcome measure when
studying gendered university major choices more broadly has several shortcomings.
First, there is substantial within-group heterogeneity in sex composition within
STEM majors and other broad groups of majors. This constitutes a shortcom-
ing for those interested in the factors underlying the persistent gender differences
in major choices. Moreover, a binary STEM measure tends to put strong empha-
sis on the lack of women in STEM fields while ignoring the underrepresentation of
men in certain other fields as the flip side of gendered choices. To overcome these
shortcomings, I introduce a novel measure of gender-typicality, which I describe in
section 2.3.
Although the family is a key agent of primary socialisation (Bandura 1977), only
few papers study the role of parental transmission for gendered major choices. In
particular, there is not much evidence on the importance of parents’ occupation and
specifically the degree to which these occupations are typically male or female. Two
recent studies address this gap by analysing the association between share of women
in parents’ occupation or educational field and share of women in offspring’s educa-
tional field, with different results. A study in Denmark finds a positive association
between the female share in the education of mothers and the female share in the
major of their daughters, as well as between the female share in the education of
fathers and that of their sons (Humlum et al. 2018). A related paper studying field
of study choice at secondary education level in the Netherlands also finds a positive
relationship between the female share in mothers’ occupation and in daughters’ field
of study (Vleuten et al. 2018). However, there is no father-son correlation. Instead,
mothers employed in more female occupational fields are more likely to have sons in
more male-dominated fields.
These papers use the sex composition to identify the degree to which a major is
gendered. While this is a useful measure, it warrants further improvement. I build
on this small set of literature by introducing a rank-based measure of the degree to
which an occupation or major is typically male or female. This measure is described
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in more detail in section 2.3.
2.2.2 Channels of intergenerational transmission
Socialisation theories in sociology (e.g. Eagly 1987, Okamoto & England 1999) and
in social psychology (e.g. Bandura 1977) argue that parents act as key agents of
socialisation to their children. Gender socialisation theories suggest that children
specifically emulate the behaviour of the same-sex parent (Vleuten et al. 2018).
Gendered behaviours can either result from children observing the behaviour of their
same-sex parent and actively choosing to imitate them (cognitive developmental
theory; Kohlberg 1966), or because parents encourage them to adhere to gender
roles (social learning theory; Bandura 1977). Therefore, from an early age, children
form beliefs about what constitute culturally appropriate behaviours and preferences
for girls and boys, including appropriate types of jobs.3
In economics, cultural transmission and socialisation processes have been in-
corporated into economic models since the start of this century (e.g. Akerlof &
Kranton 2000, Alesina & Giuliano 2015, Bisin & Verdier 2001, 2011, Escriche 2007).
Within this literature strand, a number of empirical studies have tried to identify
the existence of gender social norms through the study of female labour supply de-
cisions. For example, Fernández & Fogli (2009) demonstrate that second-generation
immigrant American women whose ancestry is from countries with higher female
labour force participation work more. Olivetti et al. (2020) show that a woman’s
labour supply in early adulthood is affected by the labour force participation of
past high school peers’ mothers. These correlations in labour force participation
are interpreted as evidence of the existence and intergenerational transmission of
gender norms. However, a key shortcoming of this empirical research is that it is
not possible to distinguish whether the intergenerational associations in labour force
3Evidence suggests that as early as in second grade, children think that maths is for boys and not
for girls (Cvencek et al. 2011). Gender socialisation even affects school performance. For example,
a significant part of the gender gap in maths test scores in secondary school can be attributed to
the transmission of cultural beliefs concerning gender roles (Nollenberger et al. 2016). Moreover,
compared to boys, girls aspire to occupations that have a higher share of women and pay less
(Polavieja & Platt 2014, Platt & Parsons 2017).
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participation are due to a transmission of gender norms or due to other reasons such
as a transfer of resources or imitation.
I address this limitation and contribute to this strand of literature by studying
a different outcome, university major, which allows me to distinguish between the
relative importance of two transmission channels: the gender-typicality per se and
the transfer of occupation-specific resources. This is possible because occupations
and university majors can be classified along two dimensions - their broad field as
well as their gender-typicality. This distinction is not possible when studying female
labour supply decisions.
More specifically, two main channels can account for intergenerational associa-
tions between gender-typicality rank in parents’ occupation and rank in offsprings’
major: a direct transfer of resources on the one hand and a transmission of gender
roles or gender norms on the other hand (Vleuten et al. 2018).
A direct transfer of resources takes place when young adults choose a major that
is similar to their parents’ occupational field. This encompasses what is commonly
referred to as the transfer of occupation-specific human capital (e.g. Humlum et al.
2018) and the inheritability of parental endowments (e.g. Becker & Tomes 1979) in
economics, and the transfer of occupation-specific resources within sociology (e.g.
Jonsson et al. 2009). Taking a broad definition, this channel includes the transfer of
occupation-specific and financial resources, social networks, human capital, traits,
and abilities (Vleuten et al. 2018, Aina & Nicoletti 2018). It occurs, for example,
if the child whose parent is a doctor studies medicine. Each occupation and each
major differs in the degree to which it is gendered. Consequently, direct transfer
mechanically leads to positive intergenerational associations between parents and
children’s femininity or masculinity rank in occupation and major, respectively. It
is reasonable to assume that young adults are more likely to identify with and use
the resources of the more influential parent whose social position dominates that of
their spouse (Dryler 1998), for example in terms of occupational status, income, or
educational level.
A second, ‘indirect channel’ is present if children choose majors that are unrelated
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to their parents’ occupations but we still observe a significant association between
gender-typicality in parental occupation and gender-typicality in children’s majors.
The presence of an indirect channel can be interpreted as strong evidence for gender
socialisation and the transmission of gender norms. This is because the possibility
of a direct transfer is very limited and instead the gender-typicality rank per se
matters for gendered major choices. Empirically, this can be tested by studying
heterogeneous effects across those children who choose majors that are related to
the same field as their parents’ occupations and those whose majors are unrelated
to parents’ occupations.
These two competing transmission channels are interrelated and cannot be con-
sidered completely independent, both from a theoretical as well as from an empirical
perspective. From a theoretical perspective, parents may be more likely to trans-
mit occupation-specific resources to their children if these are in line with cultural
gender norms. For example, fathers in STEM occupations are found to transmit
their occupation-specific preferences to their daughters only in the absence of a son
(Oguzoglu & Ozbeklik 2016). From an empirical perspective, it is possible that a
transmission of gender roles occurs within groups of students who choose majors
closely related to their parents’ occupation. In other words, there may still be a
transmission of gender norms even if we do not find empirical evidence for the ‘indi-
rect’ transmission channel. In light of these considerations, empirical evidence of the
existence of the ‘indirect’ transmission channel therefore provides an even stronger
case for the existence of gender norms.
There is little empirical research that has tried to disentangle these transmission
channels and identify the existence of gender norms in the context of gendered
university major choices (but see e.g. Humlum et al. 2018). Studies on related
but different outcomes such as occupational choices, occupational aspirations, and
field of study choices in secondary school have produced mixed results. While some
studies find support for a transmission of gender roles (e.g. Polavieja & Platt 2014,
Vleuten et al. 2018), others find no such support (e.g. Dryler 1998).
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2.2.3 Major choice in tertiary education in Germany
In 2010, 49 percent of secondary school graduates obtained a school-leaving certifi-
cate qualifying them for tertiary education. Of those, 69 percent obtained Abitur
(Allgemeine Hochschulreife) and the rest obtained a subject-linked school-leaving
certificate (Brugger et al. 2012). Abitur is a school-leaving certificate obtained at
the end of upper secondary education for students who attend the ‘highest’ Gym-
nasium school track.4 In principle, this certificate provides eligibility to study any
major at any university. In contrast, subject-linked school-leaving certificates (Fach-
hochschulreife or fachgebundene Hochschulreife) restrict eligibility either to certain
majors or to university of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen). In addition to qualify-
ing for entry to university via a school-leaving certificate, a small share of students
enters university education via a ‘non-traditional’ route without a school-leaving
certificate. These students qualify through other criteria such as vocational training
(Neugebauer & Schindler 2012). The entry rate into tertiary education in 2010 was
45 percent (Brugger et al. 2012).
When applying for an undergraduate degree, students choose a major (Studien-
fach), such as mathematics, German studies, or mechanical engineering. Students
also take two additional decisions particular to the German tertiary education sys-
tem. First, they choose one of two main types of tertiary education institutions,
traditional research universities (Universitaeten) and universities of applied sciences
(Fachhochschulen). While universities offer degrees in all majors, universities of ap-
plied sciences have a more applied focus and offer a limited range of applied sciences
majors (Jacob & Weiss 2010). Second, with many majors, a student can choose be-
tween graduating with a ‘regular’ undergraduate degree or with a ‘teaching’ degree.
The latter type is necessary to become a school teacher.
Therefore, in studying major choices I distinguish between 58 majors as well
as the three mutually exclusive ‘types’ of degree, namely university, university of
4Access to tertiary education in Germany is characterised by high social inequality, which is
partly due to an early tracking into different school types in lower secondary school. Students with
parents who possess tertiary education are much more likely to attend the highest school track
(Gymnasium) at lower secondary school (Müller & Schneider 2013).
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applied sciences, and teaching degree. Since not all 58 majors are available for each
of the three degree types, their combination yields 134 distinct categories. Figure
2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A shows the sex composition for the 30 most common categories.
The graph reveals that major choices are strongly gendered.
Choosing a university major is an important decision because the German labour
market has strong linkages between majors and occupations (Leuze 2007). In fact,
the German labour market is known “as a prototypical case of an occupational labour
market where job applicants are matched to jobs according to their occupation-
specific credentials” (Klein 2016, p. 46). Around three quarters of the gender
differences in earnings at job market entry of graduates can be explained by gen-
der differences in university major (Braakmann 2008). Moreover, low occupational
mobility means that initial major choices at university have long-lasting effects on
career outcomes, such as lifetime earnings (Aisenbrey & Brückner 2008).
University major choice in Germany is not only an important decision from the
individual’s perspective, but its study also has a number of advantages compared
to studying related choices such as the one of occupation. While gender differences
in university majors and in occupations are closely related, the choice of a major is
less influenced by demand factors than the choice of an occupation. Determinants of
occupational segregation include supply side factors such as individual preferences as
well as demand side factors such as gender stereotypes of employers enacted when
employers select job candidates (Hausmann & Kleinert 2014) and current labour
market conditions. Compared to that, major choice allows a focus on supply side
factors and is therefore a closer reflection of individual preferences.
One concern is that major choices may not adequately reflect people’s prefer-
ences because many majors have admission restrictions to manage high demand.
In this paper’s sample, 70 percent of students entered a programme with admis-
sion restrictions, with the high school GPA (Abiturnote) being the most important
and often sole criterion. This means that only students who graduate with a GPA
above a certain threshold (called numerus clausus) are admitted to the programme.
This means that on the other hand 30 percent of programmes have no admission
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restrictions, that is, students with a school-leaving certificate can enrol directly at
the respective university without the need to fulfil any additional requirements.
To alleviate part of the concern that major choice may not adequately reflect
individuals’ preferences, in Section 2.4 I conduct a robustness check on students
who graduated with a GPA above the median and a robustness check on students
who state that they entered their desired major. These restrictions do not change
results. Furthermore, while not all students may be able to enter their preferred
major, from a policy perspective, it can be argued that studying the actual choices
students make given their constraints is more important than studying idealistic
aspirations.
Literature on the determinants of university major choice in Germany suggests
that social origin plays a role in university major choice. For example, individuals
whose father possesses a tertiary degree are more likely to choose majors that are
considered prestigious, such as medicine or law (e.g. Reimer & Pollak 2010, Georg &
Bargel 2017). Apart from that, the choice of a university major is treated as largely
self-determined in the literature. This is supported by evidence that intrinsic mo-
tives, in particular interest in the major, are an important factor for major choice
while conformance with friends’ and parents’ expectations are found to be less im-
portant (Heine et al. 2008, Ochsenfeld 2016). Moreover, teacher recommendations
or evaluations are not usually needed for entry to university and are not commonly
included as an independent variable in regression models. In line with this, self-
reported information from students indicates that the three most-used sources to
inform major choice are the internet, friends, and information material provided
by universities (Heine et al. 2008). On the other hand, much fewer students cite
conversations with teachers as a source of information and only a fifth of those who
name teachers as a source evaluate them as useful.
Additionally, a few characteristics of the tertiary education system make Ger-
many a well-suited case to study major choices as a relatively ‘free choice’ that
closely proxies individual preferences. First, the choice of major is not restricted
by earlier field of study or track choices at secondary school. This is in contrast to
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other countries such as the UK or Italy, where entry to some university majors is
conditional on having taken certain exams or tracks in secondary school5. Second,
in contrast to other countries such as the US, it is not possible to enter university
without declaring a major. Therefore, the choice of major takes place (just) before
a student enters university, at the time when he or she applies for a degree. Third,
the high selectivity into certain prestigious universities in countries such as the UK
or US does not exist in Germany. Instead, universities are considered more equal in
quality and there is no strong hierarchy among universities (Jacob & Weiss 2010).
Finally, university education in 2010 was free in most of the 16 federal states. Even
in the five federal states that charged tuition fees in 2010, usually at EUR 500 per
semester, they were relatively low in international comparison.
2.3 Data and methods
2.3.1 Data sources and sample
The main dataset used is the Starting Cohort 5 of the German National Educational
Panel Study (NEPS-SC5, see Blossfeld & Roßbach 2011). The NEPS-SC5 contains
rich data of a nationally representative cohort of 17,910 first-year undergraduate
students who started their degree in October 2010, and who are enrolled for the first
time in a public or state-approved higher education institution in Germany (see Zinn
et al. 2017). Wave 1 interviews were conducted between December 2010 and January
2012 and to date, 9 waves of data are available, following individuals up until 2015.
For the analysis, a cross-sectional dataset is constructed, using information from the
wave 1 survey and from spell data on schooling.
The analysis sample is restricted to individuals between 18 and 25 years old who
obtained Abitur (Allgemeine Hochschulreife). The age restriction allows for a focus
on the transition from high school to university by excluding individuals who pursue
5For example, evidence from Italy shows that written teacher track recommendations are an
important determinant of high school track choice and this track choice is strongly correlated with
subsequent choice of university major (Carlana 2019).
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a university degree as a second career later in life. The restriction to individuals with
Abitur ensures that students are eligible for any degree at any type of university.
However, robustness checks including individuals with other types of school-leaving
certificates are shown in Section 2.4, and indicate that results remain substantially
the same. I also drop observations with missing values on key variables.
Since information on parental characteristics is provided by students, this re-
striction implies that only individuals who know the educational level, age, and
occupation of both parents are included. A parent is defined as the person who the
student identifies with as mother or father. Therefore, I include controls for the
family structure an individual grew up in, which distinguish between biological and
adoptive parents on the one hand, and step and foster parents on the other hand.6 I
also run analyses on subsamples of different family structures, and the results do not
change substantially. The final analysis sample consists of 9,640 individuals (6,100
female students and 3,540 male students).7 Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A shows how
the different sample restrictions affect sample size and summary statistics. Over-
all, the changes in the mean values of key variables due to sample restriction are
minimal.8
I use supplementary data from four sources. To construct the dependent vari-
ables, I use information on the total number of female and male students by uni-
versity major and by degree type in Germany in the academic year 2010/11 from
administrative data of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2011).
For the key regressors, I use administrative data from the Federal Labour Office,
6The survey reports adoptive parents in the category of biological parents and groups step
parents and foster parents.
7The initial full survey sample consists of 60 percent female students and the final analysis
sample consists of 63 percent female students. The overrepresentation of women in the sample is
primarily due to a higher survey response rate among women and to a lesser extent due to the
exclusion of more observations on male students due to missing values on key covariates. The
overrepresentation of female students is accounted for in the survey weights.
8There are two exceptions. The first is that when moving from the initial full sample to the one
restricted to students who are aged 18 to 25 and hold a general school-leaving certificate, parents
are more likely to have higher levels of education. This is expected because students with parents
who possess tertiary education are more likely to attend the highest school track (Gymnasium) at
lower secondary school (Müller & Schneider 2013). Moreover, the average rank in university major
for men reduces from 55.3 to 52.5. Restricting the sample further by dropping observations with
missing values on key variables does not change the mean values of any of the variables.
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which contains information on occupational group of all female and male employees
subject to social security contributions in Germany (Statistik der Bundesagentur
für Arbeit 2014). The median income by occupational group is used as a control
variable and is also obtained from the Federal Labour Office (Statistik der Bunde-
sagentur für Arbeit 2018). The NEPS does not have good information on earnings.
Therefore, estimates of average returns to major are obtained from the 2005 and
2009 DZHW Graduate Panel Survey (Brandt et al. 2018, Briedis et al. 2019), and
used as a control variable in a robustness check. The DZHW Graduate Panel Survey
is a four-yearly survey of higher education graduates administered by the German
Centre for Higher Education Research and Science Studies (DZHW). It enables to
study the transition of higher education graduate cohorts to professional careers.
Finally, I use data from Starting Cohort 4 of the National Educational Panel Survey
(NEPS-SC4) for a robustness check on the selectivity of the sample of university
students in the main dataset NEPS-SC5. NEPS-SC4 is a nationally representative
sample of students who were in grade 9 of compulsory education in the academic
year 2010/11, who are followed throughout their subsequent school careers (Blossfeld
& Roßbach 2011).
2.3.2 Methods
Before detailing the rank-based measures of gender-typicality in university major
and occupation in the next subsection, I describe the regression model. The re-
gression model resembles ‘rank-rank’ income regressions, which have been used in
research on relative mobility in income (Chetty et al. 2014). The following base-
line ‘rank-rank’ gender-typicality regression model, estimated via OLS, is used to
study the association between gender-typicality rank of the occupation that mother
and father held when the individual was aged 15 and the gender-typicality rank in
daughters’/sons’ university major:
Ri = β0 + β1RMi + β2RFi + β3Xi + β4Pi + δs + εi (2.1)
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where Ri is the gender-typicality rank of individual’s university major, RMi is the
femininity rank of the occupation the mother held when the individual was aged 15,
andRFi is the masculinity rank of the occupation the father held when the individual
was aged 15. Xi includes individual characteristics, namely seven age dummies, two
birth order dummies, three dummies for family structure growing up, and a binary
variable indicating 1st or 2nd generation immigrant. Pi are parental characteristics
and include mothers’ and fathers’ age, a binary variable indicating the parent was
employed when the individual was aged 15, three dummies for educational level,
and controls for the median income in mothers’ and fathers’ occupational group,
respectively. δs are federal state fixed effects. These variables are chosen to control,
as good as possible, for variables that are correlated with both the gender-typicality
rank in major and the gender-typicality rank in parental occupations. Summary
statistics of all variables are reported in Appendix 2.A in Table 2.A.2.
The regression model captures intergenerational positional changes by identifying
the correlation between parents’ and children’s position in their respective gender-
typicality distribution, holding constant key parental and individual characteristics
as well as federal state. All analyses are weighted using the cross-sectional sampling
weights for wave 1, to account for the complex sampling design and for non-response
(Zinn et al. 2017). Since parents’ behaviour may affect sons’ and daughters’ choices
in different ways, separate regressions are conducted for female and male students.
A key assumption of the regression model is that gender-typicality is linearly
transmitted from parent’s occupation to child’s major. Yet it is possible that the
transmission of gender-typicality occurs non-linearly or at certain points in the distri-
bution only. For example, it may be that only fathers in occupations with a relatively
low masculinity rank are associated with students’ rank in major. Similarly, it may
be possible that any associations hold only at certain points of the gender-typicality
rank distribution of university majors. To explore these potential non-linearities, I
therefore discuss results from quantile regressions and heterogeneous effects across
the distribution of key regressors (subsection 2.4.3). Nevertheless, I argue in the
next subsection that imposing linear transmission on rank-based measures possesses
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advantages compared to the two approaches used in existing research. The first uses
linear regressions with measures based on the share of women/men in occupations
and majors. The second uses categorical regressors, which necessarily use arbitrary
cutoffs of what constitutes a gender-typical occupation or major.
The analysis also suffers from a few data limitations. In particular, there is
no information on parents’ income or work hours, which would be useful to study
relative parental status (e.g. relative income) in more detail. Moreover, sibling sex
is not contained in the data, which has been identified as a relevant factor affecting
gender-stereotypical behaviour (Anelli & Peri 2015).
2.3.3 Measures of gender-typicality in university major and
in occupation
To measure the degree to which a university major is typically female, I rank each
female student relative to the population of all female students in the academic year
2010/11 in Germany based on the share of women in her university major. I call this
measure ‘daughters’ femininity percentile rank in university major’, or ‘daughters’
rank’ in short, and it takes values between 1 and 100. The femininity rank indicates
a female student’s relative position in the distribution of all female students, based
on the share of women in their university major. For example, a woman enrolled
in a psychology major at university is assigned a femininity rank of 85, indicating
that 15 percent of female students are enrolled in a major with a higher share of
women. Analogously, for male students, ‘masculinity rank in university major’ is
constructed based on the student’s relative position in the national distribution of
all male students’ share of men in university major.
Table 2.1 shows the 10 most common major choices for men and women, and
their respective rank measure. Since each person’s rank is based on the distribution
of students of the same sex, the measures are sex-specific. For example, Table 2.1
shows that the femininity rank of an economics major at university is 21, while the
masculinity rank of an economics major at university is 44.
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Table 2.1: Most common majors/occupations and their rank
Femininity Masculinity
Daughters’ university major rank Sons’ university major rank
1 Economics (FH) 31 Economics (Uni) 44
2 Economics (Uni) 21 Mechanical & process engineering (Uni) 84
3 Psychology (Uni) 85 Mechanical & process engineering (FH) 73
4 Law (Uni) 42 Economics (FH) 34
5 Human medicine (Uni) 56 Law (Uni) 24
6 Social sciences (Uni) 49 Computer science (FH) 78
7 German Studies (teaching) 90 Physics, astronomy (Uni) 68
8 Biology (Uni) 61 Industrial engineering & management, 60
economics focus (FH)
9 Social sector (FH) 82 Industrial engineering & management 61
economics focus (Uni)
10 German Studies (Uni) 78 Computer science (Uni) 89
Femininity Masculinity
Mothers’ occupation rank Fathers’ occupation rank
1 Office administrator 39 Businessman/manager 43
2 Primary/lower secondary school teacher 59 Primary/lower secondary school teacher 4
3 Nurse/midwife 66 IT professional 50
4 Stenographer/typist 92 Doctor 27
5 Salesperson 56 Office administrator 12
6 Kindergarden teacher 94 Unskilled worker 36
7 Social worker/social care worker 62 Architect/construction engineer 42
8 Doctor’s receptionist 99 Banking professional 19
9 Banking professional 22 Electrician 82
10 Doctor 13 Mechanical engineer 68
Sources: NEPS-SC5, author’s calculations. Notes: Uni indicates university, FH (Fachhochschule) indicates university of ap-
plied sciences.
As mentioned in Section 2.2, university majors are distinguished not only by
58 fields of study but also by 3 different degree types, namely, teaching degree,
university degree, and university of applied sciences degree. Their combination yields
134 distinct university majors, from which the femininity rank and masculinity rank
measures are constructed. In cases in which students declare more than one major,
I use the one they declare as their first major.
The key regressors are the femininity and masculinity percentile rank in the
occupation of mothers and fathers, respectively. There are 334 distinct occupational
groups based on the German occupational classification KldB88. Following the same
logic as for the dependent variables, I construct a measure of the degree to which
a mother’s occupation is typically female. Specifically, I rank mothers based on
the share of women in their occupation relative to all other employed women in
Germany.9 The ‘femininity rank of mothers’ occupation’ or ‘mothers’ rank’ takes
9The survey records the occupational group a parent held when the individual was aged 15. This
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values between 1 and 100, and higher numbers indicate a more ‘typically female’
occupation. For example, the rank associated with a mother who is a kindergarden
teacher is 94, indicating that 6 percent of mothers work in occupations with a higher
female share. On the other hand, the rank associated with a mother who is a doctor
is 13, suggesting that 87 percent of mothers work in occupations with a higher share
of women. I also construct measures for a masculinity rank in fathers’ occupations
in an analogous way, ranking fathers based on the share of men in their occupation
relative to all other employed men in Germany. By construction, the rank measures
follow a uniform distribution with mean and median 50.10
Students report information on the occupation that their parents held when they
were aged 15. Therefore, the measures capture the role of parental occupation during
adolescence for students’ gendered university major choices in early adulthood.11
The ten most common occupations for mothers and fathers and their respective
allows studying the association between gender-typicality of parental occupation during adolescence
for students’ gendered university major choices in early adulthood. To construct rank measures
for mothers’ (fathers’) occupations, I therefore use information on the female (male) share by
occupational group corresponding to the year in which the individual was aged 15. Since the
sample is restricted to individuals aged 18 to 25 in the year 2010, I use administrative data
(Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2014) on the female (male) share by occupational group
for one of the years in the period between 2000 and 2007, depending on each individual’s age.
While the sex composition of individual occupations may have changed by 2010, using data from
the year in which the individual was aged 15 best captures the degree of gender-typicality that the
occupation represented when the individual was an adolescent.
10There are important differences in the gender-typicality of different occupations across different
countries. Ideally, for the descendants of immigrants, I would therefore construct parental rank
measures based on the sex composition of occupations in their home country at the time when the
individual was aged 15. Unfortunately, this is not feasible given that country-specific occupational
classifications used in different countries are not easily matched to the German KldB88 classification
used in this paper. Moreover, while there is information on parental birth country, this is not
necessarily the same as what the parent considers their home country. I therefore include a dummy
taking a value of one for individuals who are first or second generation immigrants (based on
recorded birth country) in all analyses, and I perform a robustness check excluding those individuals
from the analysis (see Table 2.A.6).
11There may be concerns about the relevance of this measure if there is a high degree of occupa-
tional mobility among parents. However, I argue that the measure is appropriate for the purpose
of this paper for several reasons: First, capturing parental occupation at age 15 is meaningful as
the focus of this paper is studying the role of parental occupation during adolescence in the context
of gender socialisation. Second, the German labour market is characterised by low occupational
mobility (Aisenbrey & Brückner 2008). Third, the measure is based on 334 occupational groups,
which aggregate 1,991 different occupations of similar nature. Therefore, if parents switch occupa-
tion to a closely related one of similar nature, this would be captured within the same occupational
group.
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rank are shown in Table 2.1.
The generation of parents studied in this paper often follows a traditional gender
division of work. 17.6 percent of students’ mothers in the sample are ‘inactive’, that
is, they have not been employed since the student was born (as opposed to 0.9 per-
cent of fathers) and have therefore no occupation recorded in the survey. However,
excluding all these students from the analysis would lead to a highly biased sample,
leaving out those who have parents with the most gender-traditional household allo-
cation of work. Moreover, having an inactive mother has been shown to negatively
affect daughters’ labour force participation (e.g. Morrill & Morrill 2013). Similarly,
prior research has shown that the relative income of mothers compared to fathers is
related to the gender-typicality in sons’ major choices (Humlum et al. 2018). While
inactive mothers cannot transmit occupation-specific resources to their children,
their inactivity gives signals about appropriate gender roles to children, which may
translate into major choices.
Therefore, I create a fictitious profession corresponding to the parents who were
not employed in the period from the birth of the individual and the individual
reaching age 15. I calculate the gender-typicality rank based on the sex composition
of this fictitious profession.12 A robustness check performed in Section 2.4 shows
that their exclusion does not substantially alter results. To test the possibility that
growing up with a mother out of the labour force may directly affect students’
university major choices, I perform a robustness check with a dummy for mother
being inactive (see Table 2.A.7).
There are several advantages that these rank measures possess over alternative
measures used in prior research. Previous studies have operationalised the degree
to which occupations or majors are typically female by using the share of women
as a measure (Humlum et al. 2018, Vleuten et al. 2018). Figure 2.1 illustrates
how the female (male) share by major/occupation corresponds to the femininity
(masculinity) rank. Share-based measures have two undesired properties.
12The femininity rank for inactive mothers is 82 and the masculinity rank for inactive fathers is
2.
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Figure 2.1: Scatterplot: share- vs. rank-based measures of gender-typicality
Source: NEPS-SC5.
First, the share of women within a given occupation may depend on the structure
of occupational classifications. Specifically, the occupational classification KldB88
from the year 1988 reflects the occupational structures of the industrial society of the
1960s, with typically male occupations categorised into a higher number of smaller
groups compared to female occupations (Hausmann & Kleinert 2014). If typically
male occupations are systematically more detailed in occupational classifications
than typically female ones, this may bias the sex composition within occupations.
Specifically, it may partly explain why men tend to work in more segregated oc-
cupations while women bunch in a smaller number of occupations (Hausmann &
Kleinert 2014). Moreover, the sex distribution of occupations is more dispersed
than the distribution of university majors, partly due to the fact that the occupa-
tional classification is more detailed. Rank measures do not suffer from this problem
because they capture the position of individuals relative to others of the same cohort
and sex. A change in the sex composition of a university major affects the rank of
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a student only insofar as it alters the student’s position relative to the position of
others.
Second and more importantly, the share of women in an occupation is affected by
the sex composition of the workforce as a whole. That is, an increasing proportion
of women within a certain occupation may be explained by an increase in female
labour force participation, even if there is no change in the propensity of women
or men to choose that particular occupation (England et al. 2007). Therefore, the
fact that the overall female share among the 2010 university student population is
higher than the female share among the total workforce in their parents’ generation
is reflected in share-based measures. This complicates a meaningful interpretation
of share-based measures as measures of the concept ‘gender-typicality’ in a regres-
sion model as specified in equation 2.1. On the other hand, rank measures capture
positional mobility between parents and their children, whereby each person’s po-
sition is relative to others of the same sex and cohort. Therefore, coefficients from
a rank-rank regression model as in equation 2.1 have a meaningful and straightfor-
ward interpretation. Specifically, coefficients can be interpreted as the association
between a parent’s relative position in their sex-specific occupational rank distri-
bution and a student’s relative position in their sex-specific university major rank
distribution.
Occupations and university majors are also commonly categorised into ‘male-
dominated’ and ‘female-dominated’ ones. For example, majors (or occupations)
with a female share of 70 percent or above are often referred to as female-dominated,
while those with a female share below 30 percent are labelled as male-dominated
(e.g. Hausmann & Kleinert 2014). A key disadvantage of such categorisation is
that these cutoffs are arbitrary. This is especially problematic in regression analysis
because coefficients on binary or categorical regressors are interpreted relative to a
baseline category. Changing the cutoff then also necessarily changes the baseline.
For example, there is no theoretical reason for why estimating the effect of being
in an occupation with a female share of 70 percent or above (compared to the
baseline category of being in an occupation with a female share of less than 70
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percent) is more meaningful than, for example, estimating the effect of being in an
occupation with a female share of 66.67 (two thirds) percent (compared to being in
an occupation with a female share below 66.67 percent). A second key disadvantage
of categorical regressors, at least in the context of this paper’s focus, is that a
categorisation, independent of which cutoffs are chosen, implies a substantial loss of
information regarding the degree of gender-typicality of occupations.
In sum, rank measures have the advantage that they are independent of the
structure of occupational/major classifications and independent of the overall sex
composition of the population. Therefore, estimating a linear relationship between
parental and children’s rank in their respective distribution has a straightforward in-
terpretation. In the case of fathers and sons, for example, it captures the association
between a sons’ and a fathers’ relative position in their respective distribution.
2.3.4 Summary statistics
The left part of Table 2.2 presents selected summary statistics for key variables,
separately for sons and daughters. The average age of students is around 20 years,
and their average rank in major approximately 51. As mentioned in Section 2.2, this
is a sample of individuals who enter university and hence their parents are dispro-
portionately highly educated. Therefore, in order to check the degree of selectivity,
summary statistics are compared to those of NEPS-Starting cohort 4, a sample of
grade 9 students which includes the full population of students in regular schools.
These are reported in the right part of Table 2.2. The age difference between moth-
ers and fathers of the two cohorts corresponds approximately to the age difference
of the students across the two cohorts. Moreover, the share of mothers who were
not in employment since the student was born is similar across both cohorts. Not
surprisingly, the share of tertiary educated mothers and fathers in the undergrad-
uate student cohort (SC5) is much higher compared to the average parent in the
cohort of compulsory schooling grade 9 pupils (SC4). This is in line with previous
research which shows that intergenerational educational mobility is low in Germany
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(Heineck & Riphahn 2009).
Table 2.2: Selected summary statistics, comparison SC5 and SC4
Starting cohort 5 Starting cohort 4
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Rank in major 51.6 24.4 51.2 31.3
Age 20.5 1.2 20.2 1.5 14.8 0.6 14.8 0.7
Rank mother’s occupation 53.4 25.9 53.1 32.1 52.5 27 49 30.5
Rank father’s occupation 42.8 23.6 43.2 29.3 53.9 28.1 55.3 31.2
Mother inactive 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.16
Mother’s age 49.3 4.4 49.2 5.4 43.9 5.5 43.4 5.5
Father’s age 52.1 5.2 51.9 6.4 46.5 5.5 46.2 6
Mother: tertiary education 0.31 0.3 0.08 0.1
Father: tertiary education 0.44 0.42 0.12 0.09
Notes: Survey weights used. Mother inactive indicates that mother was not in employed in the time period
between the child’s birth and the child reaching age 15. Sources: NEPS-SC4 and NEPS-SC5.
By construction, the rank measures have a mean of 50 if they are nationally
representative. However, the highly educated parents of the study sample are not
nationally representative. Indeed, the femininity rank in mothers’ occupation is
slightly higher in the cohort of university students, while fathers’ rank is over 10
percentile points lower compared to starting cohort 4. This suggests that high-skilled
mothers’ occupations are more gender-typed while high-skilled fathers’ occupations
are less gender-typed compared to lower-skilled occupations. This can partly be
explained by the fact that many occupations with a very high share of men, such as
carpenters, truck drivers, and electricians, do not require tertiary education. A full
set of summary statistics are reported in Appendix 2.A in Table 2.A.2.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Main results
Panel A of Table 2.3 presents the main results on the relationship between gender-
typicality rank in parental occupation and masculinity rank in university major for
sons. Columns 1 to 3 do not include any controls or fixed effects. Column 1 considers
femininity rank in mothers’ occupation only, while column 2 includes masculinity
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Table 2.3: Baseline rank-rank regressions estimated via OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Subsample of sons. Dependent variable: Masculinity rank son’s major
Rank mother’s occup. 0.0192 0.0190 0.0112 -0.0027 -0.0125
(0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0160)
Rank father’s occup. 0.1226*** 0.1226*** 0.1260*** 0.1070*** 0.1129***
(0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0195)
Mother interm. schooling 0.7077 0.6125
(1.4142) (1.4064)
Mother high school 0.5955 0.5568
(1.6223) (1.5909)
Mother tertiary degree -2.1632 -2.2416
(1.5710) (1.5490)
Father interm. schooling 0.2406 0.3231
(1.5991) (1.6323)
Father high school -2.6718 -2.4875
(1.8445) (1.8231)
Father tertiary degree -1.1029 -0.8256
(1.6224) (1.6943)
Observations 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540
R-squared 0.0004 0.0141 0.0145 0.0432 0.0473 0.0573
Panel B. Subsample of daughters. Dependent variable: Femininity rank daughter’s major
Rank mother’s occup. 0.0176 0.0185 0.0115 0.0242 0.0258
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0165)
Rank father’s occup. -0.0452** -0.0456** -0.0517*** -0.0540*** -0.0547***
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0183)
Mother interm. schooling 1.7392 1.7473
(1.2968) (1.3004)
Mother high school 2.9125* 3.1032*
(1.6489) (1.6393)
Mother tertiary degree 3.3214** 3.4145**
(1.6213) (1.6192)
Father interm. schooling -1.2377 -1.2547
(1.2461) (1.2490)
Father high school -2.1357 -2.1735
(1.4909) (1.5084)
Father tertiary degree -1.8790 -1.7104
(1.2893) (1.3144)
Observations 6,100 6,100 6,100 6,100 6,100 6,100
R-squared 0.0003 0.0018 0.0021 0.0289 0.0311 0.0344
State FE no no no yes yes yes
Parental characteristics no no no no yes yes
Individual characteristics no no no no no yes
Parental income no no no no no yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the masculinity/femininity percentile rank
of sons’/daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and mas-
culinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating the parent was
employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers,
respectively) . Individual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when
growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background. Parental income is the natural
logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey weights used. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office,
Federal Statistical Office.
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rank in fathers’ occupation only. The coefficient on mothers’ rank in column 1 is
positive but not statistically significant. In contrast, column 2 reveals a positive
relationship between the degree to which fathers’ occupation is typically masculine
and the degree to which sons’ major is typically masculine. A 1 percentile (i.e. 1
unit in masculinity percentile rank) increase in fathers’ rank is associated with a 0.12
percentile increase in sons’ rank. Column 3 jointly includes mothers’ and fathers’
rank, and the coefficients stay almost identical. This suggests that fathers’ rank is
independently associated with sons’ rank and that assortative mating is not driving
the results.13
The size and significance of the estimated coefficient on father’s rank does not
vary substantially when progressively adding fixed effects and individual level con-
trols in columns 4 to 6. Column 4 includes federal state fixed effects. Column 5 adds
a set of parental characteristics, namely educational level, age, and a dummy for
being employed when their child was aged 15, for mothers and fathers, respectively.
Column 6 additionally controls for the natural logarithm of the median income in
mothers’ and fathers’ occupation. Column 6 also adds the following individual char-
acteristics: categorical variables for age, birth order, family structure when growing
up, and whether the individual has an immigrant background. The full set of coef-
ficients are presented in Appendix 2.A in Table 2.A.3.
The coefficient on fathers’ rank decreases slightly (from 0.123 to 0.113), but
remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In the most restrictive spec-
ification in column 6, a 24 percentile increase in fathers’ rank (corresponding to
one standard deviation, see Table 2.2) is associated with a 2.7 percentile increase in
sons’ rank, which corresponds to a 5 percent increase compared to the mean of sons’
rank in the sample. The positive same-sex relationship between fathers and sons is
compatible with both a direct transfer of resources as well as with a transmission
of gender roles. The coefficient on mothers’ rank becomes smaller and then turns
13Results from robustness checks in which interaction effects between rank in mothers’ occupation
and rank in fathers’ occupation are included confirm that there are no interactive effects between
mothers’ and fathers’ rank. Instead, they appear to operate independently from each other. These
results are shown in Table 2.A.5.
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negative as fixed effects and control variables are added (from 0.019 to -0.013) and
is never statistically significant. The level of education of mothers and fathers is not
associated with the masculinity rank in sons’ major, as shown in columns 5 and 6.
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the estimates for the sample of daughters. Section
2.2 mentioned that the transmission of gender roles happens primarily via the same-
sex parent. If a transmission of gender roles occurs, we would expect a positive
same-sex relationship between rank in mothers’ occupation and daughters’ major.
However, column 1 shows that the coefficient on mothers’ rank is positive but small
and not statistically significant. In contrast, column 2 indicates that fathers in more
typically masculine occupations have daughters in less typically feminine, that is,
more typically masculine majors. These findings stay very similar when mothers’
and fathers’ rank are jointly included (column 3) and when state fixed effects and
individual level controls are successively introduced (columns 4 to 6).
In the most restrictive specification in column 6, a one percentile increase in
fathers’ masculinity rank is associated with a decrease in daughters’ femininity rank
by 0.05 percentiles. An increase of one standard deviation in fathers’ rank (29
percentiles) is associated with a decrease in daughters’ rank by 1.6 percentiles, cor-
responding to a 3 percent fall compared to the mean femininity rank of daughters’
major in the sample. This coefficient is roughly half the size in absolute terms com-
pared to fathers’ rank in the specification for sons presented in column 6 of Panel
A. This negative opposite-sex relationship between fathers’ and daughters’ rank is
compatible with a direct transfer of resources between fathers and daughters. The
result that fathers’ - but not mothers’ - rank is associated with the degree to which
young women’s major choices are typically female may be related to the fact that
German families of the parental generation (typically 1950s/1960s birth cohorts)
often follow a traditional division of work in which the father is the main breadwin-
ner. Therefore, fathers may be more likely to transmit occupation-specific resources
to their daughters and/or act as a role model compared to mothers. In line with
this, the theory of direct transfer predicts that a child is more likely to draw upon
the resources of the higher-status parent (Vleuten et al. 2018). This will be further
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investigated in section 2.5.
Columns 5 and 6 of Panel B show that while fathers’ educational level is not asso-
ciated with the femininity rank in daughters’ major, mothers’ education is. Having a
mother with a high school degree and having a mother with tertiary education is as-
sociated with an increase in daughters’ rank in major by roughly 3.1 percentiles and
3.4 percentiles respectively, compared to having a mother with only basic school-
ing or less. The association between mothers and their daughters’ major choices
appears to operate not through mothers’ occupation but through their educational
level. Those mothers who have a high level of education are more likely to have
a successful career or high-status occupation, which may explain why the mother
effect operates through educational level in the context of a parental generation that
often follows a traditional male breadwinner model. This interpretation, highlight-
ing the importance of ‘parental status’, is supported by results from a heterogeneity
analysis in which mothers’ rank is interacted with a variable indicating that the
mother has tertiary education (see Table 2.7).14
2.4.2 Robustness checks
As mentioned in section 2.3, 17.6 percent of mothers were not in employment be-
tween their child’s birth and age of 15, and do not have an occupation recorded. A
traditional division of work in which the father works and the mother is not in em-
ployment, also known as ‘traditional male breadwinner’ model is common among the
parental generation, especially in West Germany (Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012).
Excluding these mothers would lead to a highly biased sample in which less tradi-
tional families are overrepresented. Therefore, these mothers for who information
on occupation is not recorded are assigned a femininity rank of 82, based on the fic-
titious occupation of ‘being inactive’. Correspondingly, inactive fathers are assigned
a masculinity rank of 2.
14In the remainder of the paper, I will present results using the specification with full set of fixed
effects and control variables. Where space permits, I will also include results without any control
variables.
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To analyse whether this decision affects results, a robustness check in which these
mothers and fathers without recorded occupation are excluded from the analysis is
conducted, and the results are presented in Table 2.4. Columns 1 and 2 show results
for sons and columns 3 and 4 those for daughters. While columns 1 and 3 present
results without any controls, columns 2 and 4 include the full set of controls and fixed
effects. The positive association between fathers’ rank and sons’ rank (columns 1 and
2) and the negative association between fathers’ rank and daughters’ rank (columns
3 and 4) both remain, and the size of coefficients is similar to those from the full
sample (see Table 2.3). The coefficient on mothers’ rank in the specification for sons
(columns 1 and 2) remains small and not statistically significant. Interestingly, the
positive coefficients on mothers’ rank in the sample of daughters (columns 3 and 4)
are slightly larger compared to those of the full sample, and the coefficient becomes
marginally significant at the 10 percent level in column 4.
Table 2.4: Robustness check: excluding mothers and fathers without recorded oc-
cupation
Dependent variable Sons: Masculinity rank major Daughters: Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank mother’s occupation 0.0010 -0.0209 0.0267 0.0329*
(0.0157) (0.0181) (0.0163) (0.0185)
Rank father’s occupation 0.1154*** 0.1057*** -0.0459** -0.0452**
(0.0230) (0.0216) (0.0205) (0.0198)
Observations 2,866 2,866 5,027 5,027
R-squared 0.0125 0.0573 0.0025 0.0365
State FE no yes no yes
Parental characteristics no yes no yes
Individual characteristics no yes no yes
Parental income no yes no yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank
of sons’/daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and
masculinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating the par-
ent was employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers
and fathers, respectively). Individual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family
structure when growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background. Parental
income is the natural logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Sur-
vey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources:
NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
The full specification for daughters in column 4 suggests that women choose
more typically female university majors if their mothers worked in more typically
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female occupations and if their fathers worked in less typically male occupations,
and the effect of fathers is slightly larger compared to that of mothers. Therefore,
the decision to include mothers without occupation in the main set of results masks
the positive effect of those mothers who have been in employment on their daughters’
major choices. This finding may again be related to the fact that parents often follow
a traditional division of work in which the father is the main breadwinner. Families
in which the mother has been employed are less likely to follow a male breadwinner
model; mothers are more likely to have a higher status, and are more likely to
transmit occupation-specific resources to their daughters and act as role models.
Nevertheless, the effect of fathers on daughters’ rank in major is still stronger than
the one of mothers. To further explore in how far the relevance of rank in mothers’
occupation depends upon their status, as suggested by the direct transfer theory,
additional analyses are presented in Section 2.5.
In Section 2.2 I discussed the concern that students’ major choices may not
accurately reflect their preferences. Specifically, students may not be able to study
their desired major due to admission criteria. The main admission criterion of majors
for which demand exceeds supply is high school GPA (Abiturnote). Therefore, Table
2.5 presents results from a robustness check in which the sample is restricted in one
of two ways. First, a sample in which only students with a high school GPA at
least as good as the median GPA of 2.2 are included (column 1 for sons and 3
for daughters); and second, a sample in which only students who indicate they
were able to realise their desired major are included (column 2 for sons and 4 for
daughters). The rationale is that students in these restricted samples are more
likely to have entered a major that represents their actual preferences. Results do
not change substantially compared to those considering the full sample of students.
Column 4 reveals that for the subsample of daughters who state that they were
able to realise their desired major, the positive coefficient on mothers’ rank becomes
weakly significant. Without further analysis, it is difficult to know why this weak
link appears but it is possible that daughters do draw on the occupation-specific
resources of their mothers if they are given the chance or alternatively, that the
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characteristics of mothers in this subsample of daughters differ from those in the
main sample.
Table 2.5: Robustness check: testing free choice
Sample GPA 2.2 Desired major GPA 2.2 Desired major
or better realised or better realised
Dependent variable Sons: Masculinity rank major Daughters: Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank mother’s occupation -0.0003 0.0031 0.0182 0.0394*
(0.0285) (0.0211) (0.0222) (0.0201)
Rank father’s occupation 0.1263*** 0.0993*** -0.0700*** -0.0820***
(0.0317) (0.0245) (0.0252) (0.0224)
Observations 1,591 2,316 3,053 4,033
R-squared 0.0817 0.0657 0.0504 0.0451
State FE yes yes yes yes
Parental characteristics yes yes yes yes
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes
Parental income yes yes yes yes
Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank of
sons’/daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and mas-
culinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating the parent
was employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and
fathers, respectively). Individual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family struc-
ture when growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background. Parental
income is the natural logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Sur-
vey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources:
NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
A number of additional robustness checks are performed and their results are
reported in Tables 2.A.6 and 2.A.7 of Appendix 2.A. Results from Table 2.A.6 show
that the main results are robust to various variations on the analysis sample, namely
including students with subject-specific school-leaving certificates (fachgebundene
Hochschulreife/Fachhochschulreife, columns 1 and 2), excluding students who study
towards a teaching degree (columns 3 and 4), including only those who grew up living
with both biological parents (columns 5 and 6), and excluding those who are first or
second generation immigrants (columns 7 and 8)15 . The robustness of results to the
inclusion of additional controls, some of which are potentially endogenous, is studied
in Table 2.A.7. Results do not change substantially when including fixed effects at
the level of administrative district (401 Landkreise, columns 1 and 2), or controlling
15The sex composition of parental occupations will vary by country and therefore I exclude those
who are foreign-born or have a foreign-born parent in this robustness check.
2.4. Results 46
for students’ high school GPA (columns 3 and 4), high school maths grade relative
to German grade (columns 5 and 6), average financial returns by major (columns
7 and 8)16, or a dummy indicating that the mother is inactive (columns 9 and
10). Moreover, the coefficients on the dummy indicating that the mother is inactive
are not statistically significant, suggesting that this variable is not independently
associated with rank in sons’ or daughters’ major.
Finally, to check how the selectivity of the sample of highly educated students
affects results, I use NEPS data of a sample of grade 9 school students (NEPS-
SC4). NEPS Starting Cohort 4 is a sample of a nationally representative cohort of
students in compulsory schooling. I estimate regressions of the probability to enter
university on fathers’ masculinity rank and mothers’ femininity rank in occupation.
The results are reported in Appendix 2.A in Table 2.A.8. Overall, results indicate
that the rank in parental occupation has no effect on sons’ and very small effects
on daughters’ likelihood to enter university. On the other hand and in line with
prior research documenting low intergenerational educational mobility (Heineck &
Riphahn 2009), there are large effects of parental level of education on sons’ and
daughters’ probability of starting a university degree and they are mainly same-
sex intergenerational correlations. Taken together, this subsection showed that the
paper’s main findings are robust to a number of robustness checks, including different
subsamples and additional control variables.
To sum up, results suggest that daughters choose more typically female university
majors if their fathers worked in less typically male occupations and if their mothers
worked in more typically female occupations. The positive same-sex correlation
between mothers and daughters is significant only when excluding mothers who
have not been employed since their child was born. Sons select more typically male
university majors if their fathers worked in more typically male majors, and this
16Average financial returns by major are obtained from regressions of the average salary paid in
the first job after graduation on group of university major, controlling for age and square of age at
graduation, federal state of the job, female dummy, dummy for having studied at FH (university
of applied sciences), and year of graduation. The underlying data are the 2005 and 2009 DZHW
Graduate Panel Survey.
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effect is roughly twice the size in absolute terms compared to the father-daughter
correlations. The association between mothers’ and sons’ ranks is close to zero and
never statistically significant.
The positive same-sex correlations are compatible with both a direct channel of
resource transfer and an indirect channel of the transmission of gender roles. In
contrast, the negative opposite-sex correlations between fathers and daughters are
only compatible with a direct transfer of resources. These potential channels will
be explored in more detail in section 2.5.
2.4.3 Non-linearity of intergenerational transmission
I next investigate how these findings vary across the distribution in the gender-
typicality rank of university major. Figure 2.2 presents the coefficients and 95
percent confidence intervals on rank in mother’s occupation (top panel) and father’s
occupation (bottom panel) from quantile regressions at the 10th to the 90th per-
centile of the distribution in major rank, for daughters (left-hand side) and sons
(right-hand side). All specifications include the full set of control variables. Overall,
the statistically significant positive father-son and negative father-daughter correla-
tions and the finding that mothers’ rank is not related to sons’ nor daughters’ major
choices holds across the majority of points in the distribution of rank in students’
major.
Moreover, the coefficient on mothers’ rank is quite stable across the different
quantiles in the distribution of daughters’ and sons’ rank in major. The size of the
father effect, on the other hand, varies across the distribution of rank in major. It
takes an approximate (albeit skewed) U-shape for the sample of daughters and a
(skewed) inverse U-shape for the sample of sons. For both the sample of daugh-
ters and the sample of sons, the coefficient on fathers’ rank is largest in terms of
absolute size between the 20th and the 50th percentile of the dependent variables.
This suggests that the effect of fathers’ rank is driven by daughters who choose
less typically feminine (gender-atypical) and by sons who choose less typically male
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Figure 2.2: Quantile regressions
Notes: Figures show coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from quantile regressions at
different quantiles of the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality
percentile rank of sons’/daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile
rank of mother’s occupation and masculinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. The full set
of control variables is included: age, a dummy indicating the parent was employed when offspring
aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers,
respectively), two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when growing up,
a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background, and natural
logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey
weights used. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
(gender-atypical) university majors. In particular, there appear to be stronger as-
sociations up until roughly the median of the distributions in sons’ and daughters’
rank. This suggests that the main results are driven by sons and daughters who
defy gender-stereotypical major choices.
Next, I explore whether the strength of these intergenerational associations not
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only varies across the distribution of the dependent variable, but also across the
distribution of the key regressors. To this end, I perform regressions in which I
interact the rank in mothers’ occupation with a binary variable taking a value of
one if the rank in mothers’ occupation is at least 50 (and zero otherwise), and
interact the rank in fathers’ occupation with a binary variable taking a value of one
if the rank in fathers’ occupation is at least 50 (and zero otherwise). I choose rank
50 as a cutoff to indicate a ‘gender-typical’ occupation as this roughly appears to be
the turning point for the dependent variables, as shown in Figure 2.2. The results
are presented in Table 2.6. In line with previous results, the coefficients on mothers’
rank do not appear statistically significant (neither for sons nor for daughters) and
this holds true for both the lower half as well as the upper half of the distribution in
mother’s rank. The coefficients on the interaction effect between mothers’ rank and
a dummy indicating rank is larger than 50 are not statistically significant either.
For fathers, on the other hand, there is again evidence for a non-linear effect in
intergenerational transmission. Results for the sample of sons (columns 1 and 2)
show that the positive association between father’s rank and sons’ rank is statis-
tically significant only for fathers with a rank below 50. For fathers with a rank
of 50 or above, the coefficient on fathers’ rank is close to zero and not statistically
significant (as indicated by the linear combination of estimates) and this difference
compared to fathers with a rank of at least 50 is statistically significant, as indicated
by the interaction effect. The results for the sample of daughters (columns 3 and
4) paint a similar picture. The negative association between masculinity rank in fa-
thers’ occupation and femininity rank in daughters’ major is statistically significant
only for fathers’ ranks up to 50. For ranks of 50 and higher, the coefficient is close
to zero and not statistically significant (linear combination of estimates) and this
difference is statistically significant, as indicated by the interaction effect.
Taken together, results from Figure 2.2 and Table 2.6 support the main take-
aways in terms of statistical significance and signs of key regressors from the linear
regression results presented in Table 2.3. Moreover, they reveal important non-linear
effects in intergenerational transmission. They show that the positive father-son
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correlations and the negative father-daughter correlations are driven by those in
gender-atypical occupations and university majors. Sons with fathers in gender-
atypical occupations choose less typically male university majors, thus breaking
gender stereotypes. Daughters with fathers in gender-atypical occupations choose
more typically female majors, though this effect seems to disappear for daughters
choosing majors with a very high femininity rank. These non-linearities are impor-
tant to bear in mind when interpreting the results and considering resulting policy
implications.
Table 2.6: Interaction effects to test linearity of intergenerational transmission
Dependent variable Sons: Masculinity rank major Daughters: Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank mother’s occup. 0.0773 0.0309 -0.0178 -0.0176
(0.0557) (0.0563) (0.0520) (0.0514)
Dummy rank mother ≥ 50 -5.8181* -2.7167 3.6310 2.3164
(3.3341) (3.5664) (2.9201) (2.9015)
Rank mother’s occup. x rank ≥ 50 0.0237 0.0011 -0.0154 0.0040
(0.0670) (0.0687) (0.0634) (0.0622)
Rank father’s occup 0.1551*** 0.1867*** -0.1398*** -0.1480***
(0.0428) (0.0415) (0.0364) (0.0374)
Dummy rank father ≥ 50 8.7344** 9.0137** -8.4503* -7.1802*
(4.2616) (4.5767) (4.4005) (4.0591)
Rank father’s occup. x rank ≥ 50 -0.1362* -0.1731** 0.1813*** 0.1654***
(0.0698) (0.0731) (0.0657) (0.0617)
Linear combination of estimates
Lincom mother 0.101** 0.0320 -0.0332 -0.0136
(0.0422) (0.0476) (0.0353) (0.0364)
Lincom father 0.0189 0.0136 0.0414 0.0174
(0.0570) (0.0596) (0.0585) (0.0533)
Observations 3,540 3,540 6,100 6,100
R-squared 0.0174 0.0596 0.0048 0.0364
State FE no yes no yes
Parental characteristics no yes no yes
Individual characteristics no yes no yes
Parental income no yes no yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank of
sons’/daughters’ university major. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating the parent was employed when
offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers, respectively). Indi-
vidual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when growing up, and a binary
variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background. Parental income is the natural logarithm of the median in-
come in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
In Section 2.3, I mentioned that categorial regressors have several disadvantages:
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they impose arbitrary cutoffs on what constitutes a gender-typical occupation, the
categorisation implies a significant loss in relevant information, and the interpreta-
tion of results is dependent on the choice of an arbitrary baseline category. Nev-
ertheless, as a robustness check, in Table 2.A.9 in Appendix 2.A, I present results
for categorical regressors. Results from these tables provide further support for
the interpretation that the father-son and father-daughter correlations are primarily
driven by fathers in less typically masculine occupations.17
2.5 Direct versus indirect channel of intergenera-
tional transmission
Section 2.2 described direct resource transfers and transmission of gender roles as
two potential channels that can account for the results presented in section 2.4. In
this section, I study the presence of these two channels through a number of different
heterogeneity analyses.
2.5.1 Direct transfer of resources
Results presented in the previous section showed that fathers’ - but generally not
mothers’ - rank is significantly correlated with the degree to which young women’s
and men’s major choices are typically female and male, respectively. Results also
revealed that mothers in more typically female occupations have daughters in more
typically female majors, if these mothers were employed at some stage while raising
17Specifically, I present results for categorical regressors, in which gender-typicality in parental
occupation can take one of three categories: Occupations with rank 30 or below are considered as
gender-atypical, those with rank 31 to 69 are considered as gender-neutral (omitted category in
regressions), and those with rank 70 or above are considered as gender-typical. The coefficient on
gender-atypical occupation of fathers is statistically significant but the coefficient on gender-typical
occupation is not. Specifically, daughters with a father in a gender-atypical occupation choose a
major with a 3.9 higher rank compared to those with fathers in a gender-neutral occupation
(column 6). Sons with a father in a gender-atypical occupation (compared to those with fathers in
a gender-neutral occupation) choose a major with a 6.6 lower gender-typicality rank (column 3).
Moreover, mother’s occupation is generally not related to students’ rank although the coefficient
on mothers in a gender-atypical occupation for the sample of daughters is negative and marginally
significant (column 4), in line with previous results.
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children. Taken together, these findings suggest that the more important role of
fathers in the study sample may be related to the fact that German families of the
parental generation often follow a traditional division of work in which the father is
the main breadwinner. That is, the father typically works full-time and the mother
does not work or works part-time (Holst & Wieber 2014). Indeed, according to the
theory of direct transfer (‘direct channel’), young adults are more likely to identify
with and use the resources of the higher-status parent (Vleuten et al. 2018).
To test the plausibility of a direct transfer of resources, I analyse whether results
vary across parental status. To do so, I perform three different heterogeneity analy-
ses, presented in Table 2.7.18 In the first, I interact mothers’ and fathers’ rank with
a dummy indicating whether they have tertiary education. The rationale is that
tertiary education is an indicator of social status and results from Table 2.3 showed
that mothers’ educational level is associated with daughters’ femininity rank in ma-
jor. In the second heterogeneity analysis, I interact the parental rank variables with
a dummy for whether the individual went to school in East Germany when aged 15.
The rationale behind this variable is that couples in East Germany on average have
a more equal division of work, which is a result of the differences in family policy be-
tween East and West Germany during the divided years (Bauernschuster & Rainer
2012, Holst & Wieber 2014). Specifically, while West German policy encouraged
a traditional male breadwinner model in which fathers worked and mothers stayed
at home, East German policy encouraged a reconciliation of motherhood and work
(Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012). Finally, I interact the parental rank variables with
a dummy for whether the individual grew up living with the mother only. While
this is a measure of intensity of parental contact, mothers in the sample who raise
children living without a partner are also more likely to have higher status. Specifi-
cally, they are more likely to possess a tertiary degree and be employed at the time
their daughter or son was 15.
18Ideally, heterogeneity analyses would study how results vary across different family working
time arrangements and relative parental income. Unfortunately, there is no information available
on whether a parent worked part-time or full-time or on parental income, so this is not possible. I
therefore conduct alternative heterogeneity analyses to proxy relative parental status.
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Table 2.7: Channel: direct transfer of resources
Dependent variable Sons: Masculinity rank major Daughters: Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rank mother’s occup. -0.0081 -0.0012 -0.0019 0.0133 0.0155 0.0251
(0.0194) (0.0185) (0.0164) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0170)
Mother tertiary degree -1.5331 1.3336
(2.6666) (2.1872)
Mother: tertiary x rank -0.0051 0.0383
(0.0407) (0.0311)
Rank father’s occup. 0.0759*** 0.1092*** 0.1111*** -0.0263 -0.0437** -0.0589***
(0.0230) (0.0202) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0200) (0.0194)
Father tertiary degree -6.6496*** 2.9826
(2.5014) (2.0209)
Father: tertiary x rank 0.1387*** -0.1159***
(0.0406) (0.0373)
Dummy East Germany -8.1227 17.4141***
(5.7517) (5.3234)
East x mother’s rank -0.0472 0.0462
(0.0326) (0.0373)
East x father’s rank 0.0151 -0.0475
(0.0418) (0.0399)
Mother only 5.5460 -1.4653
(4.3333) (4.0261)
M. only x mother’s rank -0.1668*** 0.0196
(0.0590) (0.0562)
M. only x father’s rank 0.0293 0.0627
(0.0651) (0.0575)
Linear combination of estimates
Lincom mother -0.0132 -0.0485* -0.169*** 0.0516* 0.0617* 0.0446
(0.0333) (0.0281) (0.0574) (0.0278) (0.0326) (0.0550)
Lincom father 0.215*** 0.124*** 0.140** -0.142*** -0.0912** 0.0038
(0.0344) (0.0404) (0.0647) (0.0350) (0.0366) (0.0538)
Observations 3,540 3,540 3,513 6,100 6,100 6,058
R-squared 0.0603 0.0577 0.0595 0.0366 0.0351 0.0344
State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Parental characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes
Parental income yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank of
sons’/daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and masculinity
percentile rank of father’s occupation. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating the parent was employed when
offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers, respectively). Indi-
vidual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when growing up, and a binary
variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background. Parental income is the natural logarithm of the median in-
come in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels
of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
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Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.7 present results for the sample of sons and columns 4 to
6 for daughters. Column 1 shows that mothers’ rank is not significantly associated
with sons’ major, independently of her educational level. The positive effect of
fathers’ masculinity rank on sons’ masculinity rank holds independently of fathers’
education, but it is significantly stronger if fathers have tertiary education. Column
2 shows that the effect of parental rank does not depend on whether the son grew
up living in East Germany. Finally, column 3 indicates that there is a positive
father-son correlation in masculinity rank, independently of whether the son grew
up living with both parents. However, the coefficient on the interaction between
mothers’ rank and the dummy variable of living with the mother only is negative
and statistically significant. Mothers in a more typically female occupation have
sons in less typically male majors, for those who grew up living with the mother
only.
Moving on to daughters, column 4 shows that the coefficients on mothers’ rank
and fathers’ rank, which show the effect for those mothers and fathers without a
tertiary degree, are not statistically significant. Fathers in more typically male oc-
cupations who have tertiary education, however, have daughters in less typically
female majors, and the interaction term is statistically significant. Moreover, moth-
ers in more typically female occupations who are tertiary-educated have daughters
in more typically female majors (the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10
percent level). However, the interaction term is not statistically significant. Col-
umn 5 presents the results distinguishing between East and West Germany. For
the sample of daughters going to school in West Germany, only the father-daughter
correlation is statistically significant. On the other hand, for those growing up in
East Germany the coefficient on mothers’ rank increases to 0.062 and becomes sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level (though the coefficient on the interaction term is not
statistically significant). Finally, column 6 shows that the negative father-daughter
correlation is only statistically significant for daughters who grew up living with
both parents. On the other hand, the coefficient on mothers’ rank is larger (but
imprecisely estimated) for daughters who grew up living with mothers only, even
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though the interaction term is not statistically significant.
In sum, the coefficient on fathers’ rank in the sample of sons is positive and
statistically significant independently of fathers’ status, but the effect size is sig-
nificantly larger when fathers have tertiary education. Sons’ choice is significantly
associated with mothers’ rank only if they grew up living with the mother only. This
could be explained by the higher intensity of contact with the mother, or by the fact
that single mothers on average have higher status. For daughters, the coefficient on
mothers’ rank is larger if the latter possess a tertiary degree, and if daughters grew
up living in the East or grew up living with the mother only, but the interaction
terms are not statistically significant. In contrast, the significant effect of fathers
on daughters disappears for fathers without tertiary education and for daughters
who grew up living with a mother only. Taken together, these results indicate that
parental status does indeed matter for the correlation between rank in parental
occupation and offspring’s major choice. This suggests that the direct transfer of
resources from parents to their children constitutes a relevant channel for the corre-
lation between gender-typicality rank in parental occupation and gender-typicality
rank in offsprings’ major.
2.5.2 Transmission of gender roles
Section 2.2 stated that, in addition to a direct resource transfer, a second ‘indirect
channel’ is likely present if children choose majors that are unrelated to their parents’
occupations and we still observe a significant association between gender-typicality
in parental occupation and gender-typicality in children’s majors. In such a case,
the possibility of direct resource transfers is much more limited, and therefore a
significant association can be interpreted as strong evidence for the transmission
of gender roles. Empirically, this can be tested by studying heterogeneous effects
across those children who choose majors that are related to the same field as their
parents’ occupations and those whose majors are unrelated to parents’ occupations.
To do so, it is necessary to map each major with an occupational field. The
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appropriate mapping of parental occupational fields to groups of majors is in many
cases not obvious. Therefore, I use a classification developed for the German Student
Survey, which maps university majors to occupational fields (see Georg & Bargel
2017).19 The mapping is shown in Table 2.8. The table shows that each of nine broad
groups of university majors are mapped to one of nine broad fields of occupations.
The broader the groups, the more likely it is that fields are sufficiently distinct from
each other so that the direct transfer of resources is indeed blocked as a channel
as good as possible. For example, all university majors within natural sciences,
mathematics, and computer science constitute one group and are mapped to all
occupations within the natural sciences sector, such as laboratory assistants.
Table 2.8: Mapping of occupations to university majors
University majors Occupations
Humanities, social sciences, theology, languages Print media, electronic media, librarianship, foreign
languages (e.g.journalism, publishing, librarianship)
Social sciences, education, pedagogy, psychology Education and social services (e.g. nursery school teacher,
social service provider, youth services)
Legal studies Administrative, legal, security (e.g. paralegal, police,
air traffic controller)
Economics and industrial engineering Commercial sector/trade/banking (e.g. administrative
assistant, actuary, trade association)
Medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy Health care, nursing, optometry, pharmacy (e.g. medical
assistant, medical technicians, opticians, dental technician)
Natural sciences, mathematics, computer science Natural science sector (e.g. chemical laboratory assistant,
laboratory assistant)
Engineering and architecture Technology, metallurgy, electronics, building, timber/
lumber industry, IT (e.g. locksmith, mechanic, electrician)
Agronomy, forestry, and nutritional science Nutrition, gastronomy/hotel, catering (e.g. baker, cook,
waiter); agriculture and home economics, horticulture
(e.g. gardener, florist, agricultural manager)
Fine arts, music, theatre, film school Fine art, design, music sector (e.g. photographer, interior
decorator, coutourier)
Other disciplines Other occupations
Source: Georg and Bargel (2017).
In addition to similarity of field, as demonstrated, direct resource transfer is more
likely if parents have a higher status. Therefore, I define a dummy variable called
‘direct transfer mother’ which takes a value of one if the following two conditions
are met: the mother has tertiary education and the student chooses a major that is
in the same broad field as mother’s occupation, according to Table 2.8. The variable
19The German Student Survey (Studierendensurvey) is a survey of students at German univer-
sities conducted by the research group on higher education at the University of Konstanz. It aims
to provide information on student orientations and the study situation, and has been conducted
regularly since the 1980s.
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takes a value of zero otherwise. I define a dummy variable called ‘direct transfer
father’ in the same way.
Table 2.9: Channel: transmission of gender roles
Dependent variable Sons: Daughters:
Masculinity rank major Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank mother’s occupation 0.0127 -0.0068 0.0100 0.0063
(0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0148) (0.0165)
Direct transfer mother -2.2087 -1.7456 -3.4149 -3.3175
(4.0679) (4.2721) (2.7905) (2.8414)
Direct transfer mother x mother’s rank -0.3789*** -0.3356*** 0.2678*** 0.2625***
(0.0919) (0.0960) (0.0625) (0.0598)
Rank father’s occupation 0.0784*** 0.0591*** -0.0187 -0.0219
(0.0218) (0.0204) (0.0184) (0.0177)
Direct transfer father -31.2764*** -29.7093*** 19.8305*** 18.5075***
(3.9216) (3.6297) (2.9039) (2.7351)
Direct transfer father x father’s rank 0.8146*** 0.8139*** -0.8228*** -0.8088***
(0.0748) (0.0731) (0.0750) (0.0708)
Linear combination of estimates
Lincom mother -0.366*** -0.342*** 0.278*** 0.269***
(0.0893) (0.0952) (0.0637) (0.0605)
Lincom father 0.893*** 0.873*** -0.842*** -0.831***
(0.0721) (0.0710) (0.0743) (0.0711)
Observations 3,540 3,540 6,100 6,100
R-squared 0.0599 0.0982 0.0326 0.0631
State FE no yes no yes
Parental characteristics no yes no yes
Individual characteristics no yes no yes
Parental income no yes no yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank
of sons’/daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and
masculinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Direct transfer indicates that major matches parents’ occupa-
tional group according to Table 2.8 and parent has tertiary education. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy
indicating the parent was employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each sep-
arately for mothers and fathers, respectively). Individual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three
dummies for family structure when growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant
background. Parental income is the natural logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational
group, respectively. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
Table 2.9 presents the results in which I interact mothers’ and fathers’ rank with
the ‘direct transfer’ variables. The table reports results for sons without any controls
(column 1) and with federal state fixed effects and individual level controls (column
2), and for daughters without and with controls (columns 3 and 4, respectively). The
coefficients on the interaction effects between parental rank and the ‘direct transfer’
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indicators are statistically significant and large in absolute terms in all cases. The
linear combination of estimates shown at the bottom of the table indicates that in the
cases in which ‘direct transfer’ occurs, there is a positive and statistically significant
same-sex association between rank of fathers and sons, as well as between mothers
and daughters. Moreover, there is a negative and significant opposite-sex association
between mothers and sons, as well as between fathers and daughters. The effects are
quite large compared to the main results reported in section 2.4. For example, for
daughters who choose a major in which direct transfer from the father occurs, a one
percentile increase in fathers’ masculinity rank is associated with a 0.83 decrease in
daughters’ femininity rank in major.
In contrast, the coefficients on mothers’ rank and fathers’ rank are not statis-
tically significant in most cases. This means that in those cases where the ‘direct
transfer’ is blocked, mothers’ and fathers’ rank are not significantly associated with
offsprings’ choices. The only exception is the coefficient on fathers’ rank in the sam-
ple of sons. In the full specification in column 2 it takes a value of approximately
0.06, suggesting that in those cases where sons choose a major where the direct trans-
fer of resources is unlikely to occur, a one percentile increase in fathers’ masculinity
rank is associated with a 0.06 increase in masculinity rank in sons’ major.
Overall, the ‘direct transfer of resources’ channel seems to account for a large part
of the results. There is no direct evidence for the existence of an ‘indirect channel’
for the associations between fathers and daughters, mothers and daughters, as well
as mothers and sons. However, a transmission of gender roles may still occur within
the group of students who choose a major closely related to parental occupation.
Given the broad categories of the mapping of majors to occupations, the potential
importance of this possibility should not be discarded. Moreover, there is strong
evidence of the transmission of gender roles as a relevant channel for the associations
in masculinity rank between fathers’ occupations and sons’ majors.
2.6. Discussion and conclusion 59
2.6 Discussion and conclusion
Using data of a nationally representative cohort of first-year undergraduate students
in Germany, I have focused on the role of parental socialisation during adolescence for
gendered university major choices in early adulthood. I examined whether femininity
of mothers’ occupation and masculinity of fathers’ occupation are related to whether
their adult children choose typically male or female majors at university, and if so,
why. To operationalise femininity and masculinity in occupations and majors, I
construct novel percentile rank measures. These define the degree of masculinity or
femininity in majors and occupations relative to others of the same cohort and sex.
The findings indicate that the gender-typicality rank in parental occupation mat-
ters for students’ gendered university major choices. I find that daughters choose
more typically female university majors if their fathers worked in less typically male
occupations when the daughters were teenagers. An increase of one standard de-
viation in fathers’ masculinity rank (29 percentiles) decreases daughters’ rank by 3
percent (1.6 percentiles). I also find that daughters choose more typically female
majors if their mothers worked in more typically female occupations, given certain
conditions: if those mothers were in employment after the birth of their daughter,
if mothers possess tertiary education, if daughters grew up living in East Germany,
or in cases where a ‘direct transfer of resources’ is possible.
Sons select less typically male university majors if their fathers worked in less
typically male occupations but they are not influenced by their mothers’ occupa-
tion. A one standard deviation increase in fathers’ masculinity rank (24 percentiles)
is associated with a 5 percent increase in masculinity rank of sons’ major (2.7 per-
centiles). As one would expect, the size of coefficients is considerably smaller com-
pared to those of intergenerational income rank correlations found in the literature
(e.g. Chetty et al. 2014). While the effect sizes are modest, I identified a consis-
tent and robust association despite only considering one specific aspect of parental
behaviour.
Results from quantile regressions and heterogeneity analyses show that the posi-
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tive father-son correlations and the negative father-daughter correlations are driven
by those in gender-atypical occupations and university majors. These results sug-
gest that fathers in gender-atypical occupations can help break gender stereotypes
and that the findings of the paper are at least partially driven by sons and daughters
who defy gender-stereotypical major choices.
It is important to note that intergenerational transmission is not the same for
mothers and fathers: heterogeneity analyses by parental education showed that
fathers’ rank is significantly associated with sons’ rank independently of their status
but with daughters’ rank only if they have a tertiary degree. Mothers often have less
successful careers than fathers and lower levels of education; their rank in occupation
is only significantly associated with daughters’ rank under certain conditions, and
is not correlated with sons’ rank. These asymmetries highlight the need to study
both same-sex and opposite-sex intergenerational correlations between mothers and
fathers on the one hand, and daughters and sons on the other hand. Much of
previous research on intergenerational transmission of income and education has
focused solely on fathers (e.g. Lefgren et al. 2012).
I identified two distinct channels through which these intergenerational corre-
lations can operate, a direct transfer of resources and a transmission of gender
roles. Large intergenerational correlations for children that choose a major related
to parental occupational field suggest that the direct transfer of resources plays an
important role. Moreover, intergenerational correlations are stronger if parents have
a higher status, measured for example by parental educational level. This provides
additional support for a direct transfer of resources as children are more likely to
draw upon the resources of a higher status parent (Vleuten et al. 2018). For daugh-
ters in particular, parental status mediates whether there is a significant correlation
with mothers or with fathers, or both.
An analysis of intergenerational correlations for children who chose majors un-
related to the occupational group of their parents was conducted to identify the
transmission of gender roles. Significant father-son correlations provided support
for a transmission of gender roles. Dominant cultural gender beliefs and stereotypes
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thus lead to a reproduction of sex segregation in the labour market through the
“different and seemingly voluntary choices men and women make” (Correll 2001,
p. 1725). On the other hand, results suggest that fathers in gender-atypical oc-
cupations can help break gender stereotypes and encourage sons to choose a more
gender-atypical university major. While the paper did not identify direct evidence
of the transmission of gender roles between mothers and daughters, it may still oc-
cur within the group of students who choose a major closely related to parental
occupation.
The finding that a transmission of gender roles occurs predominantly between
fathers and sons is in line with the observation that despite the increasing number
of women entering male-dominated occupations, men continue to be reluctant to
enter into female-dominated occupations (England 2010). Previous research also
suggests that male gender norms are more restrictive (Koenig 2018). This points
to a shortcoming of existing literature on intergenerational transmission of gender
roles, where the predominant focus has been on women (e.g. van Putten et al. 2008,
Morrill & Morrill 2013, Fernández & Fogli 2009, Olivetti et al. 2020). In light of
this, the finding that the positive association between rank in father’s occupation
and rank in sons’ major is primarily driven by fathers and sons in less typically
masculine occupations/majors is therefore especially encouraging.
Germany constitutes an interesting context for examining the role of parental
occupation for gendered major choices. This is because it provides a relatively
traditional setting in which a high share of mothers in the parental generation did
not work after having children and in which fathers are more likely to have a higher-
status career and higher level of education than mothers.
This traditional gender norms setting may explain why the findings of this paper
contrast those from previous research in the Nordic countries. A study in Denmark
(Humlum et al. 2018) identifies positive same-sex intergenerational correlations for
both sons’ and daughters’ sex composition in major. Previous research from the
Netherlands (Vleuten et al. 2018) has found that mothers in typically female occu-
pations affect both sons’ and daughters’ field of study choices in secondary school,
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and that fathers’ occupation matters less. The larger role played by mothers’ be-
haviour could be due to the fact that the Nordic countries are more gender-equal.
Another possibility is that especially the relevance of mothers in the Dutch context
may be due to the fact that the study focuses on field of study choices in secondary
school, and it is possible that mothers are more influential role models when children
are at a younger age.
The results from this study have important implications. First, the relevance of
parental occupation shows the importance of policies that address roots of segre-
gation that happen early in life through socialisation. One example is to invest in
educational programmes designed to encourage ‘atypical’ choices among teenagers
and to promote new role models, as showcased by initiatives such as ‘Girls’ day’
and ‘New pathways for boys’ in Germany (Bettio & Verashchagina 2009). These
initiatives intend to widen the occupational aspirations of girls and boys. Results
from this paper suggest that especially men in ‘gender-atypical’ occupations may
encourage boys to aspire to less typically male occupations.
Second, the interactive effect of parental status with masculinity/femininity in
parental occupation implies that high-status parents can serve as role models inde-
pendent of whether they are of the same gender as their child. It also highlights the
fact that successful role model identification is contingent on status and perceived
desirability.
Third, while it is important to encourage women to enter highly paid STEM
fields, policy should also aim at changing men’s attitudes and encouraging them to
enter traditionally female-dominated fields. Results from this paper suggest that one
avenue could be to stimulate men’s interest in typically female fields by challenging
traditional stereotypes.
Finally, the findings speak to Charles and Bradley’s (2009) argument that higher
levels of gender equality in terms of female labour force participation and gender pay
gaps does not necessarily come hand in hand with a disappearance of gendered major
and occupational choices. To the contrary, the authors argue that privilege and
economic development create opportunities for the expression of ‘gendered selves’.
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That is, as women in Germany have more equal careers compared to their male
counterparts and achieve a higher status, perhaps we will see more rather than less
sex segregation. The finding that higher levels of mothers’ education are associated
to daughters choosing more typically female majors supports this notion. Therefore,
breaking gender stereotypes from early on becomes all the more important and
progress should not be expected to happen automatically.
This paper has focused in detail on gender-typicality in parental occupation, a
previously unexplored determinant of the persistence of gendered university major
choices in Germany. Future research could extend this in various ways. Specifically,
the paper has focused on choice of major when entering university. It would be
interesting to study how gender-typicality of parental occupation and entry to a
gender-typical major affect the probability to drop out, switch major, and success-
fully obtain a university degree. With regards to external validity, it is possible that
results are different among individuals with lower levels of education. Therefore,
future research could explore whether the intergenerational transmission and its
underlying channels are different when studying for example vocational education
choices. Moreover, findings from this paper suggest important non-linearities in in-
tergenerational associations. Future research could build on the rank measure used
in this paper by further modeling non-linear relationships in ways that do not im-
pose arbitrary cutoffs in what constitutes a gender-typical occupation or university
major. Finally, most papers including this one, focus on one specific determinant
of major choice. Future research that considers the relative importance of different
socialisation agents, including peers and teachers, would therefore be valuable.
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Table 2.A.1: Sample selection
Aged 18 to 25 with Final sample: missing obs.
Initial full sample general school leaving certificate on key covariates dropped
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Mother employed 0.71 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.71 0.74
Father employed 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95
Mother lower secondary or less 0.2 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16
Mother intermediate secondary 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36
Mother upper secondary 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18
Mother tertiary degree 0.25 0.27 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.30
Father lower secondary or less 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.2 0.18 0.19
Father intermediate secondary 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.25
Father upper secondary 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14
Father tertiary degree 0.38 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.42
School aged 15 in East Germany 0.2 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20
Gender-typicality rank major 55.3 24.7 50.8 32.1 52.5 24.4 50.3 31.3 51.6 24.4 51.2 31.3
Age 21.7 3.4 21.5 4.8 20.5 1.2 20.2 1.5 20.5 1.2 20.2 1.5
Rank mother’s occupation 54.6 26 53.8 32.4 53.3 25.9 53.2 31.9 53.4 25.9 53.1 32.1
Rank father’s occupation 44.4 24.1 43.8 30.1 42.9 23.7 43.1 29.4 42.8 23.6 43.2 29.3
Mother’s age 50 5.5 50.1 6.9 49.2 4.5 49.2 5.4 49.3 4.4 49.2 5.4
Father’s age 53 6.2 52.9 7.7 52.2 5.4 51.9 6.4 52.1 5.2 51.9 6.4
N 7,082 10,828 5,169 8,881 3,540 6,100
Notes: Lower secondary school or less means Hauptschulabschluss or no secondary school leaving certificate. Intermediate secondary means Mittlere Reife. Upper
secondary means general or subject-linked school leaving certificate (Allgemeine Hochschulreife or Fachhochschulreife). Survey weights used. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: NEPS-SC5.
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Table 2.A.2: Summary statistics
Men Women Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Gender-typicality percentile rank in major 51.6 24.4 51.2 31.3 51.4 28.2
Dummy university of applied sciences (FH) 0.277 0.209 0.240
Dummy teaching degree 0.067 0.164 0.119
Age 20.5 1.2 20.2 1.5 20.3 1.4
Femininity rank of mother’s occup. 53.4 25.9 53.1 32.1 53.2 29.3
Masculinity rank of father’s occup. 42.8 23.6 43.2 29.3 43 26.8
Mother’s age 49.3 4.4 49.2 5.4 49.3 5
Father’s age 52.1 5.2 51.9 6.4 52 5.8
Mother inactive 0.187 0.167 0.176
Father inactive 0.007 0.010 0.009
Mother employed 0.711 0.736 0.725
Father employed 0.964 0.953 0.958
Mother lower secondary or less 0.146 0.158 0.152
Mother intermediate secondary 0.371 0.364 0.367
Mother upper secondary 0.174 0.178 0.176
Mother tertiary degree 0.309 0.301 0.305
Father lower secondary or less 0.180 0.193 0.187
Father intermediate secondary 0.258 0.252 0.255
Father upper secondary 0.125 0.138 0.132
Father tertiary degree 0.437 0.417 0.426
Ln median income in mother’s occup. group 6.4 2.8 6.6 3.2 6.5 3
Ln median income in father’s occup. group 8 0.7 7.9 0.9 8 0.8
Birth order: first born 0.377 0.377 0.377
Birth order: second or higher born 0.480 0.489 0.485
Birth order: only child 0.143 0.134 0.138
Grew up living w. biological parents 0.906 0.896 0.901
Grew up living w. mother only 0.064 0.066 0.065
Grew up living w. mother & stepfather 0.022 0.030 0.026
Grew up living w. other 0.008 0.009 0.008
Dummy 1st or 2nd generation immigrant 0.152 0.149 0.150
Dummy school at age 15 in East Germany 0.197 0.199 0.198
Notes: Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Mother/father inactive means that they have not been employed in the period between the birth of the
individual and the individual reaching age 15. Lower secondary school or less means Hauptschulabschluss or
no secondary school leaving certificate. Intermediate secondary means Mittlere Reife. Upper secondary means
general or subject-linked school leaving certificate (Allgemeine Hochschulreife or Fachhochschulreife). Source:
NEPS-SC5.
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Table 2.A.3: Full set of coefficients of baseline rank-rank regressions, sons
Dependent variable Sons: Masculinity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rank mother’s occupation 0.0192 0.0190 0.0112 -0.0027 -0.0125
(0.0155) (0.0157) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0160)
Rank father’s occupation 0.1226*** 0.1226*** 0.1260*** 0.1070*** 0.1129***
(0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0195)
Mother’s age -0.1034 -0.0387
(0.1224) (0.1258)
Father’s age 0.0773 0.0914
(0.1019) (0.1065)
Mother employed -1.1075 0.4540
(1.2416) (1.5809)
Father employed 0.6364 2.6121
(2.2604) (2.3148)
Mother intermediate schooling 0.7077 0.6125
(1.4142) (1.4064)
Mother high school 0.5955 0.5568
(1.6223) (1.5909)
Mother tertiary degree -2.1632 -2.2416
(1.5710) (1.5490)
Father intermediate schooling 0.2406 0.3231
(1.5991) (1.6323)
Father high school -2.6718 -2.4875
(1.8445) (1.8231)




















Grew up w. mother only -2.1082
(1.8578)
Grew up w. mother & stepfather -8.1363***
(2.9130)




Mother ln median income in occup. -0.3280
(0.2448)
Father ln median income in occup. -1.2612**
(0.5767)
Observations 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540
R-squared 0.0004 0.0141 0.0145 0.0432 0.0473 0.0573
State FE no no no yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank
of sons’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and masculinity
percentile rank of father’s occupation. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
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Table 2.A.4: Full set of coefficients of baseline rank-rank regressions, daughters
Dependent variable Daughters: Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rank mother’s occupation 0.0176 0.0185 0.0115 0.0242 0.0258
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0165)
Rank father’s occupation -0.0452** -0.0456** -0.0517*** -0.0540*** -0.0547***
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0183)
Mother’s age -0.0127 -0.0318
(0.1213) (0.1212)
Father’s age -0.0820 -0.0723
(0.1004) (0.1027)
Mother employed 1.4581 0.8289
(0.9441) (1.3499)
Father employed -1.4892 -1.0373
(1.8669) (2.0525)
Mother intermediate schooling 1.7392 1.7473
(1.2968) (1.3004)
Mother high school 2.9125* 3.1032*
(1.6489) (1.6393)
Mother tertiary degree 3.3214** 3.4145**
(1.6213) (1.6192)
Father intermediate schooling -1.2377 -1.2547
(1.2461) (1.2490)
Father high school -2.1357 -2.1735
(1.4909) (1.5084)




















Grew up w. mother only 2.2100
(1.4697)
Grew up w. mother & stepfather 0.9147
(2.1832)




Mother ln median income in occup. 0.1231
(0.2047)
Father ln median income in occup. -0.1158
(0.5621)
Observations 6,100 6,100 6,100 6,100 6,100 6,100
R-squared 0.0003 0.0018 0.0021 0.0289 0.0311 0.0344
State FE no no no yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank of
daughters’ university major. The key regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and masculin-
ity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
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Table 2.A.5: Interactive effect of mother’s and father’s gender-typicality rank in
occupation
Dependent variable Gender-typicality rank in major
Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank mother’s occupation -0.0245 0.0349
(0.0297) (0.0281)
Rank father’s occupation 0.0981** -0.0437
(0.0383) (0.0354)
Rank mother’s x father’s occup. 0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Dummy rank mother’s occup. ≥ 50 -1.3343 2.5344**
(1.0258) (1.0406)
Dummy rank father’s occup. ≥ 50 5.1224*** -0.8409
(1.4820) (1.5532)
Dummy mother’s x father’s rank ≥ 50 -0.5435 -1.7001
(1.7883) (2.0177)
Observations 3,540 3,540 6,100 6,100
R-squared 0.0574 0.0538 0.0344 0.0336
State FE yes yes yes yes
Parental characteristics yes yes yes yes
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes
Parental income yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality per-
centile rank of sons’/daughters’ university major. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating
the parent was employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each sep-
arately for mothers and fathers, respectively). Individual characteristics include two dummies for birth
order, three dummies for family structure when growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd
generation) immigrant background. Parental income is the natural logarithm of the median income in
mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parenthe-














Table 2.A.6: Additional variations on the analysis sample
Dependent variable Gender-typicality percentile rank in major
Sample All school leaving certificates No teaching degrees Biological parents only No immigrant background
Sons Daughters Sons Daughters Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rank mother’s occupation -0.0082 0.0199 -0.0058 0.0205 -0.0002 0.0253 -0.0079 0.0190
(0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0193) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0174)
Fank father’s occupation 0.1031*** -0.0417** 0.0974*** -0.0440** 0.1054*** -0.0604*** 0.1278*** -0.0619***
(0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0212) (0.0220) (0.0197) (0.0204) (0.0219) (0.0203)
Observations 4,341 6,748 2,715 3,387 3,218 5,502 3,063 5,266
R-squared 0.0663 0.0321 0.0657 0.0347 0.0552 0.0358 0.0649 0.0319
State FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Parental characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Parental income yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank of sons’/daughters’ university major. The key
regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and masculinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy
indicating the parent was employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers, respectively). Indi-
vidual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation)
immigrant background. Parental income is the natural logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey weights used.













Table 2.A.7: Additional control variables
Dependent variable Gender-typicality rank in major
Sample Sons Daughters Sons Daughters Sons Daughters Sons Daughters Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Rank mother’s occupation -0.0011 0.0256 -0.0147 0.0273 0.0026 0.0254 0.0037 0.0276* -0.0156 0.0332*
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0180) (0.0185)
Rank father’s occupation 0.1143*** -0.0543*** 0.1071*** -0.0520*** 0.1002*** -0.0532*** 0.0956*** -0.0490*** 0.1123*** -0.0536***
(0.0194) (0.0159) (0.0193) (0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0179) (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0194) (0.0183)
High school GPA 5.3453*** -2.4343
(1.4722) (1.5228)
Relative math grade 2.2674*** -1.7327***
(0.1815) (0.1712)
Expected income 71.81*** -61.76***
(8.67) (9.29)
Mother inactive -6.78 16.00
(14.92) (13.36)
Observations 3,538 6,092 3,529 6,092 3,491 6,001 3,540 6,100 3,540 6,100
R-squared 0.2040 0.1456 0.0703 0.0369 0.1317 0.0733 0.2536 0.1526 0.0574 0.0347
State FE Landkreis Landkreis yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Parental characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Parental income yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the gender-typicality percentile rank of sons’/daughters’ university major. The key
regressors are femininity percentile rank of mother’s occupation and masculinity percentile rank of father’s occupation. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy
indicating the parent was employed when offspring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers, respectively). In-
dividual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when growing up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd gener-
ation) immigrant background. Parental income is the natural logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. High school
GPA (Abiturnote) can take values from 1 to 6, with lower values indicating better GPA. Relative maths grade is maths grade minus german grade, each taking values
from 1 to 15, with higher values indicating better results. Expected income is obtained using earnings information by university major from the DZHW Graduate
Panel Survey. Mother inactive is defined as the mother not having been employed since the individual was born. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office, DZHW Graduate Panel Survey.
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Table 2.A.8: Probability to enter university (marginal effects after logit)
Dependent variable Enters uni and has obtained general school-leaving certificate
Sample Sons Daughters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rank mother’s occupation -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0008*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Rank father’s occupation -0.0010** -0.0000 -0.0022*** -0.0014***
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Mother intermediate schooling 0.0701*** 0.0297
(0.0222) (0.0234)
Mother high school 0.0420 0.1787***
(0.0280) (0.0509)
Mother tertiary degree 0.0415 0.1924***
(0.0369) (0.0669)
Father intermediate schooling -0.0171 -0.0395
(0.0225) (0.0325)
Father high school 0.1031*** 0.0323
(0.0359) (0.0502)
Father tertiary degree 0.1010** 0.0013
(0.0444) (0.0491)
Observations 1,731 1,731 1,799 1,799
State FE no yes no yes
Parental characteristics no yes no yes
Individual characteristics no yes no yes
Parental income no yes no yes
Notes: Sample includes all students who participated in all survey waves, and are aged between 14 and 16 in grade
9 of secondary school. Survey weights used. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: NEPS-SC4, Federal Labour Office.
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Table 2.A.9: Categorical regressors for gender-typicality in parental occupation
Dependent variable Sons: Masculinity rank major Daughters: Femininity rank major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
M: gender-atypical occup. 0.5547 0.8760 -1.9438** -1.7412*
(1.0252) (1.0578) (0.9709) (0.9855)
M: gender-typical occup. 2.6533** 0.5136 -0.7957 -0.1433
(1.1887) (1.4445) (1.0222) (1.2131)
F: gender-atypical occup. -6.7362*** -6.9068*** 4.3331*** 4.2126***
(1.1232) (1.0787) (0.9775) (0.9364)
F: gender-typical occup. 1.7773 0.6572 1.5384 0.6919
(1.5748) (1.5853) (1.3211) (1.2546)
Observations 3,540 3,540 6,100 6,100
R-squared 0.0195 0.0622 0.0053 0.0366
State FE no yes no yes
Parental characteristics no yes no yes
Individual characteristics no yes no yes
Parental income no yes no yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the femininity percentile rank of
daughters’ university major. For the regressors, M indicates mother and F indicates father; the omitted category
for regressors is gender-neutral (rank 31 to 69); gender atypical includes ranks 30 and lower; gender typical includes
ranks 70 and higher. Parental characteristics include age, a dummy indicating the parent was employed when off-
spring aged 15, three dummies for parental educational level (each separately for mothers and fathers, respectively).
Individual characteristics include two dummies for birth order, three dummies for family structure when growing
up, and a binary variable indicating (1st or 2nd generation) immigrant background. Parental income is the natu-
ral logarithm of the median income in mother’s and father’s occupational group, respectively. Survey weights used.
Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sources: NEPS-SC5, Federal
Labour Office, Federal Statistical Office.
Chapter 3
Parental leave and attitudes
towards gender roles
Abstract
In this paper, I study the effect of the 2007 paid parental leave reform in Germany
on the gender role attitudes of parents; specifically, attitudes towards the (i) gender
division of work, (ii) consequences of mothers’ labour force participation for chil-
dren’s wellbeing, and (iii) fathers’ appropriate roles. The new policy constituted a
paradigm change in German family policy away from support for a gender-traditional
division of work towards greater incentives for mothers’ paid work and fathers’ in-
volvement in childcare. I compare the attitudes of parents with a child born in the
two years before the reform (control group) to those with a child born within two
years after the reform (treatment group). I find that the reform increased support
for traditional gender roles for fathers, among parents affected by the reform com-
pared to parents before the reform. This effect is driven by a change in the attitudes
of men, and not women. I find no effect on the other two outcomes. These results
are in line with exposure as well as norm-setting effects. Results also inform the




Persistent differences in labour market outcomes between men and women remain
but their size varies across countries. Such cross-country differences are largely
driven by the behaviour of women at the transition to parenthood (Low & Sánchez-
Marcos 2015). Indeed, the start of parenthood marks the beginning of increasing
and lasting gender inequalities in earnings (Budig & Hodges 2010, Kleven et al.
2019).
Therefore, family policy, and in particular parental leave policy, plays an im-
portant role. Many high-income countries have implemented parental leave policies
that actively support a more gender-equal division of work within the family over
the last decade (Farré 2016). However, it remains unclear whether they are effective
measures to produce more gender-equal outcomes, especially when looking at effects
beyond the period of leave (Farré 2016, Olivetti & Petrongolo 2017).
One reason behind this may be that parenthood is surrounded by traditional
attitudes and norms about the appropriate roles of men and women concerning the
gender allocation of tasks (Grunow et al. 2007, Aisenbrey et al. 2009, Boll 2011,
Schober 2013). Therefore, in order to achieve the desired outcomes, policy changes
need to be accompanied by attitudinal changes (Farré 2016). This notion is sup-
ported by the growing literature that has established the relevance of gender role
attitudes for labour market behaviour (Fortin 2005, Farré & Vella 2013, Platt &
Polavieja 2016). What has been studied less is whether family policy can alter such
attitudes. This gap in the literature remains despite the fact that gender role at-
titudes are important indicators of the social climate concerning gender equality
(Blohm & Walter 2018).
In this paper, I study the impact of the 2007 paid parental leave reform in Ger-
many on the gender role attitudes (GRA) of parents; specifically, attitudes towards
(i) the gender division of work, (ii) the consequences of the labour force participation
of mothers for children’s wellbeing, and (iii) fathers’ appropriate roles. This policy
change constituted a paradigm change in German family policy away from support
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for a gender-traditional division of work towards greater incentives for women’s paid
work and father’s involvement in childcare (Lewis et al. 2008, Schober 2014).
The reform replaced a means-tested, small flat benefit aimed at parents below a
certain income threshold with an unconditional earnings-related benefit providing a
percentage of earnings while shortening the benefit duration from 24 to 12 months.
The reform also introduced an additional two months of benefits to couples in which
each parent takes at least two months of leave. The resulting policy created strong
incentives for fathers to take two months of leave that would have otherwise been
lost. Consequently, it also provided incentives for fathers to get more involved in
childcare and home-production tasks.
The reform constitutes a natural experiment because all parents with a child
born on or after January 1, 2007 were eligible for the new benefit and the reform
was introduced relatively quickly and unanticipated (Kluve & Schmitz 2018). To
estimate the effect of the reform on attitudes of parents in the medium term, I
use nationally representative data from the 2012 and 2016 German General Social
Survey (ALLBUS). I compare the attitudes of parents with a child born in the two
years before the reform (control group) to those with a child born within two years
after the reform (treatment group). Parents’ attitudes in both groups are recorded
at the same time and several years later, ensuring that both groups faced the same
macroeconomic, institutional, and cultural contexts. I conduct various robustness
checks to ensure that endogenous selection into treatment is not driving results.
Germany furnishes an interesting context for this paper as it is a country with
relatively conservative gender norms, especially when it comes to the compatibility
of motherhood and work (Lewis et al. 2008). Historically, (West) German family
policy has favoured the male breadwinner model, wherein men work and women take
care of household and children (Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012). The 2007 reform
constitutes a turning point in family policy by providing options for a more equal
sharing of responsibilities that were not previously available (Lewis et al. 2008).
Existing research argues that the new policy led to the emergence of a new social
norm in which mothers return to work after 12 months (i.e. quicker than before)
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and fathers take two months of parental leave (instead of none) (Unterhofer et al.
2017, Cygan-Rehm et al. 2018). This constitutes a move towards a more equal
gender division of leave albeit with mothers taking most of the leave and often
returning to work part-time. On the one hand, given the significant policy change,
one may expect that the reform also modernised parents’ attitudes towards the
appropriate roles of men and women more generally. On the other hand, the new
benefit may reinforce traditional attitudes as mothers still take the bulk of the leave
and return to work part-time more often. Indeed, the reform incentivised paternal
childcare involvement but not gender equality within the family more generally
(Schober 2014). Yet another view is that attitudes are formed early in life and
remain fairly stable after reaching adulthood, in which case the reform should not
have any effect on gender role attitudes (e.g. Krosnick & Alwin 1989). Thus, the
question of whether the reform modernised gender role attitudes warrants empirical
investigation. However, this has not been analysed in existing research.
Contrary to what one might at first expect, I find that the reform increased
support for traditional gender roles for fathers among parents affected by the re-
form, compared to parents before the reform. I find no effect on the other two
outcomes: attitudes towards the gender division of work, and attitudes towards the
consequences of the labour force participation of mothers. I also find that the reform
did not impact reported sharing of household and childcare activities. The effect on
increased support for traditional gender roles for fathers is driven by a change in
attitudes of men, and not women.
These results are robust to a number of robustness checks, paying particular
attention to the representativeness of the analysis sample and the possibility of
endogenous fertility. Checks include variations in the window of treatment and
control groups, the exclusion of births closely around the implementation of the
reform, additional control variables, placebo reforms, and accounting for birth order,
as well as balancing checks.
The failure of the reform to modernise attitudes of those directly affected by the
new benefit suggests that the policy changes may not have gone far enough to trigger
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deeply rooted, fundamental changes in gender role attitudes. In particular, while
the reform incentivised fathers’ leave-taking and mothers’ return to work, by no
means did it incentivise a gender-egalitarian household model. It may have thereby
cemented traditional beliefs in a modified way.
However, failure to identify an effect of the reform on attitudes of those eligible
for the new benefit does not rule out the possibility that the reform played part
in a more gradual change in attitudes. While difficult to identify empirically, it is
possible that the reform led to a modernisation of attitudes in society at large, and
not just of those directly affected by the new benefit. Attitudinal change may be
mediated through the normative messages surrounding the reform and transmitted
via the media and behaviour of peers and friends rather than direct own experience.
Indeed, as I show in a descriptive analysis, overall societal attitudes towards gender
roles have gradually and continually modernised over the last twenty years.
The finding that the reform made men’s attitudes towards the appropriate role of
fathers more traditional is in line with both exposure as well as norm-setting policy
feedback effects. For example, being offered the new benefit may have made fathers
aware of work-care conflicts, both through their own experience from leave-taking
as well as through the normative messages that the new policy carried. Mothers, on
the other hand, were already taking leave before the reform and hence they did not
have new experiences to the same extent that would have changed their identities.
This paper makes three contributions: First, it improves our understanding of
the policy feedback effects of parental leave policies on the gender role attitudes
of parents by providing the first analysis of the impacts of the 2007 parental leave
reform on parental attitudes. Second, it adds to the empirical literature on the
effects of the German reform by providing a potential mechanism for the economic
effects that previous research has identified. In particular, the fact that the reform
did not lead to a modernisation in attitudes may explain prior findings in the lit-
erature that the reform was successful in achieving increased leave-taking among
fathers and a quicker return to work among mothers but did not lead to significant
changes regarding gender equality in paid and unpaid work. Third, results from this
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paper inform the broader literature on whether individual attitudes change over the
life course, by suggesting that impressionability may not always run in the ‘right
direction’.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 details the in-
stitutional context and describes the parental leave reform in Germany. Section 3.3
discusses the relevant literature on parental leave and attitudinal change. Section
3.4 outlines the empirical strategy and data. Section 3.5 contains the results includ-
ing various robustness checks and heterogeneity analyses. The final section provides
a discussion of the findings and concludes.
3.2 The 2007 paid parental leave reform in Ger-
many
Parental leave policies are a central pillar of family policy and their design can play
an important role in shaping gender differences in the labour market and in the
household (Sjöberg 2004, Farré 2016). Today, most high-income countries have in
place gender-neutral parental leave policies that either mothers or fathers can take
(Olivetti & Petrongolo 2017). In addition, the majority of European countries have
introduced parental leave entitlements reserved exclusively to fathers over the last
decade, known as paternity leave or ‘daddy quota’ (Farré 2016). Daddy quotas are
designed to increase the involvement of fathers in childcare and housework activi-
ties. Given that women shoulder a disproportionate share of housework and that
housework negatively impacts wages (Bryan & Sevilla 2011), daddy quotas may
facilitate women’s opportunities in paid work and promote gender equality in the
labour market and at home (Farré & González 2019, Patnaik 2019).
For a long time, (West) German family policy promoted a traditional male bread-
winner model in which men do paid work and women focus on household and child-
care activities (Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012).1 Means-tested parental benefits
1While policy in the former German Democratic Republic supported a dual-worker model, after
reunification the behaviour of East German mothers adapted to that of West German mothers not
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called ‘child-rearing money’ (Erziehungsgeld) were in place from the mid-1980s. Be-
fore 2007, the parent taking leave received a flat rate of 300 Euro per month paid for
up to 24 months after childbirth if family income did not exceed a certain threshold.2
These incentives combined with traditional gender norms, particularly with regards
to the compatibility of motherhood and work, meant that mothers took relatively
long work interruptions (Bergemann & Riphahn 2015) and almost no fathers took
parental leave (Tamm 2019).
In 2007, this changed when a new parental leave benefit called ‘parents’ money’
(Elterngeld) was enacted. The reform constitutes a paradigm change in family
policy towards greater incentives for mothers’ employment. Given the relatively
conservative gender role attitudes in international comparison, “Germany appeared
to be taking a more radical lead in a contested policy area” (Lewis et al. 2008, p.276).
While attitudes towards gender roles have gradually become less traditional since
the 1980s (Blohm & Walter 2018), the introduction of the reform was not perceived
to have followed changes in gender norms. On the contrary, given a population that
used the term ‘raven mother’ to highlight that working women neglect their children,
the reform was considered premature by some (Geisler & Kreyenfeld 2019).
Under the new policy, all parents with a child born on or after the 1st of January
received the new benefit Elterngeld. The reform entailed several changes: (i) the
benefit period was shortened to up to 14 months; (ii) means testing was abolished;
(iii) the new benefit was earnings-related, replacing 67 percent of net earnings of
the parent taking up the leave, with a set minimum of EUR 300 and a maximum of
EUR 1,800; (iv) two of the 14 months of leave were exclusively reserved for fathers
and non-transferrable to mothers.3 Given that each parent took at least two months
of leave, couples were granted the 14 months. Otherwise, the two additional months
to return to the labour market after childbirth (Hanel & Riphahn 2011).
2Around 66 percent of parents received this benefit. Alternatively, parents could choose to
receive a benefit of 450 Euro per month for a period of up to 12 months. This alternative was
chosen by a minority of 10 percent of parents. 24 percent of parents were not eligible for the benefit
as their family income exceeded the maximum threshold (Kluve & Tamm 2013).
3Parents could choose to receive half of the benefit amount for a period of 24 months but only
about ten percent of recipients chose this option (Statistisches Bundesamt 2013). Single parents
receive 14 months of leave. The job protection period remained unchanged at three years.
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were lost. Apart from the requirement of two months’ minimum leave, couples could
freely choose how to split the leave. For example, they could use it simultaneously,
subsequently, or a mix of the two.
The reform had several aims. It intended to facilitate taking care of the own child
in the first year after childbirth. It also aimed to provide financial independence to
each parent, and to encourage a timely return of mothers to the labour force (i.e.
after 12 months). Finally, it was designed to increase fathers’ leave-taking and
involvement in childcare (Huebener et al. 2016).
Given these aims, the reform may have carried implicit normative messages of
shared parenting responsibilities and gender equal division of paid and unpaid work
(Schober 2014). The Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women,
and Youth (BMFSFJ) ran a large advertising campaign, raising awareness for the
introduction of Elterngeld (Unterhofer et al. 2017). This included billboards saying
“I learn crawling with mum. Then I learn walking with dad.” According to Unter-
hofer et al. (2017), the guiding principle behind this text was a model in which the
mother first takes parental leave, often for a year, followed by the father taking a
much shorter leave, often for the minimum duration of two months.
From the growing literature on the effects of the policy reform we have learned
that the main goals were largely met. That is, the reform successfully smoothed
household income in the first year after childbirth (Geyer et al. 2013), accelerated
mothers’ return to work (Bergemann & Riphahn 2015), and increased the share
of fathers taking leave from around 2.5 percent before the reform to 15 percent
in 2007 (Cygan-Rehm et al. 2018), thereafter gradually increasing each year to
39 percent in 2016 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2020). In so doing, several authors
argued that a new social norm emerged in which mothers return to work after 12
months of leave and fathers take 2 months of leave (e.g. Bergemann & Riphahn 2015,
Unterhofer et al. 2017, Cygan-Rehm et al. 2018). Such a social norms interpretation
is supported by the existence of peer effects in leave-taking (Welteke & Wrohlich
2019). Overall, these changes in behavioural patterns highlight that the reform was
successful, especially given the relatively conservative context.
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However, evidence on the reform’s effects on the division of labour within the
family are mixed. For example, as of 2016 the share of fathers taking parental leave
remained below 40 percent while over 90 percent of mothers took leave. Moreover,
the majority of fathers continues to take the minimum of two months while most
mothers take around 12 months of leave (Samtleben et al. 2019). While the new
benefit increased mothers’ employment probability in the second year after childbirth
and beyond, this is primarily driven by increases in part-time employment (Kluve
& Schmitz 2018). Finally, evidence on fathers’ involvement in and the division of
childcare and housework tasks among partners is mixed. While some find no effects
of the reform on fathers’ time devoted to childcare in the first 12 months after
birth (Kluve & Tamm 2013), others find support for increases in some aspects of
unpaid work (Schober 2014, Tamm 2019). Overall, a modified male breadwinner
model continues to dominate, in which fathers tend to work full-time and mothers
part-time while doing the majority of childcare and household tasks (OECD 2016).
These findings are broadly in line with international evidence on the economic
effects of parental leave policies, showing that leave duration has first-order effects on
mothers’ return to work decision but no consensus has emerged concerning its effects
on outcomes such as female employment, earnings, and fertility (Farré 2016, Olivetti
& Petrongolo 2017). While daddy quotas are an effective measure to increase fathers’
take-up of leave, few fathers take more leave than the minimum amount specified
and their ability to increase the long-term participation of fathers in domestic work
and childcare has not been confirmed in most countries (Ekberg et al. 2013, Farré
2016, Dunatchik & Özcan 2019, Patnaik 2019).
Given that cultural norms play an important role in the division of paid and
unpaid work among parents, it is not surprising that parental leave policies produce
mixed results. The effects of the Elterngeld in Germany may have been limited
by traditional attitudes and practices (Lewis et al. 2008, Schober 2014). A more
gender-equal division of roles also requires a change in attitudes towards gender
roles in paid and unpaid work (Farré 2016). It is unclear whether family policy
also changes attitudes. Therefore, the literature on the relationship between family
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policy and attitudinal change will be explored in the next section.
3.3 Parental leave and attitudinal change
Historically, the gender division of labour was characterised by a male breadwinner
norm in which fathers work full-time and mothers take care of the home and children.
Such a work division within families is guided by a large cultural component (Farré
2016). That is, it is deeply rooted in social norms concerning the appropriate roles of
men and women. Support for this notion is provided by research which shows that
less traditional attitudes towards the gender division of work strongly predict female
labour force participation and earnings across countries (Fortin 2005). Therefore,
a more equal sharing of responsibilities requires a change in attitudes towards the
appropriate roles of men and women in society (Farré 2016). Policy incentives may
need to be accompanied by attitudinal changes to achieve a more gender egalitarian
division of work. This raises the question how such attitudes change.
Attitudinal change
There are two main views about attitudinal change. One suggests that gender
role attitudes are formed early in life and remain fairly stable over the remaining
life course (Krosnick & Alwin 1989, Brooks & Bolzendahl 2004). It is assumed
that attitudinal change happens primarily via cohort replacement (e.g. Brewster
& Padavic 2000, Inglehart & Baker 2000). Such a view gives little weight for the
potential of policy reforms to impact individual attitudes.
A second view assumes that changes in the social structure or individual circum-
stances can alter an individual’s attitudes over the life course, even after reaching
adulthood (Brooks & Bolzendahl 2004, Baxter et al. 2015). Recent studies show
that individuals’ attitudes are susceptible to life events such as becoming parents
(Schober & Scott 2012, Baxter et al. 2015), parenting school-age daughters (Borrell-
Porta et al. 2019) and migrating (Breidahl & Larsen 2016), therefore providing
support to this view. Such an approach also supports the notion that policy reforms
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can trigger attitudinal change. However, there is little evidence to date on whether
policy reforms can lead to individual changes in gender role attitudes in the short
to medium term.
Previous studies on the impact of policy on attitudinal changes
Several studies have emphasised the role of culture and policy institutions for shaping
(both stated and revealed) preferences regarding gender roles and female labour force
participation (e.g. Fernández & Fogli 2009, Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012, Alesina
et al. 2013, Beblo & Görges 2018). While “culture and institutions [are thought to]
interact and evolve in a complementary way, with mutual feedback effects” (Alesina
& Giuliano 2015, p. 938), these studies emphasise the slow and steady process of
their role in shaping preferences and attitudes, as well as their persistence over the
long term.
In line with this, at the cross-country level, respondents in countries or political
regimes with more gender-equal family policies have more positive attitudes towards
female labour force participation (Sundstrom 1999, Sjöberg 2004, Bauernschuster &
Rainer 2012). However, when considering solely the generosity of parental leave
provisions (as one pillar of family policy), there is no clear cross-country association
with gender role attitudes (Olivetti & Petrongolo 2017).
At the national level, the introduction of parental leave policies is often accom-
panied by or has followed changes in a country’s gender social norms (Olivetti &
Petrongolo 2017). Only a few studies have examined the impact of specific family
policy changes on attitudes at the micro level. These have produced mixed results
and no consensus has emerged. For example, the introduction of daddy months in
Norway had no effect on parents’ attitudes towards gender roles but led to lower
levels of reported conflicts over the household division of labour and a more equal
division of some household tasks (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011). Another study fo-
cused on Norway found that the increase in childcare availability was associated with
a significant shift in mother’s attitudes towards the suitability of institutional care
(Ellingsæter et al. 2017). Pedulla & Thébaud (2015) conduct a survey experiment
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in which respondents are asked about their preferred relationship structure under
varying degrees of institutional constraints. The results show that young adults’
preferences are responsive to work-family policy interventions and that most people
prefer an egalitarian relationship structure if institutional constraints are removed.
Gangl & Ziefle (2015) study several extensions in parental leave entitlements in
Germany during the 1990s and early 2000s. They find that more generous leave
entitlements led to a decline in mothers’ subjective work commitment. Unterhofer
& Wrohlich (2017) show that the 2007 parental leave reform changed grandparents’
gender role attitudes. Specifically, mothers of sons who took parental leave expressed
lower levels of agreement with a traditional gender division of work.
Moreover, attitudinal change can also run in the unintended direction. In Ger-
many, a recent study looked at the expansion of public childcare and found that it
had contradictory effects: While childcare expansion has been associated with less
traditional gender role attitudes among mothers in West Germany, it was associ-
ated with more traditional attitudes among East German mothers (Zoch & Schober
2018). Another example of unintended consequences, while not focusing on gender
role attitudes is a recent paper by Farré & González (2019). It shows that the in-
troduction of two weeks of paternity leave in Spain did not only lower subsequent
fertility but also lowered the desired fertility reported by men. To date, there is no
evidence on whether the 2007 German parental leave reform altered parents’ gender
role attitudes.
Mechanisms of attitudinal change
The idea that family policy reforms can trigger shifts in individual attitudes is in
line with the concept of policy feedback effects. Policy feedback effects occur when
policy changes lead to attitudinal changes through the feedback effects that new
policies create on the society which they have originated from (Svallfors 2010). The
literature distinguishes between two mechanisms through which policy reforms can
alter attitudes: direct exposure effects on the one hand, and norm-setting effects
on the other hand (e.g. Sjöberg 2004, Gangl & Ziefle 2015, Zoch & Schober 2018).
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According to exposure effects, the direct exposure to a new policy can lead to atti-
tudinal change (Gangl & Ziefle 2015). Policy feedback effects that operate via direct
exposure mechanisms are expected to be limited to those who are directly affected
by a policy change. Similar to theories of exposure, according to identity theories
(e.g. Stryker & Burke 2000), novel experiences such as a father’s leave-taking or a
mother’s breadwinning may change their gender role identities. For example, in-
creased exposure to childcare and domestic tasks may strengthen men’s parenting
identities and practices (Schober 2014). On the other hand, it may also make fa-
thers realise the opportunity costs of taking leave and they may experience conflicts
between work and care they were previously unaware of. In the context of the
2007 parental leave reform, both exposure and identity theories would predict that
parents with a child born on or after 1 January 2007 may change their attitudes
in response to the new benefit, as they were directly affected by it (as opposed to
parents who had a child born before 2007). In addition, the change in experience
was more pronounced for fathers compared to mothers as most mothers already
took parental leave before the introduction of the new policy. This suggests that we
would expect fathers to be more likely to change their attitudes in response to the
policy change compared to mothers. In addition, we would expect individuals who
are more likely to use the new benefit to be more likely to change their attitudes, for
example, highly-educated fathers compared to fathers with lower levels of education.
Beyond exposure effects on those who are directly affected by a policy, policies
may affect attitudes in society at large through norm-setting effects. This is because,
apart from providing economic incentives and shaping opportunities, family policy
contains normative messages which influence views regarding the appropriate roles
of men and women in the gender division of work (Lewis 2001, Sjöberg 2004). Thus,
policy changes the legitimacy of certain behaviours.
Family policy may therefore set new normative anchors for the trade-offs between
men’s and women’s work and care roles (Gangl & Ziefle 2015). Indeed, several
authors have argued that the 2007 parental leave reform led to the emergence of
a new social norm in which mothers return to work after 12 months of leave and
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fathers take two months of leave (e.g. Bergemann & Riphahn 2015, Unterhofer et al.
2017, Cygan-Rehm et al. 2018). If norm-setting effects play a role in explaining
attitudinal changes in response to the 2007 reform, we would expect to see changes
in attitudes both among mothers and fathers, and both among those who were
eligible for the new benefit as well as parents with older children who were not
eligible for the benefit.
However, the two mechanisms of exposure and norm-setting policy feedback
effects cannot be considered entirely independent from each other. For example,
being offered the new benefit may affect parental attitudes even if a parent does not
actually use the leave (Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011). Eligible parents were directly
exposed to important norm-setting signals that the new benefit carried (Hook 2010).
While non-eligible parents of children born before 2007 would also learn about the
new benefit and its accompanying norms, only eligible parents had to actively engage
with the new benefit in terms of its implications on their own decision-making.
Specifically, each parent had to decide whether to make use of paid parental leave
and couples had to decide how to split the leave among themselves. Even if a couple
ends up deciding to not make use of the daddy months, they will have gone through
that decision-making process, as opposed to non-eligible parents or society at large.
Therefore, we would expect any norm-setting effects to be strongest among those
who are eligible for the benefit. It is hence not possible to attribute any changes in
attitudes of parents eligible for the new benefit to either direct exposure or norm-
setting effects. Instead, it is reasonable to assume that both mechanisms play a
partial role in explaining any observed changes in parental attitudes.
3.4 Data and methods
3.4.1 Data sources and sample
The paper uses data from the 2012 and 2016 German General Social Survey (Allge-
meine Bevoelkerungsumfrage/ALLBUS). The ALLBUS survey is a repeated cross-
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section collected biennially and comprising a sample of around 3,500 respondents
per survey year (GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften 2019). It is based
on a sample of individuals representative of the adult population living in Germany
(Wasmer et al. 2014). The survey covers a rich range of questions on attitudes, po-
litical preferences, etc. The advantages of this dataset include the items on gender
role attitudes and the availability of month of birth of all children in the household,
both which are key for the paper.
Gender role attitudes are covered in every second survey wave, and to date this
includes the post-Elterngeld reform survey years 2008, 2012, and 2016. In 2012 and
2016, a new set of questions on gender role attitudes was given to half of survey
respondents, taking into account the changing gender relations and partly replacing
previous attitude questions that were considered outdated (see Walter 2018b). I
refer to this part of the sample as the ‘new GRA split’. The new set of questions are
of particular interest for this paper as they contain some items specifically on the
changing roles of fathers. In the main analysis, I only consider the respondents who
were asked the new set of questions to ensure coherence and that outcome variables
are the same across the full analysis sample. For robustness, for the three attitude
items that were part of both the old and new set of questions, I also perform analyses
that include all survey respondents in 2008, 2012, and 2016, not just the new GRA
split.
The sample is restricted to parents who had a biological child born between
January 2005 and December 2008 and whose children live in the same household. I
also drop a small number of observations on foreign-born respondents who migrated
after 2004 and observations for which month of birth is missing. The final sample
consists of 185 respondents. Of those, 66 are in the control group and 119 are in
the treatment group. The treatment group is larger than the control group. The
main reason is that for parents who had a child born during both the control and
treatment window, the lastborn child is considered and hence they are considered
treated. However, robustness checks considering only the lastborn child show that
this does not affect results.
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To make sure the analysis sample is not a selected sample, Table 3.1 sheds light on
its representativeness. To this end, the table compares characteristics of the analysis
sample to those of a larger comparable group, which includes all respondents who
had at least one child between 2004 and 2009 and whose age was in the same range
as range of the analysis sample (between 21 and 55 years). The table shows that
there are no significant differences between the two samples in terms of observable
characteristics, minimising concerns of selectiveness of the analysis sample.
Table 3.1: Representativeness of the analysis sample
Analysis sample Larger comparable sample Difference significant
Age 39 39.9
Number of children 2.1 2
Age at first birth 29.1 29.8
Female 0.59 0.57
Tertiary education 0.45 0.41
Married 0.78 0.79
Lives with partner 0.92 0.9
Employed 0.8 0.83
Foreign born 0.17 0.15
Lives in East Germany 0.14 0.15
Number of observations 185 462
Notes: This table shows whether there are any significant differences in covariates between the analysis sample and
a larger comparison sample. The analysis sample consists of those who have a child born between 2005 and 2008
and who were part of the survey split administered the new items on gender role attitudes. The comparison sample
comprises all respondents interviewed in 2012 or 2016 who had at least one child between 2004 and 2009 and whose
age was in the same range as that of the analysis sample (between 21 and 55) but who are not part of the analysis
sample. Survey weights used. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
Previous research has identified persistent differences in gender roles attitudes
between West and East Germany (e.g. Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012). Due to
the small sample size in particular of those living in East Germany, I include both
East and West Germany in the sample rather than presenting results separately.
However, I present results from a heterogeneity analysis studying whether effects
vary across residents in East and West Germany. Moreover, I include a full set of
results for West Germany in Appendix 3.A.
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3.4.2 Methods
The introduction of the Elterngeld constitutes a natural experiment as it quasi-
randomly assigns all parents with a child born closely around January 1, 2007 to a
treatment and a control group. Specifically, all parents with a child born on or after
the 1st of January were eligible for the new benefit Elterngeld and thus form the
treatment group. All parents with a child born before the cutoff date fall under the
old Erziehungsgeld scheme and form the control group.
I therefore follow previous research on the impacts of the policy change (e.g.
Kluve & Schmitz 2018, Cygan-Rehm et al. 2018) and estimate the effect of the
reform by comparing treatment and control groups. Specifically, I compare gender
role attitudes of parents who had a child in the 24 months before (control group)
to those of parents who had a child in the 24 months after the introduction of the
reform (treatment group), to identify the reform’s effect on parents’ gender role
attitudes in the medium term. Importantly, attitudes of the treatment and control
groups are measured at the same time and several years after the reform, thereby
ensuring that both groups face the same macroeconomic, institutional, and cultural
environments. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Treatment and control groups and the timing of interviews
Source: Author’s illustration.
I estimate the following regression model via OLS:
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yi = α +X
′β + γElterngeld benefiti + εi (3.1)
where yi is the outcome of interest, Xi is a vector of control variables including
respondents’ age and square of age, child’s age and square of age, and birth month
fixed effects. γ is the coefficient of interest and measures the treatment effect of eli-
gibility for the new benefit. I estimate OLS regressions with robust standard errors,
but I also show results from ordered probit models for robustness. All regressions
are estimated with the provided survey weights that adjust for oversampling of East
German federal states.
The paper is interested in getting as close as possible to estimating the causal
effect of the policy reform on parental attitudes. However, fathers who took parental
leave are a selected group who differ from fathers who were eligible but did not opt to
take parental leave in terms of both observed as well as unobservable characteristics.
For example, highly-educated fathers are most likely to take parental leave (Geisler &
Kreyenfeld 2019), and educational level has been found to be systematically related
to attitudes towards gender roles (e.g. Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011, Bauernschuster
& Rainer 2012). Similarly, mothers’ and fathers’ leave duration and how couples
choose to split leave among them is likely to be related to the attitudes they hold.
Therefore, serious concerns around self-selection prevent using benefit take-up as an
independent variable when interested in estimating the effect of the policy reform.
A preferrable alternative is therefore to use benefit eligibility as a key regressor
(intention to treat). This intention to treat (ITT) effect identifies the overall effect
of the reform on those eligible, independently of their benefit take-up or duration
of leave. This is preferable because there are no issues of self-selection into the
take-up of parental leave. For this reason, estimating the ITT effect is the standard
approach in related literature on parental leave reforms, for example, when estimat-
ing the effect of parental leave on fertility (Farré & González 2019), on attitudes in
the grandparents’ generation (Unterhofer & Wrohlich 2017), or on families’ living
arrangements (Cygan-Rehm et al. 2018). In fact, ALLBUS data does not even con-
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tain information on parental leave uptake. From the perspective of policymakers,
the intention to treat effect is arguably more relevant than the effect on those who
took up leave as it estimates the total effect of the reform (Kotsadam & Finseraas
2011).
Since benefit take-up of mothers is nearly universal, the results suggest effects on
the treated (those who actually took the leave) that are nearly identical to the ITT
estimates (Samtleben et al. 2019). For fathers, the ITT effect can be interpreted as
lower bound estimates. As around 15 and 21 percent of eligible fathers took up the
benefit in 2007 and 2008, respectively, results suggest effects on the treated up to
five times as large as the ITT estimates if direct exposure to benefit take-up was
solely driving any results. However, it is reasonable to expect that being offered paid
parental leave specifically reserved to fathers affects the attitudes of eligible parents
“over and above the effects of actually using the leave” (Kotsadam & Finseraas
2011, p. 1614). This is because the introduction of leave specifically reserved to
fathers is a strong norm-setting signal which challenges norms of male breadwinning
and encourages fathers to be more involved in childcare (Hook 2010). While norm-
setting policy effects also affect those who are not eligible for the benefit (i.e. parents
in the control group), it can be expected that eligible fathers in the treatment group
are more strongly experiencing them compared to non-eligible fathers in the control
group. For example, eligible couples have to actively engage with and decide how
they split the leave among themselves. Even if a couple ends up deciding to not
make use of the daddy months, they will have gone through that decision process,
as opposed to parents in the control group. As a result, a limitation of the ITT
approach in this context is that it does not allow attribution of any effects to the
different underlying mechanisms described in Section 3.3. Instead, it is reasonable to
assume that both mechanisms play a partial role in explaining any observed changes
in parental attitudes.
The main threat to identification is endogenous selection into treatment. Specif-
ically, the characteristics of parents who chose to have a child under the new benefit
regime may differ from those who became parents given the pre-reform benefits.
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Similarly, the reform may have altered preferences for having additional children.
Since the reform was largely unanticipated and passed very quickly, parents with
children born within three months before and after the eligibility cutoff could not
know that the reform would be in place at the time their children were conceived
(Kluve & Schmitz 2018). Thus, by comparing outcomes of parents who had a baby
just before to those who had a baby just after the reform, it is possible to identify
the causal effect of the reform.
Ideally, I would compare parents who had a child in the three months before
the reform to those who had a child in the three months after the reform so that
endogenous selection into treatment is not possible (e.g. Kluve & Schmitz 2018).
Additionally, to rule out potential seasonal effects, I would combine a short window
of births with a difference-in-differences strategy (e.g. Dustmann & Schönberg 2011).
That is, I would compare attitudes of those with children born shortly before and
shortly after the reform on the 1st of January 2007 to those born shortly before and
after the 1st of January in the years before and after, when no policy change took
place.
Unfortunately, due to the small sample size resulting from the selection crite-
ria, I cannot follow a difference-in-differences strategy. Instead, I need to increase
the window around the cutoff to 24 months before and after the reform, yielding
a sample size of 185 respondents. The choice of window around the cutoff date
highlights the tradeoff between increasing sample size and making treatment and
control groups as similar as possible while reducing the likelihood of endogenous
fertility. To ensure that endogenous selection into parenthood is not driving the
results, I perform various robustness checks and sensitivity analyses. I conduct bal-
ancing tests to confirm that characteristics of the treatment and control groups are
not significantly different from each other. Additionally, I vary the window of births
for inclusion in treatment and control groups, I include additional control variables,
I show that treatment does not predict total fertility, and I study results for different
birth order parities and a subsample of parents who have one child only. Results
are robust to these checks and thus increase confidence in the findings, despite the
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limitations I discussed.
Using a 24 month window before and after the reform, I consider all individuals
who had a child born between January 2005 and December 2008. For those who
had more than one child in this period, I consider the lastborn child. This follows
previous research (Bergemann & Riphahn 2011). Parents who had a child prior to
2007 and the next child post 2008 are not considered. In robustness checks, I instead
consider the lastborn as well as the firstborn child, respectively, for the assignment
to treatment and control groups. The results stay qualitatively similar.
Another concern is that mothers who are due to give birth closely around the
reform cutoff date may time their birth, for example through induced births or
caesarean sections. Therefore, in a robustness check, I exclude parents who had a
child in the month around the introduction of the new reform. Potential seasonal
effects pose an additional threat to identification. That is, previous research has
shown that children who are born in spring have different long-term outcomes from
children born in the fall (e.g. Buckles & Hungerman 2013). However, this should be
less of a concern as the seasonal effect operates mainly through relative age imposed
by school enrolment cutoff dates based on birth month. Therefore, it is less of a
concern for parents’ long-term attitudes. Nevertheless, I control for child’s month
of birth.
Finally, my identification strategy relies on the fact that parents in both treat-
ment and control groups are interviewed at the same time. For this reason, any
macroeconomic or policy changes apart from the 2007 parental leave reform, or any
trends in social norms should not bias my results. In particular, there were two
subsequent changes in family policy. One was an expansion of public child-care pro-
vision for children aged younger than three. A second one was the introduction of
Elterngeld Plus in 2015, which facilitated parents’ ability to work part-time while
receiving parental leave benefits. It also granted additional leave of at least four
months for couples in which both parents work 25 to 30 hours a week (Samtleben
et al. 2019). Such policy changes would affect the medium-term attitudes held by
treatment and control groups in similar ways, thus not threatening the identification
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strategy. Following the same logic, the fact that parental leave policies are often
accompanied by or follow changes in gender social norms (Olivetti & Petrongolo
2017) does not threaten my identification strategy.
3.4.3 Measures
Gender role attitudes encompass beliefs about “the assignment of different adult
social responsibilities to men and women” (Pleck 1977, p.182). Six gender role
attitude items have been asked in ALLBUS since 1982. These were developed in
the 1970s and 1980s and primarily focus on a traditional male breadwinner model
(Walter 2018b). Similarly, the measures used in representative international surveys
tend to focus on a traditional male breadwinner model and questions that consider
the changing role of fathers in the family are generally not included (Walter 2018a).
Against this background, a novel set of questions was introduced to ALLBUS in
2012. In 2012 and 2016, half of respondents in the new GRA split were asked a
new set of nine items, which include three of the old items and six new ones. The
new questions reflect the social changes of the past decades with regards to the
employment of women with young children, the decrease of the male breadwinner
role and the increase of co-parenting (Walter 2018b). Therefore, the new set of
items is supplemented with statements concerning the role of fathers and a more
egalitarian division of tasks among couples. These nine items are shown in Table
3.2.
Walter (2018b) details the revision and validation of the new ALLBUS items.
Results from confirmatory factor analysis reveal that the revised measure consisting
of the nine items presented in Table 3.2 showed a satisfactory structure with two
factors, one representing traditional gender roles and the other representing modern
and more egalitarian gender roles.4 Given the novelty of the measures concerning
the appropriate role of fathers in particular, such validation is crucial for their in-
4An alternative item, the statement “The best way to organise family and work life is for both
partners to work part-time and to look after the home and children equally” was found to not be
strongly correlated with the new factor modern gender roles and was therefore not considered for
inclusion into the new measure.
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terpretation. Consequently, these items on fathers’ roles have been presented and
interpreted on a traditional-modern spectrum in the literature, similar to the items
on mothers’ roles (see e.g. Blohm & Walter 2018).
Table 3.2: Gender role attitude items in ALLBUS
Item name Item text Index topic Agreement
considered as
bothfull The best way to organise family and work life is for both Division of tasks modern
partners to work full-time and to look after the home
and children equally.
malebread It is much better for everyone concerned if the man goes Division of tasks traditional
out to work and the woman stays at home and looks after
the house and children.
workmumhome Even if both parents work, it is still better if the mother Division of tasks traditional
has main responsibility for looking after the home and
children.
fullmumbond A mother working full-time can normally establish just as Mothers’ LFP modern
close a relationship with her small child as a mother who
doesn’t work.
childbenefits A child actually benefits from his or her mother having a Mothers’ LFP modern
job rather than just concentrating on the home.
childsuffers A small child is bound to suffer if his or her mother goes Mothers’ LFP traditional
out to work.
fulldadbond A father working full-time can normally establish just as Fathers’ role modern
close a relationship with his small child as a father who
doesn’t work.
rolechange A man can be responsible for looking after the home and Fathers’ role modern
children just as well while the woman works full-time.
fulldadbad A father who works full-time cannot care for his children Fathers’ role traditional
properly.
Notes: Answer categories are completely disagree, tend to disagree, tend to agree, and completely agree. Each state-
ment is coded so that higher values indicate a more traditional view. Source: ALLBUS.
I follow this distinction between traditional and egalitarian/modern attitudes to-
wards gender roles. Following Blohm & Walter (2018), traditional attitudes towards
the gender division of work posit that women are primarily responsible for childcare
and household tasks, while men are mainly supposed to do paid work. Egalitarian
attitudes, on the other hand, support equal roles for men and women. According to
this, agreement with the item ‘rolechange’ (“A man can be responsible for looking
after the home and children just as well while the roman works full-time.”), one of
the newly introduced items, can be interpreted as modern. If respondents evaluate
the consequences of female labour force participation as negative for child develop-
ment, this is considered traditional. On the other hand, if the consequences of the
labour force participation of mothers is not considered to hurt child development,
this is coded as modern. The same logic applies to the interpretation of attitudes
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towards the consequences of fathers’ labour force participation (see Blohm & Walter
2018, Walter 2018b): agreement with the statement ‘fulldadbond’ (“A father work-
ing full-time can normally establish just as close a relationship with his small child
as a father who doesn’t work.”) can be interpreted as modern, whereas agreement
with the statement ‘fulldadbad’ (“A father who works full-time cannot care for his
children properly.”) is interpreted as traditional.
In addition to representing a traditional-modern spectrum, the ALLBUS items
can be grouped according to different theoretically relevant dimensions (Blohm &
Walter 2018). These are (i) attitudes towards the division of paid and unpaid work
between men and women (hereafter called gender division of tasks); (ii) attitudes
towards the consequences of female labour force participation for child development
(hereafter called LFP of mothers); and (iii) attitudes towards the role of men in
the family (hereafter called role of fathers). To simplify the analysis, rather than
presenting results for all nine attitude items separately, I group them according to
these three dimensions. Prior research on gender role attitudes uses additive indices
on the different dimensions of gender role attitudes (e.g. Sjöberg 2004, Kotsadam &
Finseraas 2011, Baxter et al. 2015). I therefore build three additive indices that form
my outcome variables, each consisting of three items. These measures are shown in
Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Indices of gender role attitudes
Source: Author’s illustration based on ALLBUS.
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To assess whether the items included in each index represent the same concept,
I calculate Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of internal consistency. While somewhat
arbitrary, values between 0.6 and 0.8 are usually considered to be a good level of
internal consistency (OECD 2008b). I report the values for Cronbach’s alpha in
Figure 3.2. The value for the LFP of mothers index is 0.69 but the values for the
division of tasks and role of fathers indices are below 0.6. However, in both cases
they are above 0.5 and thus close to the threshold. The relatively low values are
partly due to the fact that each index consists of only three items. Overall, this
suggests that the internal consistency of indices is acceptable but at the lower end.
Considering the trade off between internal consistency and presenting each of nine
items separately, I focus on the indices but also report the main results for each
individual item.
Each item measures levels of agreement with four answer categories: ‘completely
disagree’, ‘tend to disagree’, ‘tend to agree’, and ‘completely agree’. I recode each
item taking values between 0 and 3, with higher values indicating more traditional
attitudes and lower values indicating more egalitarian or modern attitudes. Con-
sequently, each of the three additive indices takes values between 0 and 9 as they
are composed of three items each. I also construct an alternative measure for ro-
bustness checks, which is based on binary attitudes (in which ‘tend to agree’ and
‘completely agree’ are grouped together and ‘tend to disagree’ and ‘completely dis-
agree’ are grouped together) . The indices then measure the number of statements
the respondent has a traditional view on.
The key regressor is an indicator variable taking a value of zero if the relevant
child was born between January 2005 and December 2006 (control group), and
a value of one if the child was born between January 2007 and December 2008
(treatment group).
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3.4.4 Summary statistics
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the three gender role attitude measures for the
analysis sample. Each of the measures is an additive index of three items with
higher values indicating higher levels of agreement with traditional gender roles.
The measures on gender division of tasks and role of fathers are right-skewed and
both have three as the modal value. In contrast, levels of agreement with traditional
attitudes towards the LFP of mothers are higher, with a modal value of five.
Table 3.3 shows mean values of covariates for the full analysis sample, as well as
for treatment and control groups. Covariates are balanced between the two groups
with the following exceptions. By construction, child’s age is higher in the control
group than in the treatment group. Consequently, it is intuitive that respondents’
age is also higher in the control group. Apart from these, none of the covariates
are statistically different at the five percent level between the two groups, which
strengthens the validity of the identification strategy. In particular, the number of
children and age at first birth are balanced, suggesting that endogenous fertility
is unlikely to be problematic. Moreover, the share of female respondents, share of
tertiary educated, the probability to be employed or to be foreign born, and survey
year are balanced. Most of the birth months are also balanced, with the exception of
April and December, and the difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level.
For the unbalanced variables, it is important to include them as controls in
the analysis. Therefore, I include controls for respondents’ age and square of age,
child’s age and square of age, and month of birth dummies in all specifications. A key
assumption of the analysis is that there is no endogenous selection into treatment via
fertility. Therefore, it is reassuring that treatment and control groups are balanced
in terms of total number of children and in terms of key socioeconomic characteristics
such as the share of tertiary-educated.
Figure 3.4 shows mean values of the outcome variables for the treatment and
control groups. Average levels of agreement are highest for traditional attitudes
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of outcome variables
Notes: The horizontal axes indicate values of the index and the vertical axes indicate the share of
respondents. Each index takes values from zero to nine and higher values indicate more
traditional attitudes. Source: ALLBUS.
concerning the LFP of mothers measure and lowest concerning the role of fathers.
We can also see a statistically significant difference between treatment and control
groups for one of the three outcomes: Traditional attitudes towards the role of
fathers are higher in the treatment group compared to the control group. Mean
values for traditional attitudes concerning the gender division of tasks are slightly
higher in the treatment group, but the difference is not statistically significant. Mean
values for attitudes towards the LFP of mothers are the same in both groups.
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Table 3.3: Covariate balancing across treatment and control groups
Control Treatment Total Difference significant
Age 41 37.8 39 ***
Number of children 2 2.1 2.1
Age at first birth 29.1 29.1 29.1
Female 0.58 0.59 0.59
Tertiary degree 0.49 0.43 0.45
Married 0.78 0.78 0.78
Lives with partner 0.9 0.93 0.92
Employed 0.85 0.78 0.8
Foreign born 0.17 0.17 0.17
Lives in East Germany 0.12 0.15 0.14
Survey year 2012 0.47 0.48 0.48
Survey year 2016 0.53 0.52 0.52
Child’s age (in months) 101.1 77.6 86.2 ***
Child’s birth month January 0.06 0.1 0.09
Child’s birth month February 0.1 0.06 0.07
Child’s birth month March 0.09 0.07 0.08
Child’s birth month April 0.02 0.08 0.06 *
Child’s birth month May 0.04 0.09 0.08
Child’s birth month June 0.06 0.08 0.07
Child’s birth month July 0.05 0.07 0.07
Child’s birth month August 0.08 0.08 0.08
Child’s birth month September 0.12 0.12 0.12
Child’s birth month October 0.14 0.07 0.09
Child’s birth month November 0.06 0.1 0.08
Child’s birth month December 0.18 0.07 0.11 *
Number of observations 66 119 185
Notes: Survey weights used. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Longer-term trends in gender role attitudes
In the main analysis, I compare the gender role attitudes of treatment and control
groups, where attitudes of both groups are recorded in the same survey year. To
put the analysis into the larger context, in this subsection I present longer-term
trends in gender role attitudes in Germany. As mentioned in the previous section,
most of the attitude items in the main analysis were introduced for the first time in
2012. For the longer-term trends, I am thus only able to construct measures for two
dimensions, the gender division of tasks and consequences of mothers’ labour force
participation. These two measures consist of the old GRA items and not of those in
the main analysis, and hence they are not directly comparable to each other. The
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Figure 3.4: Mean of dependent variables for treatment and control groups
Notes: Survey weights used. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source:
ALLBUS.
items included in each measure are shown in Table 3.A.1 of Appendix 3.A. Each
measure is an additive index taking values between zero and three. The measures
consist of three items each and indicate the number of items that a respondent
expressed agreement with a traditional view.
Figure 3.5 presents fitted values with 95 percent confidence intervals for the
measures on attitudes towards the gender division of work (left-hand side) and the
consequences of female labour force participation (right-hand side) by survey year.
All regressions are estimated via OLS and include controls for sex, age, square of
age, indicator variables for having tertiary education, being married, living with
a partner, having at least one child, being employed, being foreign-born, living in
East Germany, and dummy variables for survey years. The sample includes all
respondents aged between 21 and 55, corresponding to the age range of the main
analysis sample. The sample size is 7,457 respondents for the division of tasks
measure (left-hand side) and 7,526 for the LFP of mothers measure (right-hand
side). The top row in Figure 3.5 shows the trends for the full sample. For both
measures, we observe a downward trend over the period from 2000 to 2016. In line
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Figure 3.5: Trends in gender role attitudes I
Notes: Graphs show predicted values of GRA indices from linear regressions controlling for sex,
age, square of age, indicator variables for having tertiary education, being married, living with a
partner, having at least one child, being employed, being foreign-born, living in East Germany,
and dummy variables for survey years. Graphs in bottom panel are from models fully interacted
with binary variable indicating parental status. Indices take values from zero to three, with
higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Indices include the attitude items shown in
Table 3.A.1. Survey weights used. Source: ALLBUS.
with the measures of the main analysis, attitudes on the consequences of LFP of
mothers are on average more traditional than those on the gender division of tasks.
The bottom row of Figure 3.5 shows trends separately for parents and non-
parents. These are obtained from regression models that are fully interacted by
whether the respondent has children. The downward trends in traditional gender
role attitudes are present for both groups and they are very similar among parents
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and non-parents.
In Figure 3.6, I present trends in attitudes for groups distinguished by sex, edu-
cational level, and region of residence. Again, each of them is obtained from models
fully interacted by the grouping variable. The figures reveal that (i) for all six
groups, we observe a downward trend in traditional attitudes over the time period;
(ii) for all six groups except residents in East Germany, attitudes towards the con-
sequences of mothers’ labour force participation are more traditional than those
towards the gender division of tasks; (iii) men hold more traditional attitudes than
women; (iv) those with lower levels of education hold more traditional attitudes than
those with a tertiary degree; (v) West Germans hold more traditional attitudes than
East Germans.
Taken together, the trends from this section reveal that attitudes towards the
gender division of work and the consequences of female labour force participation
have modernised since the start of this century – both overall and among all sub-
groups considered. Moreover, results corroborate findings from existing literature
that attitudes differ by education, sex, and between East and West Germany (e.g.
Blohm & Walter 2018). Interestingly, we do not see large differences in attitudes
between parents and non-parents. It is not possible to attribute any of the observed
trends in gender role attitudes to norm-setting policy feedback effects of the 2007
reform described in Section 3.3, though it is theoretically possible that such effects
have contributed to the evolution of gender role attitudes.
3.5.2 Results on extended sample and for individual atti-
tudes
Three of the attitude questions are included in both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ set of survey
items. Hence, they were given to all respondents in the 2012 and 2016 survey waves
and not just half. Moreover, they were included in the 2008 survey. Therefore,
I estimate the effect of the reform on these three outcomes, namely ‘childsuffers’,
‘malebread’, and ‘childbenefits’ using a larger sample that includes all respondents
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Figure 3.6: Trends in gender role attitudes II
Notes: Graphs show predicted values of GRA indices from linear regressions controlling for sex,
age, square of age, indicator variables for having tertiary education, being married, living with a
partner, having at least one child, being employed, being foreign-born, living in East Germany,
and dummy variables for survey years. All models are fully interacted with the respective
grouping variable. Indices take values from zero to three, with higher values indicating more
traditional attitudes. Indices include the attitude items shown in Table 3.A.1. Survey weights
used. Source: ALLBUS.
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from the survey years 2008, 2012, and 2016. The full statement that each variable
refers to is shown in Table 3.2.
Similarity between these results on a larger sample and those from the main
analysis sample would increase confidence that the main analysis sample is not
selective but representative. The results in Table 3.4 show that the reform did not
affect agreement with any of these statements. Instead, the coefficients are all close
to zero.
Table 3.4: Results on individual attitude items for extended sample
Dependent variable childsuffers malebread childbenefits
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.027 0.029 -0.011
(0.094) (0.083) (0.083)
Observations 591 593 586
R-squared 0.069 0.080 0.031
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent vari-
able takes values from 0 to 3, with higher levels indicating more traditional
attitudes. Control variables include age (in years), age squared, child’s age
(in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey
weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
Figure 3.7 then shows the mean values of these three attitude items for (i) the
extended sample without observations that are also included in the main analysis
and (ii) the main analysis sample. As before, each item can take values between
zero and three, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. The figure
shows that means are very similar between the two samples and not significantly
different across the two groups for any of the items.
Table 3.5 then presents estimates of the effect of being eligible for the new ben-
efit on each of the attitudinal variables for the main analysis sample as described
in Section 3.4. Columns 1 to 3 present results on the three items that form the
index gender division of tasks, columns 4 to 6 show items included in the measure
consequences of mothers’ labour force participation, and columns 7 to 9 show items
included in the measure fathers’ roles. The results show that the reform did not
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Figure 3.7: Difference in gender role attitudes between extended sample and analysis
sample
Notes: Each dependent variable can take values from 0 to 3, with higher levels indicating more
traditional attitudes. Extended sample includes year 2008 and the old split of 2012 and 2016.
Survey weights used. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
affect any of the items included in the gender division of work and mothers’ LFP
measures. A comparison of these results with those from Table 3.4 on the extended
sample increases confidence that the main analysis sample is not a selective sample
despite its small number of observations. In particular, there is no statistically sig-
nificant effect of the reform on the outcomes ‘malebread’ (column 2), ‘childbenefits’






Table 3.5: Results on individual attitude items
Dependent variable bothfull malebread workmumhome fullmumbond childbenefits childsuffers fulldadbond rolechange fulldadbad
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment 0.064 -0.028 0.176 0.049 0.115 -0.062 0.479*** 0.252** 0.312*
(0.168) (0.154) (0.169) (0.207) (0.151) (0.207) (0.163) (0.112) (0.176)
Observations 184 185 185 185 182 185 184 185 185
R-squared 0.163 0.139 0.191 0.133 0.098 0.109 0.113 0.133 0.057
Age controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values from 0 to 3, with higher levels indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables
include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels
of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
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The results also show that the reform has an effect on the items that relate
to the role of fathers: The reform increased traditional views for all three items
‘fulldadbad’, ‘fulldadbond’, and ‘rolechange’. That is, parents eligible for the new
benefit exhibit higher levels of agreement with the statement that ‘a father who
works full-time cannot care for his children properly’, lower levels of agreement
with the statement ‘a father working full-time can normally just establish as close a
relationship with his small child as a father who doesn’t work’, and lower levels of
agreement with the statement ‘a man can be responsible for looking after the home
and children just as well while the woman works full-time’.
In the next subsection, I present results for the three indices as described in
Section 3.4 rather than each individual attitude question.
3.5.3 Main results
Table 3.6 presents the main results of the effect of the reform on gender role atti-
tudes. Each column displays results for one of the three additive indices on gender
roles: gender division of tasks (column 1), consequences of mothers’ labour force
participation (column 2), and fathers’ roles (column 3). Each measure is coded so
that higher values indicate more traditional views. I control for the characteristics
that differ between the treatment and control group. These are respondent’s age
and square of age, child’s age and square of age, and month of birth fixed effects.
Those affected by the reform report higher levels of agreement with a traditional
gender division of tasks (column 1) and higher levels of agreement with traditional
views on the consequences of female labour force participation (column 2), but these
results are not statistically significant. I find one statistically significant effect of the
reform: Those affected by the Elterngeld benefit report higher levels of agreement
with traditional roles for fathers (column 3). The coefficient suggests that those with
children born after the reform have 1.04 higher agreement with men’s traditional
gender roles, on a scale from 0 to 9. Compared to the mean score of the control
group of 2.2, that is approximately a 47 percent increase. However, these estimates
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Table 3.6: Main results: effect of new benefit on GRA indices
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.213 0.162 1.041***
(0.358) (0.441) (0.336)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.117 0.131 0.092
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values
between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables
include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month
of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
should be interpreted with caution - due to the small sample size, the point estimate
is not very precisely estimated with the 95 percent confidence interval ranging from
0.38 to 1.70. Moreover, the linear regression model does not account for the ordinal
scale of the outcome variables. Therefore, I also present results from an ordered
probit model in Table 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A. The results stay substantively the
same.
These findings are in line with both exposure effects as well as with norm-setting
effects of the reform (see Section 3.3), though it is not possible to disentangle these
two mechanisms based on the empirical analysis.
Apart from levels of agreement, it is also of interest whether respondents agree or
disagree with a statement. Therefore, in Table 3.7, I present results for indices that
are based on binary attitudinal variables. The indices show the number of items a
respondent has a traditional view on. The sign of coefficients remains positive for
all outcomes and the coefficient on male modern gender roles remains significant at
the 5 percent level.
The inclusion of the control variables on respondents’ age, child’s age, and birth
month is important as these variables differ across treatment and control groups.
For completeness, results without controls and a stepwise introduction of controls
are presented in Table 3.A.3 of Appendix 3.A. The table shows that results stay
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Table 3.7: Main results for GRA indices based on binarised attitude items
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.127 0.105 0.353**
(0.176) (0.191) (0.150)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.121 0.123 0.077
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes val-
ues between 0 and 3, indicating the number of items the respondent had a traditional view
on. Control variables include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s
age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
very similar when excluding these control variables.5
3.5.4 Robustness checks
In this subsection, I perform various checks to study the robustness of the main
results presented in Table 3.6. As mentioned in Section 3.4, the main threat to
identification is potential bias arising from endogenous selection into treatment,
which in this context is equivalent to endogenous fertility. Due to the quick and
unanticipated introduction of the reform, parents within three months of the cutoff
could not have known that the reform would be in place at the time they conceived
(Kluve & Schmitz 2018). This reasoning also implies that it was not possible for
parents to select into the control group for those who were worse off after the reform.
However, individuals who did not choose to become parents or to have an addi-
tional child given the pre-reform benefits may have done so under the new Elterngeld
benefit policy. This is most likely the case for highly-educated people who on av-
erage benefited most from the reform. Indeed, previous research found that the
Elterngeld reform increased fertility of high-educated groups (Raute 2019). Highly-
educated people who would not have chosen to become parents or have an additional
child under the old benefits regime became parents or had additional children un-
5Results for the West German subsample are shown in Appendix 3.A in Table 3.A.4, and
heterogeneity across East and West Germany is discussed at the end of this section.
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der the new regime, hold on average more gender-egalitarian attitudes. Therefore,
this would likely introduce a downward bias to the effect that I find for attitudes to-
wards the roles of fathers. Nevertheless, in what follows I perform various robustness
checks to make sure that endogenous fertility is not driving the results.
In Table 3.8, I start by varying the window of children’s birth dates included
in treatment and control groups. If the results stay similar across different analysis
windows, it increases confidence that endogenous selection into treatment is not
driving the main findings. In Panel A of Table 3.8, I increase the window of births
from 24 months to 36 months before and after the reform. The size of the coefficients
for the attitude measures division of work (column 1) and LFP of mothers (column
2) become slightly larger compared to the main coefficients in Table 3.6 but remain
insignificant despite smaller standard errors. The size of the coefficient on fathers’
roles becomes marginally smaller and stays significant at the one percent level.
In Panel B of Table 3.8, I keep the window for the control group at 24 months, as
in the baseline specification, but I shorten the window of the treatment group to six
months. The rationale for varying only the treatment group window is that parents
could select intro treatment group but not the control group. The coefficients for all
three attitudinal outcome variables remain positive and their magnitude increases.
Due to the smaller sample size, the standard errors also increase. Again, the coef-
ficients for the outcomes gender division of work (column 1) and LFP of mothers
(column 2) are not significant but the coefficient for the outcome gender roles of
fathers (column 3) remains statistically significant at the five percent level.
In Panel C, I reduce the window of births from 24 months to 12 months before
and after the reform. Again, the standard errors are substantially larger compared to
the main results. The estimates for the outcome measures division of work (column
1) and mothers’ LFP (column 2) become close to zero, while the estimate for the
outcome fathers’ roles (column 3) stays similar in size and statistically significant
at the 10 percent level despite the larger standard error. These results increase our
confidence that endogenous selection into treatment is not driving the findings.
Another concern is that parents with children born closely around the reform
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Table 3.8: Sensitivity analysis: window of births for treatment and control groups
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. 36 months window
Treatment (36m window) 0.312 0.305 0.929***
(0.295) (0.379) (0.279)
Observations 287 284 285
R-squared 0.071 0.057 0.068
Panel B. 24 months for control, 6 months for treatment
Treatment (24/6m window) 0.530 0.753 1.507**
(0.573) (0.805) (0.664)
Observations 88 86 88
R-squared 0.295 0.143 0.230
Panel C. 12 months window
Treatment (12m window) -0.016 -0.075 0.997*
(0.479) (0.636) (0.501)
Observations 91 90 92
R-squared 0.292 0.238 0.257
Panel D. Excluding births within a month of reform
Treatment 0.301 0.211 1.261***
(0.369) (0.458) (0.345)
Observations 171 170 171
R-squared 0.122 0.129 0.105
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values between
0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables include age (in
years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey
weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
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cutoff date may have manipulated their eligibility by delaying birth, as suggested
by findings in Neugart & Ohlsson (2012). Panel D of Table 3.8 therefore excludes
those with children born within a month of the cutoff, that is, those with children
born in December 2006 or January 2007. The sign of all coefficients remains the
same and their size comparable in magnitude to the main results of Table 3.6.
Taken together, in Table 3.8 I have presented results for four different analysis
windows. Independently of how I define the windows, the reform had no signifi-
cant effect on attitudes towards the gender division of work or the LFP of mothers
measures. Moreover, the sign of coefficients remains positive or close to zero. Addi-
tionally, in all specifications, I observe a positive and statistically significant effect
of treatment on traditional gender roles for fathers. This increases confidence that
the results are not driven by endogenous fertility.
Next, I study more directly whether those affected by the reform are more likely
to have further children. I analyse whether treatment predicts the number of children
and results are presented in Table 3.9. Column 1 shows that the main treatment
variable does not predict the total number of own children living in the household.
In columns 2 to 4, the outcomes are binary variables for having one, two, or three
and more children, respectively. Results reveal that treatment does not predict the
probability to have any specific number of children. Taken together, the results
from Table 3.9 strengthen the view that endogenous fertility choices do not play an
important role.
As described in Section 3.4, for those who had more than one child between
2005 and 2008, I consider the lastborn child for the classification into treatment and
control groups. The rationale for this choice is that anybody who was affected by
the reform is considered to be treated, independent of the birth order of the child.
Those in the treatment group may or may not have additional children after 2008.
It could be argued that considering only the lastborn child would make treatment
and control groups more similar, but the downside is that results may be more
sensitive to endogenous fertility. In Panel A of Table 3.10, I study the reform effects
when treatment and control groups are constructed based on the lastborn child
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Table 3.9: Robustness check: effects on fertility
Dependent variable Number of children One child Two children Three or more children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.130 -0.046 -0.011 0.057
(0.158) (0.086) (0.089) (0.084)
Observations 185 185 185 185
R-squared 0.072 0.111 0.159 0.098
Age controls yes yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Control variables include age (in years), age squared, child’s
age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
only. The results on all outcomes are very similar to those of the main analysis.
This similarity in findings further reduces concerns that endogenous fertility may be
driving the results. It also suggests that the effect of treatment does not depend on
the parity of the child.
In Panel B of Table 3.10, I also study results when treatment and control groups
are based on the firstborn child only. This effectively creates three differences com-
pared to the classification in the main results. First, those who had more than one
child between 2005 and 2008 are now classified as control group instead of treatment
group despite having experienced the new benefit. Second, parents who had their
first child in 2005 or 2006 and another child post-2008 were not considered in the
main analysis but now form part of the control group. Third, anyone who had their
first child prior to 2005 will not be included in the sample of this robustness check,
despite having further children born between 2005 and 2009. The coefficients for
division of tasks and for mothers’ LFP remain insignificant and small in size. In ad-
dition, the coefficient on fathers’ roles (column 3) is almost halved compared to the
main results, and becomes insignificant. The insignificant results for the outcomes
division of tasks and mothers’ LFP, and the positive but smaller coefficient for the
outcome fathers’ roles further strengthen confidence in the main results.
Moreover, these results are likely downward biased because those in the control
group may actually have had a second child during the treatment period, and thus
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Table 3.10: Sensitivity analysis first child and last child
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Lastborn child
Treatment (based on last child) 0.357 0.154 0.938**
(0.386) (0.480) (0.363)
Observations 147 144 146
R-squared 0.155 0.175 0.092
Panel B. Firstborn child
Treatment (based on first child) -0.131 0.116 0.515
(0.405) (0.486) (0.363)
Observations 121 120 121
R-squared 0.134 0.137 0.117
Panel C. Subsample those with one child only
Treatment -0.007 -0.040 0.512
(0.742) (0.989) (0.766)
Observations 53 51 52
R-squared 0.293 0.404 0.230
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values between 0 and
9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables include age (in years), age
squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source:
ALLBUS.
have experienced the new benefit. Therefore, these results suggest that gender role
attitudes do not remain stable after the transition to parenthood but instead that
experiences can alter attitudes independent of child parity.
In Panel C of Table 3.10, I study results for the subsample of parents who have
only one child at the time of interview. This sample is very small and hence standard
errors more than double compared to the main results in Table 3.6. Nevertheless,
the coefficients for the first two outcome variables are very close to zero, while the
coefficient for fathers’ roles remains positive and sizeable at 0.51. The fact that
the results stay similar when considering only one-child respondents give further
reassurance that results are not driven by endogenous fertility choices.
Next, I study whether the introduction of additional control variables alters
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results. In the main specification in Table 3.6, I control only for the covariates
that are not balanced across treatment and control groups. Panel A of Table 3.11
shows results from a regression with additional control variables which have been
shown to affect gender role attitudes. These are a binary variable indicating tertiary
education and a binary variable indicating whether respondents are foreign born.
The estimates do not change by much when adding these controls.
Table 3.11: Robustness check: additional control variables
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Additional control variables education and migration
Treatment 0.234 0.188 1.065***
(0.360) (0.437) (0.337)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.150 0.168 0.105
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Additional controls education & education & education &
migration migration migration
Panel B. Year controls
Treatment 0.288 -0.017 0.743**
(0.358) (0.392) (0.321)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.116 0.133 0.099
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls no no no
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Additional controls survey year survey year survey year
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values
between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables
in Panel A include age (in years), age squared, a binary variable indicating tertiary educa-
tion, a binary variable indicating foreign birth country, child’s age (in months), child’s age
squared, and month of birth dummies. Control variables in Panel B include age (in years),
age squared, survey year, month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALL-
BUS.
The sample consists of respondents interviewed in 2012 and 2016, hence the
results capture the effects of the reform on reported attitudes 5 and 9 years after
its introduction. The rationale behind pooling the years is to maximise sample size.
Importantly, the interview year is balanced as shown in Table 3. In Panel B of Table
3.5. Results 118
3.11 , I report results when adding a dummy variable indicating interview year 2016
as a control, and results are robust to this. I exclude the age of child controls, as age
of the child and interview year are very highly correlated by construction. Again,
the results remain qualitatively similar compared to the main results.
To further strengthen confidence in the paper’s estimation strategy, I estimate
the effects of hypothetical ‘placebo’ reforms constructed to be introduced on a dif-
ferent date than the actual parental leave reform. I estimate the effects of a placebo
reform being introduced at the start of each month, for each date between January
2004 and December 2011. Treatment and control groups are constructed in the same
way as in the main analysis, using a 24 month window around the date of the reform.
Figure 3.8 presents coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals across different
hypothetical introduction dates. No significant results for placebo reforms taking
place on January 2005 or before, or on January 2009 or after would strengthen con-
fidence that the results obtained earlier can indeed be attributed to the parental
leave reform. This is because treatment and control groups for placebo reforms on
January 2005 or before were both exposed to the same benefit Erziehungsgeld. Sim-
ilarly, treatment and control groups for placebo reforms on January 2009 or after
were both exposed to the new benefit Elterngeld. For placebo reforms taking place
between February 2005 and December 2008, there is some overlap in treatment and
control groups with those of the actual reform, and that overlap becomes larger the
closer the placebo date is to January 2007. For the significant results on attitudes
towards the role of fathers obtained earlier, we would therefore expect a phasing out
of these results the further the placebo reforms are away from January 2007.
Indeed, the graphs for the outcomes gender division and LFP of mothers show
that coefficients remain statistically insignificant throughout (apart from two ex-
ceptions for the outcome gender division which show up as marginally significant).
Moreover, the graph on the outcome role of fathers confirms a clear statistically
significant effect around January 2007 as well as ‘phasing-out’ effects, as expected.
Again, there are generally no statistically significant effects outside the period be-
tween January 2005 and January 2009, with a few exceptions of marginally signifi-
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Figure 3.8: Placebo reforms
Notes: Figures show coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from separate regressions of
placebo reforms constructed to be introduced at the start of each month for the period between
2004 and 2011. Each dependent variable takes values between 0 and 9, with higher values
indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables include age (in years), age squared,
child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Robust standard
errors used. Source: ALLBUS.
cant coefficients outside of this period. Overall, results from these placebo reforms
further strengthen the confidence in this paper’s estimation strategy. They show
that results are not driven by time trends and they further reduce concerns about
omitted variable bias due to unobserved differences between treatment and control
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groups.
To sum up, I have argued in this section that any potential bias arising from
endogenous fertility may likely introduce a downward bias to the estimated results.
Nevertheless, I provided a variety of robustness checks addressing concerns of en-
dogenous fertility and omitted variable bias and results are robust to these additional
checks.
3.5.5 Heterogeneity and other outcomes
I have shown that the parental leave reform increased traditional attitudes towards
the role of fathers and did not affect attitudes towards the gender division of work or
the consequences of mothers’ labour force participation for child development. These
results are robust to a variety of robustness checks. In this subsection, I study the
heterogeneity of results across the different groups considered in the trends analysis
in Figure 3.6. These are sex, educational level, and region. As discussed in Section
3.3, based on theories of exposure, we would expect fathers to be more likely to
change their attitudes in response to the policy change compared to mothers, and we
would expect highly-educated fathers to be more likely to change attitudes compared
to fathers with lower levels of education.
I start with heterogeneity analyses by respondent sex, presented in Table 3.12.
I interact the main treatment effect with a dummy for women, and I also show the
linear combination of treatment and being a woman at the bottom of the table.
Columns 1 and 2 reveal that the coefficient on the effect of the reform for men is
positive, while the interaction between the treatment and the woman dummy is
negative. The overall effect of the reform for women is also negative, as indicated by
the linear combination of estimates. However, none of the coefficients is statistically
significant. For attitudes towards the role of fathers in column 3, the main coefficient
on the treatment variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that
the reform increased men’s levels of agreement with traditional roles for fathers.
Moreover, the interaction effect between treatment and the woman dummy for the
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Table 3.12: Heterogeneity by sex
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.588 0.719 1.687***
(0.471) (0.650) (0.488)
Woman 0.157 -0.223 0.670
(0.492) (0.673) (0.470)
Treatment x woman -0.727 -1.172 -1.159*
(0.603) (0.783) (0.591)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.128 0.172 0.113
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Treatment + woman -0.139 -0.454 0.528
(0.457) (0.510) (0.407)
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values
between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables
include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month
of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
outcome attitudes towards men’s roles is negative and statistically significant. The
overall effect of the reform on attitudes towards men’s roles for women is much
smaller and not statistically significant. This shows that, as expected, the main
results on the outcome attitudes towards fathers’ roles is driven by a change in
men’s attitudes.6
Next, I study heterogeneity of results by level of education. The results are pre-
sented in Table 3.13 and show that the effects of the reform are not significantly
different between those with tertiary education and those with lower levels of edu-
cation. However, the coefficient for attitudes towards the role of fathers is larger for
those with tertiary education, as expected.
Table 3.14 studies how results differ across East and West German residents.
The negative and statistically significant coefficients on the East dummy indicate
that East Germans hold less traditional attitudes towards the gender division of
6Given that the results for the outcome ‘roles of fathers’ are significantly different for men and
women, I provide additional results on the heterogeneity by sex for the subsample of West Germans
as well as for each individual attitudinal item in Appendix 3.A, Tables 3.A.5 and 3.A.6.
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Table 3.13: Heterogeneity by education
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.320 0.030 0.757*
(0.502) (0.598) (0.448)
Tertiary degree -0.533 -1.017 -0.406
(0.512) (0.636) (0.473)
Treatment x tertiary degree -0.209 0.248 0.551
(0.682) (0.832) (0.629)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.139 0.159 0.097
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Treatment + tertiary degree 0.110 0.278 1.309***
(0.490) (0.618) (0.476)
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values between
0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables include age (in
years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey
weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
Table 3.14: Heterogeneity across West and East Germany
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.219 0.183 1.117***
(0.395) (0.487) (0.367)
East Germany -1.233** -1.488** -0.337
(0.520) (0.653) (0.599)
Treatment x East Germany -0.061 -0.223 -0.532
(0.706) (0.807) (0.732)
Observations 184 182 184
R-squared 0.163 0.184 0.110
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Treatment + East Germany 0.158 -0.0395 0.584
(0.596) (0.645) (0.654)
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values between
0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables include age (in
years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey
weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
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work and the consequences of mothers’ labour force participation. This is in line
with results from Figure 3.6 as well as well-known findings from existing literature
(e.g. Bauernschuster & Rainer 2012, Blohm & Walter 2018). On the other hand,
attitudes towards the role of fathers (column 3) are not significantly different among
East Germans. The interaction effects between treatment and the East dummy are
negative but not significant in all three columns, suggesting that the treatment effect
does not differ between East and West Germans. Nevertheless, the linear combi-
nation of estimates in column 3 reveals that the effect of the reform on attitudes
towards the role of men is smaller and not statistically significant for East Ger-
mans. This suggests that the increase in traditional attitudes towards fathers’ roles
is predominantly driven by those residing in West Germany.
Taken together, results from this paper suggest that the Elterngeld benefit did
not modernise attitudes towards the gender division of work and attitudes towards
the consequences of female labour force participation. Moreover, it made parents’
attitudes towards the role of fathers more traditional.
Table 3.15: Division of household (HH) and childcare (CC) tasks
Dependent variable No. of HH tasks No. of HH tasks No. of CC tasks No. of CC tasks
done mainly shared equally done mainly shared equally
by woman by woman
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -0.600 0.244 0.045 -0.305
(0.569) (0.550) (0.500) (0.513)
Observations 85 85 81 81
R-squared 0.235 0.182 0.134 0.195
Age controls yes yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Control variables include age (in years), age squared, child’s
age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
To strengthen interpretation of the obtained results, I study whether the reform
affected the actual sharing of childcare and housework tasks and results are presented
in Table 3.15. Given that the reform did not affect attitudes towards the gender
division of tasks we would expect null effect on these outcomes as well. One caveat is
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that these outcomes were only asked in 2016 and hence the sample size is very small
and results should thus be interpreted with caution. The survey contains several
household and childcare tasks such as cooking and asks respondents who performs
each of these tasks. There are five answer categories, always the woman, mostly
the woman, half each or together, mostly the man, and always the man. I create
four indices as my outcome variables, each taking values from zero to three. The
first counts the number of household tasks done mostly or always by the woman.
It comprises three household tasks that are predominantly performed by women,
cooking, doing laundry, and cleaning (column 1). The second comprises the same
household tasks but counts the number of them that are equally shared (column
2). The third index counts the number of childcare tasks done mostly or always
by the woman, comprised of playing with the kids, doing homework with the kids,
and bringing the kids to bed (column 3). The final index counts the number of
these childcare tasks that are performed equally or together (column 4). Results
show that the reform did not affect the division of household and childcare tasks
among couples. This strengthens the conclusion that the parental leave reform did
not trigger a change towards more egalitarian views among those affected.
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
Parenthood often marks the starting point of persistent gender inequalities in paid
and unpaid work. Against this background, I studied the impact of the 2007 parental
leave reform in Germany on the gender role attitudes that affected parents held
several years later. This reform constituted a turn in the direction of German family
policy, away from support for a male breadwinner model in which the husband works
and the wife stays at home, and towards incentives for mothers’ employment and
fathers’ involvement in childcare.
The new benefit led to the emergence of a new social norm in which fathers take
two months of parental leave and mothers return to the labour force relatively quickly
given the German context, after 12 months (Unterhofer et al. 2017, Cygan-Rehm
3.6. Discussion and conclusion 125
et al. 2018). Nevertheless, evidence on fathers’ involvement in and the division of
childcare and housework tasks within couples is mixed (Kluve & Tamm 2013, Tamm
2019). Traditional attitudes towards gender roles may explain these mixed results.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of the German parental leave
reform, by studying its effects on attitudinal change.
I find that the reform failed to modernise gender role attitudes of those directly
affected by the new benefit, compared to those who were parents before its introduc-
tion. Specifically, I find no effect on attitudes towards the gender division of work
or on attitudes towards the consequences of mothers’ labour force participation.
Additionally, the reform increased support for traditional gender roles for fathers
among parents affected by the reform, compared to parents before the reform. The
new benefit did not impact the sharing of household and childcare activities within
the family. I further find that the effect of the reform on increased support for
traditional gender roles for fathers is driven by attitudinal changes of men. Results
are also stronger for tertiary-educated parents and those living in West Germany.
These findings are in line with both exposure and identity theories on the one hand,
and with norm-setting policy feedback effects on the other hand.
Specifically, being offered the new benefit may have made fathers aware of work-
care conflicts, both through their own experience from leave-taking as well as through
the normative messages that the new policy carried and that they mentally engaged
with when deciding whether and how much leave to take. Moreover, one could argue
that the observed changes in attitudes closely match the incentives that the reform
provided. The reform incentivised fathers to take leave and get more involved in
childcare. In line with this, the reform increased support for traditional roles for
men. Specifically, it increased agreement with the statement that fathers working
full-time cannot care for their children properly. Similarly, it decreased agreement
with the statement that a father working full-time can normally establish just as
close a relationship with his small child as a father who doesn’t work. Moreover, it
decreased agreement with the statement that a man can be responsible for looking
after the home and children just as well while the woman works full-time. These
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results are in line with identity theories, suggesting that the new experience of
leave-taking among fathers changed their parenting identities. At the same time,
it may have altered their perceptions of career costs associated with taking leave.
Results from heterogeneity analyses indicating that effects are stronger for tertiary-
educated lend additional support for an exposure and identity interpretation, as the
increase in parental leave usage was greatest among highly educated fathers (Geisler
& Kreyenfeld 2019).
On the other hand, one could argue that the reform did not lead women to have
new experiences to the same extent, as they were already taking leave before the
reform. The null effect on attitudes towards the consequences of female labour force
participation, and the finding that women did not change their attitudes towards
the role of fathers, are in line with such an identity explanation. Moreover, while
the reform incentivised fathers’ leave-taking and mothers’ return to work, it did not
incentivise a gender-egalitarian division of roles. Instead, women still take most of
the paid leave and return to work part-time more often. It may therefore not be
surprising that the reform did not impact attitudes towards the gender division of
work.
An analysis of time trends showed that attitudes towards the gender division
of work and towards the consequences of female labour force participation held by
German society at large have gradually become less traditional since the start of
the 21st century. These results are in line with norm-setting policy feedback effects,
however, it is not possible to attribute the observed changes in attitudes to such
norm-setting effects of the policy reform. Specifically, it may be that the norma-
tive messages surrounding the reform contributed to a continued modernisation of
gender role attitudes in society over time, both for those directly experiencing the
new benefit as well as for wider society. Similarly, social interactions with those
eligible for the new benefit may have led to changes in the attitudes of the con-
trol group and of wider society. In contrast, the actual eligibility for the benefit
may not have changed attitudes towards the gender division of work and towards
the consequences of mothers’ labour force participation above and beyond overall
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societal trends. Prior research showing that the reform modernised gender role
attitudes in the grandparents’ generation (Unterhofer & Wrohlich 2017) and that
mothers’ leave-taking decisions depended on those of their coworkers (Welteke &
Wrohlich 2019) lend support to such an interpretation. Administrative statistics
showing that the share of fathers who took parental leave has been gradually rising
each year since 2007 also support the possibility of a more gradual modernisation
of attitudes (Statistisches Bundesamt 2020). Therefore, the results do not rule out
the possibility that the policy modernised societal attitudes gradually over time. It
is possible that the general normative messages surrounding the reform rather than
the direct treatment may be relevant for attitudinal change, particularly if treatment
does not expose individuals to starkly new experiences.
In light of these interpretations, interesting avenues for future research would be
to study whether the introduction of Elterngeld Plus in 2015, which facilitated a
more gender equal division of work via additional leave granted to couples in which
both work part-time, affected gender role attitudes. Additionally, further research
on the effects of policy changes on attitudes that considers peer and network effects
is needed.
This paper makes several contributions to existing literature. First, the paper
improves our understanding of the possible policy feedback effects of parental leave
policies on parents’ gender role attitudes by providing the first analysis of the effects
of the 2007 parental leave reform on attitudes. The only other study that has
analysed the impact of a parental leave reform on parents’ gender role attitudes is
one from Norway. In line with the results from this paper, the study found that the
introduction of a daddy quota did not affect parents’ gender role attitudes towards
the gender division of tasks and the consequences of female labour force participation
(Kotsadam & Finseraas 2011). Significant changes in men’s attitudes towards the
role of fathers, however, provide evidence for the existence of policy feedback effects.
Second, the paper adds to the empirical literature on the effects of the Eltern-
geld. Overall, results from this literature indicate that the reform was effective in
achieving the aims of a quicker labour market return of mothers and an increased
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adoption of leave-taking among fathers. However, longer-term economic impacts,
particularly with regards to gender equality in paid and unpaid work, are more con-
troversial. Results from this paper provide evidence for the failure of the reform to
modernise parental attitudes as a potential mechanism for these limited longer-term
behavioural changes.
Third, results inform the broader literature on whether individual attitudes
change over the life course. The robust effect of the reform on increased support
for traditional attitudes towards the role of fathers suggests that policy can indeed
affect attitudes but that impressionability may not always run in the intended di-
rection. Moreover, new experiences must be different enough from previous ones in
order to trigger attitudinal changes.
Apart from providing theoretically relevant insights concerning attitudinal change,
the findings from this paper carry important policy implications. Specifically, the
results from this paper suggest that policy can be an effective means to trigger atti-
tudinal changes. Moreover, in order to increase support for a gender equal division
of paid and unpaid work within families, policy needs to go further and actively
incentivise such a division.
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3.A Appendix tables
Table 3.A.1: Gender role attitude items included in ‘old’ indices
Item name Item text Index Agreement
considered as
suphusb It’s more important for a wife to help her husband with Division of tasks traditional
his career than to pursue her own career.
malebread It is much better for everyone concerned if the man goes Division of tasks traditional
out to work and the woman stays at home and looks
after the house and children.
wifenowork A married woman should not work if there are not Division of tasks traditional
enough jobs to go around and her husband is also in a
position to support the family.
mumbond A working mother can establish just as loving and secure Mothers’ LFP non-traditional
a relationship with her children as a mother who doesn’t
work.
childsuffers A small child is bound to suffer if his or her mother Mothers’ LFP traditional
goes out to work.
childbenefits A child actually benefits from his or her mother having Mothers’ LFP non-traditional
a job rather than just concentrating on the home.
Source: ALLBUS.
Table 3.A.2: Main results, ordered probit model
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.121 0.116 0.620***
(0.183) (0.191) (0.187)
Observations 184 182 184
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from ordered probit models. Each dependent variable takes
values between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control
variables include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared,
and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.








Table 3.A.3: Stepwise introduction of control variables
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment 0.362 0.248 0.280 -0.026 0.018 0.020 0.676** 0.725** 0.817**
(0.314) (0.318) (0.348) (0.384) (0.378) (0.389) (0.285) (0.296) (0.320)
Observations 184 184 184 182 182 182 184 184 184
R-squared 0.008 0.025 0.115 0.000 0.001 0.128 0.031 0.039 0.070
Age controls no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Child age controls no no no no no no no no no
Birth month FEs no no yes no no yes no no yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values between 0 and 9, with higher values in-
dicating more traditional attitudes. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
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Table 3.A.4: Main results, West German subsample
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.240 0.207 1.175***
(0.413) (0.512) (0.382)
Observations 136 134 136
R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.116
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values
between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables
include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month
of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of








Table 3.A.5: Heterogeneity by sex for each attitude item
Dependent variable bothfull malebread workmumhome fullmumbond childbenefits childsuffers fulldadbond rolechange fulldadbad
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment 0.254 0.110 0.224 0.282 0.344 0.023 0.593** 0.506*** 0.585**
(0.211) (0.214) (0.232) (0.294) (0.247) (0.288) (0.249) (0.150) (0.267)
Female 0.173 -0.034 0.018 0.263 0.005 -0.505* 0.063 0.419*** 0.183
(0.245) (0.239) (0.234) (0.300) (0.266) (0.293) (0.233) (0.146) (0.283)
Treatment x female -0.346 -0.287 -0.094 -0.413 -0.461 -0.289 -0.216 -0.421** -0.513
(0.285) (0.286) (0.300) (0.355) (0.313) (0.340) (0.298) (0.195) (0.336)
Observations 184 185 185 185 182 185 184 185 185
R-squared 0.170 0.153 0.191 0.140 0.130 0.184 0.117 0.165 0.075
Age controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Treatment + female -0.092 -0.178 0.131 -0.131 -0.117 -0.266 0.377* 0.086 0.072
(0.222) (0.204) (0.219) (0.250) (0.182) (0.230) (0.197) (0.145) (0.219)
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values between 0 and 3, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control vari-
ables include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
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Table 3.A.6: Heterogeneity by sex for West German subsample
Dependent variable Gender division LFP of mothers Roles of fathers
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.687 0.739 1.911***
(0.530) (0.746) (0.565)
Female 0.299 -0.309 0.783
(0.536) (0.748) (0.516)
Treatment x female -0.870 -1.230 -1.341**
(0.665) (0.879) (0.663)
Observations 136 134 136
R-squared 0.152 0.191 0.145
Age controls yes yes yes
Child age controls yes yes yes
Birth month FEs yes yes yes
Treatment + female -0.183 -0.491 0.570
(0.527) (0.587) (0.455)
Notes: Table shows estimates from OLS regressions. Each dependent variable takes values
between 0 and 9, with higher values indicating more traditional attitudes. Control variables
include age (in years), age squared, child’s age (in months), child’s age squared, and month
of birth dummies. Survey weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Levels of
significance *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: ALLBUS.
Chapter 4




We study the effect of parenting daughters on attitudes towards gender norms in
the UK; specifically, attitudes towards the traditional male breadwinner norm in
which it is the husband’s role to work and the wife’s to stay at home. We find
robust evidence that parenting daughters decreases fathers’ likelihood to hold tra-
ditional attitudes. This result is driven by fathers of school-aged daughters, for
whom the effects are robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects. Our esti-
mates suggest that fathers’ probability to support traditional gender norms declines
by approximately 3 percentage points (8 percent) when parenting primary school-
aged daughters and by 4 percentage points (11 percent) when parenting secondary
school-aged daughters. The effect on mothers’ attitudes is generally not statistically
significant. These findings are consistent with exposure and identity theories. We
conclude that gender norm attitudes are not stable throughout the life-course and
can significantly be shaped by adulthood experiences.
1This chapter is written jointly with Mireia Borrell-Porta and Joan Costa-Font, and a version
of it is published as: The ‘mighty girl’ effect: does parenting daughters alter attitudes towards
gender norms? in Oxford Economic Papers, 71(1), 2019, pp. 25–46. An earlier working paper





In recent decades, concerns about gender equality have been increasingly promi-
nent in both the political and the social spheres, prompting governments to embark
on the task of alleviating gender differences inside and outside the labour market.
Nevertheless, progress towards achieving gender equality appears to have gradually
slowed down (Eagly & Wood 2012). Against this background, a growing body of
research has established the importance of traditional gender norms in explaining
the persistence of gender inequalities in wages (Burda et al. 2007), in labour force
participation (Fernández et al. 2004, Fortin 2005, Fernández & Fogli 2009, Farré &
Vella 2013, Johnston et al. 2014), and in the division of domestic work (DeMaris
& Longmore 1996, Greenstein 1996, Davis & Greenstein 2009). However, there is
limited evidence on how susceptible to change such norms are. This paper addresses
this question.
Changing individual attitudes towards societal gender norms may be critical
for further progress towards a less gendered division of work and towards gender
equality more generally, since it may legitimize a wider range of social roles for both
men and women (Eagly & Wood 2012). So far, the literature has focused mostly on
long-term changes in norms across cohorts (Baxter et al. 2015), although research
on individual changes in attitudes towards gender norms across the life cycle is
gradually increasing. This latter approach has studied the role played by the family
environment, including that of marriage, parenthood, and women’s labour patterns
inside and outside the household (see Clarkberg 2002, Corrigall & Konrad 2007,
Cunningham 2008, Schober & Scott 2012, Baxter et al. 2015).
Our paper contributes to this literature by analysing one life course event that
has received limited attention so far, namely the effect of parenting daughters. Us-
ing a British nationally representative longitudinal survey spanning two decades,
we examine whether rearing daughters changes parental attitudes towards gender
norms, and more specifically, attitudes towards the traditional male breadwinner
norm in which it is the husband’s role to work and the wife’s role to stay at home.
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Given that a child’s sex cannot be anticipated, we assume that rearing a daughter
- as opposed to a son - is an approximately random event (Washington 2008).2
In examining the individual change in attitudes towards gender norms, we borrow
the definition of gender norms from Pearse & Connell (2016), who define them as
‘collective definitions of socially approved conduct in relation to groups constituted
in the gender order - mainly distinctions between men and women’. Hence, norms
are defined as ‘features of a collective life’ (p.34) that signal to other members of a
group or society how they should behave’ (Schwartz 2012, p. 16), and closely follows
definitions in other social science disciplines.
We find evidence that parenting daughters decreases fathers’ likelihood to agree
with a traditional male breadwinner norm. This is especially the case for fathers of
school-aged daughters, for whom the effects are robust to a number of alternative
specifications, and in particular the inclusion of individual fixed effects (FE) that
control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Our FE estimates suggest that
fathers’ probability to support traditional gender norms declines by approximately
three percentage points (8 percent change) when parenting primary school-aged
daughters and by four percentage points (11 percent change) when parenting sec-
ondary school-aged daughters. In contrast, the effect on mothers’ attitudes is smaller
and generally not statistically significant. While it is not possible to discern the ex-
act mechanisms through which daughters affect parental attitudes, the heterogeneity
of results between fathers and mothers combined with the finding that attitudinal
change occurs when daughters reach school age is in line with theories of exposure
as well as with identity theories. Furthermore, given that attitudes towards gender
norms are shaped by experiences during adulthood, our results provide evidence of
intra-cohort change in attitudes. Consistent with our findings on attitudinal change,
we find that parenting school-age daughters is also associated with a lower likelihood
that couples follow a traditional gender division of work.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to explore the impact of a
2However, some authors such as Hamoudi & Nobles (2014) found that relationship conflict
between husband and wife predicted the sex of subsequent children, and hence, separate analyses
need to be done looking at the effect of the first child’s sex only.
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child’s sex across daughters’ ages on individual changes in attitudes towards gender
norms. This is important because our findings suggest that it is when daughters are
of school-age - and not before - that fathers’ attitudes become less traditional, thus
coinciding with the period in which children experience a stronger social pressure to
conform to gender norms (Lane et al. 2017). The paper also contributes to expanding
the evidence beyond the USA, being the first paper to explore the impact of the
sex of the child on attitudes towards gender norms in the UK. Finally, and unlike
previous studies, we draw on data that covers very recent years - up to 2012 - which
is important given the large changes in patterns of gender inequalities during recent
decades.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the relevant
literature, and Section 4.3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4.4
contains the main results, Section 4.5 robustness checks, and a final section con-
cludes.
4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 On the malleability of attitudes towards gender norms
There are two main approaches in social science on the evolution of attitudes towards
social norms, including gender norms. One approach suggests that attitudes are
formed before reaching adulthood and remain stable thereafter.3 Societal change in
norms then occurs through processes of cohort succession, when older cohorts are
replaced by younger ones who systematically differ in its social and historical early
years’ experiences (Mannheim 1952, Brooks & Bolzendahl 2004). An alternative
approach - the one embraced by this paper - questions the stability of norms and
embraces the viewpoint that attitudes can change over the life course, either due to
social structural changes, or due to changes in individual circumstances (Brooks &
3See for example the increasing persistence hypothesis (Glenn 1980, Inglehart & Baker 2000)
or the impressionable years hypothesis (Ryder 1965, Carlsson & Karlsson 1970, Krosnick & Alwin
1989).
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Bolzendahl 2004, Hogg & Vaughan 2013, Baxter et al. 2015).4
Empirical evidence concerning these two approaches remains inconclusive. Two
early papers analysing US data from the 1970s and the 1980s point in different
directions, one suggesting that attitudes towards familial roles in the USA occur
mainly within cohorts (Mason & Lu 1988) and another providing evidence for co-
hort replacement-based explanations (Wilkie 1993). Further analyses with data from
the 1990s and early 2000s have not resolved the debate. While some research sup-
ports cohort replacement theories (Brewster & Padavic 2000), there is also evidence
which confirms the importance of intra-cohort change (Danigelis et al. 2007). An-
other paper finds that while cohort replacement theories have a strong explanatory
power, ideological learning during adulthood may mediate a large part of the cohort
replacement effect (Brooks & Bolzendahl 2004).
Attention on intra-cohort change has recently shifted the focus of research to-
wards the potential factors underpinning change, with a particular emphasis on
family environment. To this purpose, longitudinal data has increasingly been used
to study the impact on attitudes towards gender norms of women’s decision to work
(Cunningham 2008), parenthood (Evertsson 2013, Baxter et al. 2015), the interac-
tion between work and childbirth (Berrington et al. 2008, Schober & Scott 2012),
and marriage and cohabitation (Moors 2003, Corrigall & Konrad 2007). Nonethe-
less, the sex of the child has received limited attention. In what follows, we will
focus on the specific effect of the sex of the child.
4.2.2 On the relevance of a child’s sex for attitudes towards
gender norms
Evidence on the effect of a child’s sex on attitudes towards gender norms remains
inconclusive.5 Warner’s (1991) pioneer study showed that daughters led Canadian
4See for example the life-stages hypothesis (Sears 1983, Visser & Krosnick 1998) or the lifelong
openness hypothesis (Brim & Kagan 1980).
5In this paper, we focus on attitudes towards traditional gender norms as a dependent variable.
A few papers from various disciplines have studied the effect of a child’s sex on a range of other
outcomes, among them parents’ political party identification (Oswald & Powdthavee 2010, Lee &
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and US parents to hold more modern attitudes towards gender norms (with the
exception of American men). She explains her finding with the inclusion of chil-
dren’s well-being into parents’ own utility function, consistent with (social) identity
theory. The logic behind (social) identity theory is that individuals derive utility
from behaving in line with the social roles and the social categories they identify
with (see e.g. Hogg et al. 1995, Akerlof & Kranton 2000). Consistently, mothers
with sons are more likely to hold traditional views on gender norms (Downey et al.
1994).6
Nonetheless, the external validity of those studies is limited due to small and
unrepresentative samples sizes. In contrast, Shafer & Malhotra (2011) use a large
sample (the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 from the USA) and find
that only fathers reduce their support for traditional gender roles when having a
daughter, while mothers’ attitudes remain unchanged. The intuition behind their
finding is that mothers, unlike fathers, may have already crossed the ‘threshold
of exposure’ by experiencing situations in their own lives that render them more
sympathetic to a modern attitude towards gender norms.
Having a daughter would expose fathers to a larger extent than mothers to new
worldviews, leading to a more significant shift in their attitudes. This evidence is in
line with theories of exposure, which posit that individuals - parents, in this case -
‘develop or change their understanding of women’s place in society [...] when they
encounter ideas and situations that resonate with feminist ideals’ (Bolzendahl &
Myers 2004, pp. 761-762). However, they cannot test the plausibility of exposure-
related explanations, since they analyse the effect of childbirth as opposed to the
effect of parenting daughters of different age groups. This is an important issue we
address in this paper.
Conley 2016), voting behaviour on women’s issues (Washington 2008, Glynn & Sen 2015), labour
supply (Lundberg & Rose 2002, Lundberg 2005, Pabilonia & Ward-Batts 2007, Choi et al. 2008),
take-up of parental leave (Bartel et al. 2018), support for gender equality policies (Warner & Steel
1999), and CEO’s wage setting (Dahl et al. 2012). For an overview, see Lundberg (2005) and Raley
& Bianchi (2006).
6Their explanations, however, are that sons are more valued than daughters, and that sons need
more maternal attention, inducing mothers to think that working would be a disservice to them.
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The significant effect of a child’s sex on attitudes is challenged by two papers.
Katzev et al. (1994) use the National Survey of Families and Households and find
that, against their expectations, mothers with boys are more likely to hold modern
attitudes towards marriage and family life. Similarly, Conley & Rauscher (2013),
using the 1994 General Social Survey, find no evidence (for any parent) of daugh-
ters promoting non-traditional views and gender norms. The null effect would not
necessarily contradict exposure-related theories given that if fathers exhibit a son
preference,7 they might spend less time with daughters and as a result be less ex-
posed to their worldviews (Lee & Conley 2016). However, both studies are limited
by either the older nature or the cross-sectional nature of the data, with findings
potentially affected by time-invariant unobservables. The longitudinal nature of our
data helps to overcome these limitations.
An additional advantage of large longitudinal evidence is that it allows for the
examination of age-specific effects, which may play an important role. According
to (social) identity theories, the event of a daughter’s birth could be enough to
trigger a readjustment of the parental utility to include their daughter’s interests.
However, it is possible that such readjustment only takes place once daughters are
older and the consequences of gender norms on them become more visible. Research
in psychology suggests that children are aware of gender stereotypes at the age of
six already (Bian et al. 2017), with social pressure to conform to existing gender
norms mounting around the early adolescence period (Lane et al. 2017). In line with
theories of exposure (see Bolzendahl & Myers 2004, Glynn & Sen 2015), parents may
thus start to become more aware of what is at stake for their daughters when they
reach school-age, prompting a readjustment of their gender norm attitudes around
this time (and not earlier). The rest of the paper will be devoted to understand
empirically how the sex of the child influences parental attitudes across child age.
7Dahl & Moretti (2008) found a son preference in the USA using data from the 1960s to the
2000s. This son preference is less evident in more recent US data (see Blau et al. 2020).
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4.3 Data and empirical strategy
We use rich longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
together with the BHPS sample of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS).
The BHPS was collected annually from 1999 to 2008 and became part of the new
UKHLS, which started in 2009 and is still ongoing (University of Essex 2015). The
data are a nationally representative sample of British households collected annually
since 1991. Attitudes towards the gender division of work - our outcome variable
of interest - were collected biennially, hence our data comprise 11 distinct waves
covering the period from 1991 to 2012.
4.3.1 Sample
We restrict the sample to individuals who we observe with a child under the age
of 21 in the household in at least one wave, thus excluding individuals who never
have children in the household as well as individuals who are only observed after
their children in the household are already in their twenties or older. Since we follow
individuals over time and are interested in the variation from children entering the
household and not the variation from children leaving the household, we follow
individuals only as long as the number of children in the household is increasing
or constant.8 After dropping observations for which the main outcome variable or
any of the covariates are missing, the final sample is an unbalanced panel including
48,822 observations of 11,405 individuals (5,073 men with 20,851 observations and
6,332 women with 27,971 observations).
4.3.2 Measures
Our dependent variable measures attitudes towards traditional gender norms, specif-
ically towards a traditional gender division of work. Respondents are asked to rate
agreement with the statement ‘a husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to
8We replicated the main results of section four without this further sample restriction and
results remained similar.
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look after the home and family’ on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to
‘strongly disagree’. We recoded the answers so that higher values mean stronger
agreement with the statement, hence more traditional attitudes. We focus on this
attitudinal question as it captures the essence of the traditional male breadwinner
norm, by which it is the husband’s role to work and the wife’s role to stay at home.
We also binarize the dependent variable into non-traditional (taking a value of zero
for ‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’) and traditional (taking a value of one for ‘nei-
ther agree nor disagree’, ‘agree’, and ‘strongly agree’) and report results alongside
those for the ordinal dependent variable.9
Our main regressor of interest is the binary variable ‘at least one daughter’ that
takes on a value of one if the respondent has at least one daughter living in the
household, and zero otherwise.10 To account for the potential interactive effect
between sex and age of the child on attitudes to gender norms, we also distinguish
different age groups: ‘daughter 0 to 5’, ‘daughter 6 to 10’, and ‘daughter 11 or
older’ are dummy variables indicating whether there is at least one daughter of the
respective age group living in the household. If there is more than one daughter, we
consider the age of the youngest daughter, but we also run a robustness check using
age of the oldest daughter. We refer to these age groups as preschool-aged daughters,
primary school-aged daughters, and secondary school-aged daughters, and to refer
to the latter two at the same time we say school-aged daughters.
Our data contain information on children living in the household (as opposed to
fertility records) which we use to construct our daughters measures, and we equally
consider biological children, adopted children, foster children, and partners’/step-
children.11 Since we are interested in the longitudinal effect of parenting daughters
via exposure or identity changes rather than the one-time event of a birth of a
daughter, we consider information from co-residence preferable over that from fer-
9We also ran the main results (Tables 4.2 and 4.3) when considering ‘neither agree nor disagree’
as non-traditional and results remained similar, albeit with generally smaller effect sizes.
10In a robustness check in Table 4.6, we use alternative ways to represent sex of the child.
1194.4 percent of our children-wave pairs are on biological children, 4.8 percent on step/partners’
children, 0.7 percent on adopted children, and 0.2 percent on foster children. If anything, we expect
our results to be downward biased compared to considering only biological children.
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tility histories.
4.3.3 Estimation approach and identification assumptions
We are interested in identifying the effect of parenting daughters on parental at-
titudes towards gender norms, and start by estimating the following pooled OLS
baseline specification:
yit = α + β1dit + β2(dit ∗ femit) + β3femit + β4cit + β5Xit + β6Tt + εit (4.1)
where yit stands for the level of agreement with traditional gender norms of
individual i at time t, femit is a dummy variable indicating the individual is female,
cit are dummy variables controlling for the total number of children in the household,
Xit are a set of individual characteristics, and Tt are wave fixed effects. dit is our
key regressor for parenting daughters and takes two forms. Once a dummy with a
value of one if the individual has at least one daughter in the household, and zero
otherwise. In a second specification testing age-of-daughter specific effects, d is a
categorial variable, and we include three dummies for the categories ‘at least one
daughter with the youngest aged zero to five years’, ‘at least one daughter with the
youngest aged six to ten years’, and ‘at least one daughter with the youngest aged
at least eleven years’. Robust standard errors are clustered by individual.
Thus, we estimate the effect of parenting at least one daughter, while holding
family size constant. When the number of children is controlled for, the coefficient
on the daughter dummy captures the additional effect of parenting daughters as
opposed to parenting only sons. In all models, we interact the effect of parenting
daughters with a dummy for females, thus allowing the effect of parenting daughters
to vary by sex of the parent. We then start adding control variables in a stepwise
fashion: first, by adding the ‘basic controls’ age, square of age, as well as region
and wave FEs. Then, by additionally adding the ‘additional controls’, which consist
of two educational level dummies, five marital status dummies, eight employment
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status dummies, and the natural logarithm of household income (see Table 4.A.2 in
Appendix 4.A for summary statistics and definitions of all variables).
While estimates from pooled OLS regressions are comparable to previous liter-
ature that uses cross-sectional data, we also estimate individual FE models with
robust standard errors, in order to eliminate bias arising from unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity and to capture the effect of daughters on changes in attitudes
within individuals longitudinally rather than comparing those with to those without
daughters.12 Hence, the error term in equation 4.1 takes the form:
εit = µi + ρit (4.2)
We follow previous literature (e.g. Washington 2008, Oswald & Powdthavee 2010)
in considering the sex of any given child entering the household as approximately
random. This is based on the argument that parents cannot choose the sex of
any given child, absent sex-selective abortion. Previous literature has regarded the
possibility of sex-selective abortion as empirically unimportant in Western countries
(Choi et al. 2008). However, we still face potential endogeneity because of three
reasons. First, fertility stopping rules may depend on the sex mix of children already
in the household, hence our key regressor of having at least one daughter conditional
on the total number of children may be selected. Indeed, evidence suggests that
parents in Western countries including the UK are more likely to have a third child
if their first two children are of the same sex, as they prefer a ‘balanced’ sex mix
of children (Iacovou 2001, Lundberg 2005). There is also some evidence suggesting
that a firstborn boy increases the probability of further children (Ichino et al. 2014).
This implies that only the sex of a firstborn child is truly random, and if more
(less) traditional parents have a son (daughter) preference, this would introduce an
upward bias to our OLS estimates. To account for these possibilities, we perform
robustness checks in which we test for endogenous fertility stopping rules. We also
12For ease of interpretation we estimate linear models, but our results remain very similar when
we re-estimate the main results for the binarized dependent variable with logit and fixed effects
logit models (see Table 4.A.4).
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estimate the effect of the sex of the first child only on attitudes, and we re-estimate
the main results on the subsample of observations with two or less children.
Second, there is potential selection into co-residence with daughters because a
father’s or mother’s decision about co-residence may depend upon whether they have
daughters or sons. For example, after couples split, we typically observe the resident
parent with marital status ‘divorced’, while the non-resident parent drops out of our
estimation sample.13 Then, if the likelihood to divorce or to get child custody
depends on a child’s sex, this may bias our results.14 Therefore, this essentially
becomes a problem of attrition and we perform robustness checks testing whether
having daughters is related to attrition and whether attrition affects our results.
We also re-estimate the main results on the subsample of never-divorcees and never-
attritors.
Finally, we also check that our results are not driven by reverse causality, that
is, that initial attitudes predict the probability of having a daughter. In addition to
performing these robustness checks, we note that FEs account for the bias arising
from time-invariant unobservable characteristics that are correlated with both the
probability to live with daughters and with attitudes. For our FE estimates to still be
biased, it would be necessary that the timing of daughters entering the household is
systematically correlated with shocks causing attitudinal change. Or alternatively,
that individuals with higher malleability in attitudes are more likely to live with
daughters versus sons. We argue that this is unlikely. In line with this, Amato &
Booth (1991) find that individuals in the US who were divorced at baseline held less
traditional gender role attitudes, while getting divorced during the duration of the
panel was not associated with changes in attitudes. We are, however, not aware of
13This happens due to one of two reasons, either because they attrit from the panel due to the
inability to track or retain the non-resident parent in the study after the family splits, or because
we drop observations on non-resident parents as we follow individuals only as long as the number
of children in the household is increasing or constant. We replicated the main results reported in
section 4.4, keeping the observations for which variation came from children leaving the household,
and results remained similar.
14However, there seems to be no evidence of an association between children’s sex and divorce
or custody arrangements in Western countries other than the USA (Lundberg 2005) and we are
not aware of any UK study investigating this.
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any UK evidence on this issue.
4.3.4 Sample descriptive statistics and randomization checks
Table 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A reports summary statistics for the analysis sample.
The average age of observations for men and women in our sample is 37.5 and 35.4
years, respectively. The average number of children is 1.62 and 1.66, respectively.
The dummy of having at least one daughter in the household takes a value of one for
57 percent of observations on men and 58 percent of observations on women. The
various variables on daughters in the household (at least one daughter, only daugh-
ters, first daughter) are very similar between males and females and suggest that
there are no substantial differences between fathers and mothers in their probability
to co-reside with daughters.
Figure 4.1 examines how attitudes towards the gender division of work differ by
respondent sex and by the sex composition of offspring for individual-wave pairs
with at least one child in the household. It shows the mean value of the ordinal
(Panel a) and binarized (Panel b) outcome variable. On average, men have higher
levels of agreement with the traditional male breadwinner norm than women. Men
with at least one daughter or only daughters are less traditional than men with only
sons. Women with daughters only are less traditional than women with sons only,
but those with at least one daughter actually appear more traditional compared
to those with only sons. To understand whether these differences are explained by
other covariates requires further analysis.
In Table 4.1 we check whether our key regressor of parenting at least one daugh-
ter is related to any socio-demographic characteristics. In panel a, each row shows
the coefficient of a separate regression of the probability to have at least one daugh-
ter on the respective socio-demographic characteristic, while controlling for the total
number of children. Most of the individual characteristics are unrelated to the prob-
ability of parenting daughters, with a few exceptions. For females, having a higher
degree is positively associated with parenting daughters, while being widowed/other
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Figure 4.1: Mean attitudes towards traditional gender division of work
Notes: Sample restricted to individual-wave pairs with at least one child in the household. Panel
a shows mean levels of agreement with the statement ‘husband should work and wife stay at
home’ (scale 1 to 5), by the sex composition of children. Panel b shows the share of observations
with ‘traditional attitudes’ when the dependent variable is binarized, by the sex composition of
children. Source: Authors’ calculations based on BHPS and UKHLS data.
marital status, being retired, and being in government training/having another em-
ployment status is negatively associated with parenting daughters. For men, being
divorced is associated with a lower probability to be parenting daughters. To ac-
count for these differences, we control for marital status, employment status, and
educational level. Panel b tests whether all socio-demographic characteristics shown
in panel a, plus region and wave FEs, can predict having at least one daughter while
holding family size constant. The F-test rejects joint significance for both the male
and the female subsample. This supports our assumption of no selection into having
at least one daughter, conditional on family size.
4.4 Results
Our main results are presented in Tables 4.2 to 4.4. Table 4.2 estimates the ef-
fect of parenting daughters on attitudes towards the traditional gender division of
work. Table 4.3 subdivides this effect into parenting daughters of three different age
groups. Finally, Table 4.4 studies whether parenting daughters is also associated
4.4. Results 148
Table 4.1: Randomisation checks
(1) (2)
Male Female
Panel a: randomisation checks
Age -0.0006 -0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0006)
Age squared 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
First degree -0.0137 -0.0123
(0.0173) (0.0158)
Higher degree 0.0234 0.0566**
(0.0298) (0.0277)
Ln household income -0.0018 -0.0039
(0.0062) (0.0056)
Marital status: married -0.0001 -0.00162
(0.0118) (0.0103)
Marital status: living as couple 0.0149 0.0047
(0.0122) (0.0111)
Marital status: widowed/other 0.0183 -0.108**
(0.0848) (0.0434)
Marital status: divorced -0.103** 0.0234
(0.0406) (0.0198)
Marital status: separated -0.0364 0.0181
(0.0347) (0.0226)
Marital status: never married -0.0043 -0.0096
(0.0038) (0.0133)
Empl. Status: self-employed -0.0205 -0.0240
(0.0146) (0.0225)
Empl. Status: in paid employment 0.0139 0.0028
(0.0105) (0.0086)
Empl. Status: unemployed -0.0119 0.0010
(0.0144) (0.0146)
Empl. Status: retired -0.0036 -0.146**
(0.0549) (0.0600)
Empl. Status: family care 0.0956 0.0069
(0.0850) (0.0115)
Empl. Status: FT student -0.0109 0.0021
(0.0315) (0.0102)
Empl. Status: LT sick/disabled 0.0045 -0.0070
(0.0131) (0.0118)
Empl. Status: maternity leave 0.0100 0.0344
(0.0293) (0.0245)
Empl. Status: gov’t training/other 0.0131 -0.0533*
(0.0331) (0.0314)
Observations 20,851 27,971
Panel b: F-test of joint significance of long regression
Joint F-statistic 1.06 1.28
p-value 0.36 0.11
Notes panel a: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by individual. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1.
The different rows are separate pooled OLS regressions with having at least one daughter as the dependent
variable. All specifications include 4 dummy variables for number of children. Notes panel b: F-test of joint
significance of covariates shown in panel a, plus region and wave fixed effects. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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with couples’ probability of following a traditional gender division of work.
4.4.1 Main results
Table 4.2 presents the effect of parenting daughters on levels of agreement with
the traditional male breadwinner norm, using the continuous attitudinal scale of
the survey as well as a binarized version to capture potential ‘attitudinal shifts’.
In columns 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 the dependent attitude variable is ordinal, while in
columns 4 and 8 it is binarized. In all specifications we include dummy variables
for the total number of children in the household, hence we identify the effect of
parenting at least one daughter while holding family size constant. We only report
the coefficients on the variables of key interest. For full results showing coefficients
on all control variables see Table 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A. We allow the effect to vary
by sex of the parent as we interact the daughter dummy with a female dummy, and
in addition to the interaction term we report the direct effect of parenting daughters






Table 4.2: Effect of parenting daughters on attitudes to gender norms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Ordinal dep. variable binary Ordinal dep. variable binary
At least one daughter -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.0930*** -0.0310*** -0.0547** -0.0571** -0.0415 -0.0102
(0.0255) (0.0249) (0.0242) (0.0115) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0140)
Female -0.276*** -0.263*** -0.295*** -0.117***
(0.0235) (0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0102)
At least one daughter x female 0.0803*** 0.0963*** 0.0495* 0.0063 0.0919*** 0.0905*** 0.0626** 0.0091
(0.0294) (0.0290) (0.0280) (0.0130) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0156)
Linear combination of estimates: effect for females
At least one daughter -0.0330 -0.0228 -0.0435** -0.0247** 0.0373 0.0334 0.0212 -0.00111
(0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0210) (0.00976) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0133)
Total number of children controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Basic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822
R-squared 0.041 0.061 0.106 0.075 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.010
Number of individuals 11,405 11,405 11,405 11,405
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for columns (1) to (4)). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Total number of children
controls: 4 dummies for number of total children. Basic controls: age, age squared, wave dummies, region dummies. Additional controls: 2 education dummies,
5 marital status dummies, 8 employment status dummies, ln household income. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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We find that having daughters is associated with lower levels of agreement with
traditional gender norms among men, but not among women as reflected in column
1. Next, we add age, square of age, as well as wave and region FEs in column 2 and
we observe that results are robust to such controls. In column 3 we additionally con-
trol for education, marital status, employment status, and the natural logarithm of
household income. Importantly, the negative association between parenting daugh-
ters and traditional attitudes remains after controlling for these observable charac-
teristics. Results hold too when attitudes are binarized in column 4, and we show
that men with daughters are approximately three percentage points less likely to
hold traditional attitudes compared to men without daughters, while holding family
size constant. This coefficient reflects an 8 percent reduction in the probability to
hold traditional attitudes.15
Given that these results could be explained by individual specific and time in-
variant unobservables that affect both co-residence with daughters and attitudes,
columns 5 to 8 exhibit the individual FE results and show that the negative associ-
ation between parenting daughters and traditional attitudes persists in FE models.
Comparing the FE columns with their respective OLS ones reveals that the size
of the coefficient is approximately halved when accounting for time-invariant un-
observed heterogeneity. Once we introduce the ‘additional controls’ for education,
marital status, employment status, and ln household income in columns 7 and 8,
the coefficient on the daughter dummy becomes statistically insignificant although
the sign remains.
We then turn to examine attitudes among women. Women hold on average
less traditional attitudes compared to men. The interaction effects between par-
enting daughters and being female show that the effect of parenting daughters is
significantly different for mothers compared to fathers when the outcome variable is
ordinal. The linear combinations of estimates capture the overall effect of parent-
ing daughters among women. OLS estimates (columns 1 to 4) show that parenting
15Approximately 37.1 percent of male observations without daughters in our sample hold tradi-
tional attitudes.
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daughters is also negatively associated with traditional attitudes among women, the
effect is smaller compared to the one for men and statistically significant only in two
of the columns. When individual FEs are included, the coefficient on the daugh-
ter dummy is statistically insignificant in all specifications and the sign even turns
positive for the specifications with ordinal dependent variable (columns 5 to 7).
Taken together, the results suggest that having daughters is associated with
lower levels of agreement with traditional gender norms among men. For women,
the association is ambiguous. Once controlling for the full set of observable charac-
teristics and time-invariant unobservable characteristics in columns 7 and 8, effects
for both males and females are not statistically significant. This suggests that, on
average, attitudes do not change with the birth of a daughter.
4.4.2 Age-of-daughter specific effects
Given that rearing a daughter might not exert an immediate effect on attitudes upon
birth but instead may emerge after a certain exposure, we next turn to examining
age-of-daughter specific effects of rearing daughters on parental gender norm atti-
tudes (Table 4.3). We separate our previous dummy on parenting daughters into
three different dummy variables: ‘at least one daughter of age group 0 to 5’, ‘at
least one daughter of age group 6 to 10’, and ‘at least one daughter of age group
11 or older’.16 We refer to them in our paper as pre-school, primary school, and
secondary school-age daughters. Consistently with Table 4.2, the omitted category
is thus ‘not parenting any daughters’.
16If there is more than one daughter, we define the age group based on the youngest daughter in
the household, and we perform robustness checks in which we define the age group based on the






Table 4.3: Effect of parenting daughters of different age groups on attitudes to gender norms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Ordinal dep. variable binary Ordinal dep. variable binary
At least one daughter (youngest 0 to 5) -0.158*** -0.107*** -0.0659** -0.0165 -0.0468* -0.0474* -0.0295 -0.0031
(0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0271) (0.0129) (0.0274) (0.0274) (0.0275) (0.0142)
At least one daughter (youngest 6 to 10) -0.162*** -0.144*** -0.120*** -0.0480*** -0.0703** -0.0790** -0.0625* -0.0281*
(0.0308) (0.0301) (0.0296) (0.0144) (0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0170)
At least one daughter (youngest 11 plus) -0.0375 -0.116*** -0.103*** -0.0348** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.110*** -0.0410**
(0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0297) (0.0141) (0.0344) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0187)
Female -0.276*** -0.263*** -0.296*** -0.118***
(0.0235) (0.0232) (0.0223) (0.0103)
Daughter 0 to 5 x female 0.0926*** 0.0818** -0.0074 -0.0222 0.0900*** 0.0887*** 0.0519* 0.0030
(0.0336) (0.0332) (0.0322) (0.0150) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0309) (0.0159)
Daughter 6 to 10 x female 0.0986*** 0.116*** 0.0811** 0.0216 0.0952** 0.0920** 0.0821** 0.0218
(0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0353) (0.0168) (0.0370) (0.0371) (0.0372) (0.0195)
Daughter 11 plus x female 0.0540 0.0976*** 0.0832** 0.0235 0.0905** 0.0862** 0.0851** 0.0205
(0.0366) (0.0361) (0.0347) (0.0164) (0.0418) (0.0420) (0.0421) (0.0216)
Linear combination of estimates: effect for females
At least one daughter (youngest 0 to 5) -0.0653** -0.0252 -0.0733*** -0.0387*** 0.0432* 0.0413 0.0225 -0.0001
(0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0242) (0.0110) (0.0259) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0134)
At least one daughter (youngest 6 to 10) -0.0632** -0.0276 -0.0389 -0.0264** 0.0248 0.0130 0.0195 -0.0063
(0.0270) (0.0267) (0.0253) (0.0119) (0.0299) (0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0156)
At least one daughter (youngest 11 plus) 0.0166 -0.0187 -0.0195 -0.0113 -0.0151 -0.0374 -0.0249 -0.0205
(0.0264) (0.0268) (0.0254) (0.0120) (0.0332) (0.0351) (0.0350) (0.0177)
Total number of children controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Basic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822
R-squared 0.042 0.061 0.106 0.076 0.006 0.010 0.014 0.010
Number of individuals 11,405 11,405 11,405 11,405
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for columns (1) to (4)). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Total number of children controls:
4 dummies for number of total children. Basic controls: age, age squared, wave dummies, region dummies. Additional controls: 2 education dummies, 5 marital status
dummies, 8 employment status dummies, ln household income. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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The OLS estimates suggest that parenting daughters of each age group is asso-
ciated with less traditional gender attitudes among fathers, but the effect is larger
for daughters of school-age (age groups 6 to 10 and 11 plus) rather than pre-school,
which is consistent with exposure-based explanations. As expected, when we control
for individual FEs (columns 5 to 8), the coefficients on pre-school daughters and pri-
mary school daughters shrink. In the full specification in column 7, the coefficient
on daughters aged 0 to 5 becomes insignificant, suggesting that on average, atti-
tudes do not change at birth. In contrast, results suggest that parenting daughters
of primary and secondary school-age makes fathers on average less traditional, with
a larger effect size for secondary school-age daughters. Consistently, results for the
binarized outcome variable in column 8 indicate that parenting pre-school daughters
does not affect fathers’ attitudes, while parenting primary school-age daughters re-
duces the probability to hold traditional attitudes by about three percentage points,
which constitutes an 8 percent change compared to the baseline probability of hold-
ing traditional attitudes of 37.1 percent among men without daughters. Parenting
secondary school-age daughters reduces the probability to hold traditional attitudes
by approximately four percentage points, which amounts to an 11 percent change
compared to men without daughters.
As before, we then turn to examining the effects for mothers. The interactions
between the different daughter dummies and the female dummy show that in many
cases, the effect of parenting daughters is significantly different for mothers. When
we test the joint significance of the linear combination of estimates, OLS estimates in
columns 1 to 4 suggest that parenting pre-school and primary school daughters is as-
sociated with less traditional attitudes among mothers. However, once we introduce
individual FEs the effect of parenting daughters on attitudes becomes insignificant
for all age groups, while the sign of the coefficients turns positive for the younger
two age groups.
Taken together, results from Table 4.3 suggest that after accounting for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity, there is no robust effect among mothers. For
fathers, attitudes to gender norms do not change with the birth of a daughter but in-
4.4. Results 155
stead, fathers’ attitudes become significantly less traditional when parenting school-
age daughters.
4.4.3 Effects on behaviour
Given these interesting results for men, we next explore whether parenting daughters
is also associated with behavioural changes reflecting the male breadwinner norm as
it would be expected if attitudes inform behaviours (Table 4.4). To do so, we focus
on the subsample of males living in a couple, and we define a variable which takes
the value of one if the individual is employed or self-employed and the partner is
neither of the two, and a value of zero otherwise.
We find that on average, having daughters does not change the probability to
follow a male breadwinner norm (column 1 for OLS and 3 for FE). Studying different
age groups again yields a more differentiated picture though. Parenting pre-school
daughters is associated with a higher probability to behave traditionally. However,
parenting primary and secondary school-age daughters is associated with a lower
likelihood to follow a traditional male breadwinner norm in which the man works
and the woman does not work, and this result holds both cross-sectionally and
longitudinally. In terms of effect size, FEs estimates shown in column 4 indicate
that parenting daughters aged six to 10 reduces the probability of a traditional
gender division of work by seven percentage points, and parenting daughters aged
11 or older reduces that probability by five percentage points. Compared to the
baseline probability of following a traditional norm for those without daughters of
20.3 percent, this is a sizeable reduction of 36 percent and 25 percent, respectively.
Therefore, our finding that parenting daughters changes attitudes to gender norms
is also reflected in behavioural changes concerning gender norms, for the subsample
of individuals living with a partner.
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Table 4.4: Effect of parenting daughters on the traditional gender division of work
(male subsample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Dependent variable Traditional gender division of work
At least one daughter -0.0172 0.0000
(0.0118) (0.0194)
At least one daughter (youngest aged 0 to 5) 0.0699*** 0.0122
(0.0137) (0.0196)
At least one daughter (youngest 6 to 10) -0.0653*** -0.0724***
(0.0141) (0.0218)
At least one daughter (youngest 11 plus) -0.0849*** -0.0507**
(0.0139) (0.0248)
Observations 18,144 18,144 18,144 18,144
R-squared 0.064 0.078 0.077 0.082
Number of individuals 4,889 4,889
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for columns (1) to (2)). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Control variables in all columns: 4 dummies for number of total children, age, age squared, 2
education dummies, 5 marital status dummies, ln household income, wave dummies, region dummies. Outcome
variable: Dummy individual (self-)employed and partner not (self-)employed. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
4.5 Robustness checks
Given the results in Section 4.4, we next examine the robustness of our main findings
in a number of different ways. We include the full set of covariates, so the estimates
are comparable to those in columns 3 (OLS) and (7) (FE) of Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
4.5.1 Endogenous fertility and reverse causality
We start by exploring in how far our results are affected by endogenous fertility
stopping rules. In panel a of Table 4.5, we examine whether the sex of the first
child (columns 1 and 3) and the sex mix of the first two children (columns 2 and 4)
in the household predict the total number of children an individual has in the last
wave he or she appears in the estimation sample. To do so, we construct a collapsed
cross-sectional data set in which we only keep one observation per individual and
summarize information from different survey waves. We analyse the male and female
subsamples separately.
We find that there is a negative but not statistically significant association be-
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Table 4.5: Testing for endogenous fertility stopping rules and reverse causality
Panel a: Does the sex mix of existing children predict total number of children?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of children
Male Female
Ever 1stdaughter -0.0386 -0.0149
(0.0261) (0.0236)
First two children: at least 1 daughter -0.0820*** -0.0730***
(0.0294) (0.0271)
Observations 5,073 3,618 6,332 4,422
R-squared 0.081 0.068 0.121 0.079
Panel b: Do initial attitudes predict ever having a daughter?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ever a daughter
Male Female




Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Controls in all panels &
columns: age, age square, 2 education dummies, ln HH income, 5 marital status dummies, 8 employment sta-
tus dummies, wave dummies, and region dummies. Additional controls in panel b: 3 dummies number of total
children. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
tween having a first daughter and the total number of children for both men and
women. The key regressor labelled ‘ever1stdaughter’ takes a value of one if in at
least one survey wave the oldest child is female, and zero otherwise. The dependent
variable is the total number of children the individual has in the last wave he or she
appears in the estimation sample. However, we do find a negative and statistically
significant correlation between having at least one daughter among the two oldest
children and the number of total children, for the subsample of individuals who have
at least two children by the last wave. The key regressor is a binary variable taking
a value of one if there is at least one daughter among the two oldest children in
the household in the last wave the individual is included in the estimation sample,
and zero if they are both sons. This implies that those who have two sons are more
likely to have further children compared to those with at least one daughter and
hence there is positive selection of having at least one daughter. This is in line with
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previous research which shows that parents prefer having offspring with a balanced
sex mix (Iacovou 2001, Lundberg 2005). To make sure this is not driving our results,
we examine the effect of the sex of the oldest child only (Table 4.6) and we analyse
the subsample of individual-wave pairs with two or less children only (Table 4.7),
and we find that our results are robust to these additional checks.
Specifically, in Table 4.6, we examine the robustness of our findings from Table
4.3 to three alternative specifications of the key regressors. These are dummy vari-
ables taking a value of one if there are only daughters of the respective age group in
the household (columns 1 and 2), if the oldest child in the household is female and
in the respective age group (columns 3 and 4), and if there is at least one daughter
with the age group based on the oldest daughter (columns 5 and 6), respectively,
and zero otherwise.
Table 4.6: Alternative key regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Key regressor Only daughters Oldest child female At least one daughter
Age group based on youngest daughter oldest daughter oldest daughter
Pooled OLS FEs Pooled OLS FEs Pooled OLS FEs
Daughter (age 0 to 5) -0.0552* -0.0339 -0.0282 -0.0204 -0.0616** -0.0304
(0.0313) (0.0296) (0.0314) (0.0346) (0.0272) (0.0276)
Daughter (age 6 to 10) -0.108** -0.0675 -0.0709** -0.0371 -0.108*** -0.0550*
(0.0425) (0.0431) (0.0326) (0.0361) (0.0298) (0.0323)
Daughter (age 11 plus) -0.113*** -0.158*** -0.0581** -0.0909** -0.104*** -0.109***
(0.0393) (0.0467) (0.0281) (0.0388) (0.0287) (0.0358)
Female -0.283*** -0.279*** -0.296***
(0.0177) (0.0195) (0.0223)
Daughter 0 to 5 x female 0.0203 0.0471 -0.0311 0.0753* -0.0138 0.0478
(0.0390) (0.0360) (0.0384) (0.0401) (0.0325) (0.0313)
Daughter 6 to 10 x female 0.111** 0.0684 0.0493 0.0964** 0.0653* 0.0770**
(0.0525) (0.0540) (0.0412) (0.0451) (0.0356) (0.0365)
Daughter 11 plus x female 0.111** 0.111* 0.0493 0.119** 0.0791** 0.100**
(0.0481) (0.0606) (0.0354) (0.0489) (0.0332) (0.0408)
Linear combination of estimates: effect for females
Daughter (age 0 to 5) -0.0349 0.0132 -0.0593** 0.0549* -0.0754*** 0.0174
(0.0282) (0.0277) (0.0274) (0.0317) (0.0241) (0.0259)
Daughter (age 6 to 10) 0.0039 0.0010 -0.0216 0.0592 -0.0429* 0.0219
(0.0327) (0.0373) (0.0272) (0.0360) (0.0256) (0.0309)
Daughter (age 11 plus) -0.0021 -0.0466 -0.0088 0.0278 -0.0246 -0.0088
(0.0314) (0.0444) (0.0238) (0.0389) (0.0249) (0.0354)
Observations 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822
R-squared 0.106 0.014 0.106 0.014 0.106 0.014
Number of individuals 11,405 11,405 11,405
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for pooled OLS estimates). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Control variables in all columns: 4 dummies for number of total children, age, age squared,
2 education dummies, 5 marital status dummies, 8 employment status dummies, ln household income, wave dum-
mies, region dummies. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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We find that the results from these alternative specifications are very similar
to those obtained in Table 4.3. Overall, having daughters is negatively and sig-
nificantly associated with less traditional attitudes among men, and the effect for
secondary school-age daughters is robust to the inclusion of individual FEs. For
women, the negative and mostly insignificant association between having daughters
and traditional attitudes becomes positive for the two younger age groups and gen-
erally insignificant with FEs. The coefficients indicating the effect among fathers are
largest for parenting only daughters and smallest when we only consider the sex of
the first child, consistently with an exposure-based explanation. In sum, the robust-
ness of our main results to considering only the sex of the oldest child suggests that
they are not driven by endogenous fertility stopping rules. Moreover, we argue that
it would be difficult for an individual to select into having only daughters, having
at least one daughter, and having a firstborn daughter, all while holding family size
constant. Therefore, results from Table 4.6, when taken together, provide further
support that our findings are not driven by endogenous fertility stopping rules.
Another way to test that our results are not driven by endogenous fertility stop-
ping rules based on the sex mix of the first two children is to examine results for the
subsample of individual-wave pairs with two or less children (columns 1 to 4 of Ta-
ble 4.7). Results for the subsample are very similar to the main results, providing a
further indication that endogenous fertility stopping rules are not the driver behind
our findings.
In panel b of Table 4.5, we test for the possibility of reverse causality. We
run regressions of ‘ever having at least one daughter’ on initial gender attitudes in
the first wave the individual was interviewed while controlling for the full set of
covariates, including the total number of children. We find that initial attitudes are
not associated with the probability of ever having a daughter while holding family








Table 4.7: Different subsamples
Subsample Two or less children Never-divorcees Never-attritors
Pooled OLS Fixed effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects Pooled OLS Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Daughter -0.101*** -0.0427 -0.102*** -0.0459* -0.0815* -0.0678*
(0.0260) (0.0298) (0.0248) (0.0278) (0.0426) (0.0377)
Female -0.293*** -0.295*** -0.296*** -0.298*** -0.290*** -0.290***
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0344) (0.0344)
Daughter x female 0.0656** 0.0704** 0.0507* 0.0602* 0.0257 0.0855**
(0.0303) (0.0324) (0.0290) (0.0311) (0.0459) (0.0405)
Daughter 0-5 -0.0764*** -0.0307 -0.0760*** -0.0364 -0.0680 -0.0614
(0.0287) (0.0302) (0.0276) (0.0281) (0.0431) (0.0384)
Daughter 6-10 -0.115*** -0.0531 -0.132*** -0.0683** -0.0877* -0.0885*
(0.0340) (0.0365) (0.0302) (0.0333) (0.0510) (0.0467)
Daughter 11+ -0.116*** -0.122*** -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.105* -0.116**
(0.0326) (0.0407) (0.0305) (0.0372) (0.0625) (0.0553)
Daughter 0-5 x female 0.0069 0.0601* -0.0008 0.0521 0.0140 0.0846**
(0.0342) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0318) (0.0483) (0.0416)
Daughter 6-10 x female 0.0823** 0.0812* 0.0797** 0.0779** 0.0351 0.0910*
(0.0412) (0.0421) (0.0366) (0.0386) (0.0569) (0.0527)
Daughter 11+ x female 0.112*** 0.115** 0.0824** 0.0737* 0.0415 0.0818
(0.0384) (0.0473) (0.0363) (0.0441) (0.0692) (0.0635)
Linear combination of estimates: effect for females
Daughter -0.0353 0.0278 -0.0513** 0.0142 -0.0558 0.0176
(0.0223) (0.0281) (0.0224) (0.0264) (0.0348) (0.0342)
Daughter 0-5 -0.0695*** 0.0294 -0.0768*** 0.0157 -0.0539 0.0232
(0.0257) (0.0283) (0.0256) (0.0268) (0.0372) (0.0343)
Daughter 6-10 -0.0330 0.0281 -0.0519* 0.0095 -0.0527 0.0025
(0.0284) (0.0342) (0.0272) (0.0314) (0.0406) (0.0427)
Daughter 11+ -0.00475 -0.00720 -0.0267 -0.0346 -0.0637 -0.0345
(0.0279) (0.0393) (0.0275) (0.0370) (0.0495) (0.0522)
Observations 39,736 39,736 39,736 39,736 44,654 44,654 44,654 44,654 17,984 17,984 17,984 17,984
R-squared 0.102 0.103 0.014 0.014 0.107 0.107 0.013 0.014 0.099 0.099 0.021 0.021
Individuals 9,467 9,467 10,539 10,539 2,630 2,630
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for pooled OLS estimates). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Control variables in all columns: 4 dummies
for number of total children, age, age squared, 2 education dummies, 5 marital status dummies, 8 employment status dummies, ln household income, wave dummies, region dum-
mies. The regressor ‘daughter’ is shorthand for ‘at least one daughter’. Age groups are based on the youngest daughter if there is more than one daughter. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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4.5.2 Selection into co-residence after divorce and attrition
As detailed in Section 4.3, when parents divorce, the resident parent will typically be
observed as divorced while the non-resident parent will drop out of our estimation
sample, i.e. there is attrition from the sample. Hence, potential selection problems
at family dissolution are essentially problems of potentially non-random attrition in
our analysis.
In Table 4.8, we again use the collapsed cross-sectional data set, to test for
bias arising from attrition. Panel a shows that having a daughter in at least one
interview wave is not associated with attrition from the estimation sample, that is,
the probability of dropping out of the sample before the last wave. In panel b, we test
for attrition bias in our results by performing a BGLW test. This test is described in
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) and was first used by and named after Becketti et al. (1988).
To do so, we estimate the effect of ever having daughters on initial attitudes to gender
norms. By comparing results using the total estimation sample to results using the
sample of individuals who do not drop out of the sample before the last interview
wave (i.e. the non-attrition sample), we examine whether coefficients would be
different if only the non-attrition sample was used. We find that ever having a
daughter is generally unrelated to initial attitudes. P-values from tests of differences
in coefficients between the two samples (columns 3 and 6) suggest that there are no
significant differences in coefficients between the total and the non-attrition samples.
This also holds when we look at the daughter dummy differentiated by age groups.
Hence, we can conclude that our coefficients are unaffected by attrition.
As a final check for selection into co-residence after divorce, and related attrition,
in Table 4.7 we re-estimate the main results for two additional subsamples: individ-
uals who are never observed as divorced (columns 5 to 8), and individuals who are
not dropped from the estimation sample before the last survey wave (columns 9 to
12). For both subsamples, results are very similar to the main results. The negative
effect of parenting daughters (independent of age group) even becomes statistically
significant at the 10 percent level with FEs (columns 7 and 11). In line with the
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results from the BGLW test in Table 4.8, there is no indication that family separa-
tion through divorce and related disappearance from our estimation sample drives
our results.
Table 4.8: Testing for attrition bias
Panel a: Does having daughters predict attrition?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of dropping out of sample before last wave
Male Female
Ever daughter 0.0024 0.0108 0.0085 0.0170
(0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0107) (0.0112)
Total no. of children controls no yes no yes
Observations 5,073 5,073 6,332 6,332
R-squared 0.232 0.235 0.271 0.274
Panel b: BGLW test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial attitude: gender division of work
Total Non-attrition p- Total Non-attrition p-
sample sample value sample sample value
Ever daughter -0.0184 0.0389 0.34
(0.0323) (0.0672)
Ever daughter x female 0.0404 -0.0418 0.27
(0.0421) (0.0841)
Female -0.274*** -0.230*** 0.48 -0.238*** -0.243*** 0.93
(0.0363) (0.0714) (0.0316) (0.0662)
Ever daughter (youngest 0 to 5) 0.0227 0.0227 1.00
(0.0334) (0.0718)
Ever daughter (youngest 6 to 10) -0.0675* 0.0162 0.29
(0.0348) (0.0854)
Ever daughter (youngest ≥ 11) -0.0020 0.0360 0.64
(0.0328) (0.0846)
Ever daughter 0 to 5 x female -0.0769* -0.0002 0.34
(0.0438) (0.0918)
Ever daughter 6 to 10 x female 0.0496 -0.0510 0.32
(0.0463) (0.110)
Ever daughter 11 plus x female 0.0149 0.0124 0.98
(0.0426) (0.107)
Total no. of children controls yes yes yes yes
Observations 11,405 2,630 11,405 2,630
R-squared 0.110 0.106 0.110 0.106
Notes: Panel a: robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel b: standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Controls in all panels & columns: age, age square, 2 education dummies, ln HH income, 5 marital status
dummies, 8 employment status dummies, wave and region fixed effects. Additional controls in panel b: dummies for
number of total children. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
4.5.3 Further robustness checks
Table 4.A.3, presented in Appendix 4.A, checks the robustness of our results to an
alternative dependent variable, which measures levels of agreement with the state-
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ment that ‘both the husband and wife should contribute to the household income’.
While this variable relates less directly to attitudes towards the gender division of
work, it still captures attitudes towards gender norms more generally. We interpret
higher levels of agreement with the statement as more gender-equal and hence less
traditional attitudes. Our main findings are reflected with this alternative outcome
variable: parenting daughters makes men less traditional, the effect is strongest for
fathers of school-age daughters, and there are no statistically significant effects for
mothers that are robust to the introduction of individual FEs.17 Finally, we find
that the main results with the binarized dependent variable (see columns 4 and 8 of
Tables 4.2 and 4.3) are robust to estimating logit and FE logit models (Table 4.A.4
in Appendix 4.A).18
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
Understanding the malleability of attitudes towards gender norms is important for
tackling gender inequality at its roots. Against the backdrop that attitudes are
shaped early in life, we show that parenting daughters decreases fathers’ likelihood
to agree with a traditional gender division of work while there is no robust effect on
mothers. This result is in line with previous US findings (Shafer & Malhotra 2011)
supporting the idea that having a daughter affects men and women differently. More
importantly, we show that the effect on fathers’ attitudes occurs when daughters are
of school age, which is a novel finding. We carefully check that our results are not
driven by unobserved individual heterogeneity, endogenous fertility stopping rules,
reverse causality, or attrition from the estimation sample. Finally, our findings on
attitudes are also reflected in behavioural changes concerning gender norms, for the
17However, in contrast to our main outcome variable, the pooled OLS estimates indicate that
both men and women with pre-school daughters are more traditional compared to those without
daughters, and that mothers of secondary school-age daughters are less traditional compared to
those without daughters.
18We also conducted a placebo test in which we created a random variable of a ‘fake’ daughter
to check that our results do not just pick up some other trend that occurs in people’s lives around
the time when they have school-age children. As expected, we found no statistically significant
effect of the placebo variables on attitudes to the gender division of work.
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subsample of individuals living with a partner.
We build on the few papers which have examined the effect of a child’s sex on
attitudes towards gender norms in several ways. Not only are we one of few studies
to provide longitudinal evidence and the first study to show UK evidence and to
cover recent years, but we also enrich the literature by showing that there is an
age-specific effect of daughters on fathers’ gender norm attitudes.
While we are unable to test underlying mechanisms, the differential effect of
parenting a daughter on fathers and mothers together with the finding of an age-
specific daughter effect on attitudes is consistent with theories of exposure as well
as with identity theories. Consistent with these theories, both father and mother
may incorporate their children’s well-being into their own utility function. Through
parenting, fathers of daughters may develop a better understanding of gender in-
equality issues that women and girls face, resulting in a significant shift in their
attitudes towards gender norms. Conversely, mothers have already been exposed to
situations of disadvantage first-hand, and as a consequence, parenting a daughter
has a negligible effect on their attitudes towards gender norms, which are already
less traditional than that of men.
The timing of exposure - when daughters are of school-age - is in line with
research in psychology which suggests that children become aware of gender stereo-
types and social pressures to conform to gender norms around this age (Bian et al.
2017, Lane et al. 2017). Hence, fathers are likely to gradually become aware of
the gender norms affecting their daughters’ actions after that age, prompting the
change in their gender norm attitudes. Our findings also provide evidence for theo-
ries of intra-cohort change in attitudes. Attitudes towards gender norms seem to be
malleable to experiences during adulthood such as parenting a daughter, thus sug-
gesting that indirect exposure to disadvantage has the potential to change people’s
attitudes.
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4.A Appendix tables
Table 4.A.1: Baseline results with full set of covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Ordinal dep. variable binary Ordinal dep. variable binary
AL (at least) 1 daughter -0.113*** -0.119*** -0.0930*** -0.0310*** -0.0547** -0.0571** -0.0415 -0.0102
(0.0255) (0.0249) (0.0242) (0.0115) (0.0270) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0140)
Female -0.276*** -0.263*** -0.295*** -0.117***
(0.0235) (0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0102)
AL 1 daughter x female 0.0803*** 0.0963*** 0.0495* 0.0063 0.0919*** 0.0905*** 0.0626** 0.0091
(0.0294) (0.0290) (0.0280) (0.0130) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0156)
One child 0.336*** 0.341*** 0.121*** 0.0475*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.0677*** 0.0282***
(0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0102) (0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0107)
2 children 0.422*** 0.447*** 0.214*** 0.0916*** 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.150*** 0.0608***
(0.0230) (0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0122) (0.0227) (0.0261) (0.0267) (0.0140)
3 children 0.537*** 0.563*** 0.295*** 0.128*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 0.142*** 0.0582***
(0.0290) (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0149) (0.0317) (0.0365) (0.0372) (0.0194)
4 or more children 0.765*** 0.792*** 0.446*** 0.175*** 0.262*** 0.267*** 0.220*** 0.109***
(0.0439) (0.0464) (0.0450) (0.0201) (0.0533) (0.0576) (0.0583) (0.0290)
Age -0.0467*** -0.0241*** -0.0093*** 0.0254* 0.0230* 0.0130*
(0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0023) (0.0135) (0.0136) (0.0070)
Age squared 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0002*** -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
First degree -0.281*** -0.0964*** 0.0642** 0.0171
(0.0229) (0.0104) (0.0314) (0.0148)
Higher degree -0.316*** -0.110*** 0.0260 -0.0028
(0.0420) (0.0180) (0.0554) (0.0279)
Marital: living as couple -0.0275 -0.0038 -0.0117 0.0053
(0.0192) (0.0089) (0.0181) (0.0091)
Marital: widowed/other -0.0437 -0.0351 0.0576 0.0485
(0.0731) (0.0349) (0.0743) (0.0349)
Marital: divorced -0.138*** -0.0489*** -0.0102 0.0127
(0.0307) (0.0146) (0.0317) (0.0164)
Marital: separated -0.179*** -0.0696*** 0.0019 -0.0046
(0.0365) (0.0169) (0.0361) (0.0184)
Marital: never married -0.121*** -0.0270** -0.0541** -0.0008
(0.0263) (0.0116) (0.0249) (0.0122)
Empl.: employed -0.150*** -0.0733*** -0.0282 -0.0175
(0.0243) (0.0118) (0.0214) (0.0111)
Empl.: unemployed 0.0960*** 0.0337** 0.0541* 0.0274*
(0.0367) (0.0165) (0.0312) (0.0160)
Empl.: retired -0.151** -0.0699* 0.108* 0.0371
(0.0769) (0.0383) (0.0634) (0.0320)
Empl.: family care 0.235*** 0.0946*** 0.140*** 0.0618***
(0.0375) (0.0177) (0.0325) (0.0167)
Empl.: FT student 0.258*** 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.0485***
(0.0321) (0.0150) (0.0271) (0.0140)
Empl.: LT sick/disabled -0.251*** -0.0867*** -0.0749** -0.0228
(0.0396) (0.0176) (0.0347) (0.0172)
Empl.: maternity leave 0.132*** 0.0615*** 0.0841** 0.0431**
(0.0469) (0.0212) (0.0417) (0.0196)
Empl.: gov’t training/other 0.0040 0.0191 0.0811 0.0241
(0.0635) (0.0302) (0.0583) (0.0302)
Ln household income -0.128*** -0.0563*** -0.0025 -0.0044
(0.0103) (0.0047) (0.0084) (0.0042)
Constant 2.105*** 2.875*** 3.655*** 0.918*** 2.125*** 1.551*** 1.635*** -0.0204
(0.0204) (0.0974) (0.132) (0.0591) (0.0122) (0.361) (0.369) (0.187)
Wave and region FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822 48,822
R-squared 0.041 0.061 0.106 0.075 0.006 0.009 0.013 0.010
No. of individuals 11,405 11,405 11,405 11,405
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for columns (1) to (4)). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Sources:
BHPS, UKHLS.
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Table 4.A.2: Summary statistics and variable definitions
Name Description Male Female
Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variables
Attitude: gender division A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after 2.39 0.99 2.18 1.00
of work (ordinal) the home and family. 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=
neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
Attitude: gender division A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after 0.40 0.31
of work (binarized) the home and family. 0=strongly disagree/disagree, 1=
neither agree nor disagree/ agree/ strongly agree
Behaviour: Traditional gender Male subsample: 1=individual (self-)employed & partner not 0.24
division of work (self-)employed, 0=otherwise
Key regressors
At least (AL) one daughter 1=At least one daughter in the household, 0=otherwise 0.57 0.58
AL 1 daughter (youngest 0 to 5) 1=At least one daughter in the HH, with the youngest aged 0.21 0.21
0 to 5; 0=otherwise
AL 1 daughter (youngest 6 to 10) 1=At least one daughter in the HH, with the youngest aged 0.14 0.15
6 to 10; 0=otherwise
AL 1 daughter (youngest 11 plus) 1=At least one daughter in the HH, with the youngest aged 0.22 0.23
at least 11; 0=otherwise
Covariates
No children 1=no children in the HH, 0=otherwise 0.19 0.15
One child 1=one child in the HH, 0=otherwise 0.25 0.28
Two children 1=two children in the HH, 0=otherwise 0.38 0.38
Three children 1=three children in the HH, 0=otherwise 0.14 0.14
4 or more children 1=four children in the HH, 0=otherwise 0.04 0.05
Number of children Total number of children in the HH (values 0 to 9) 1.62 1.12 1.66 1.10
Age Age in years 37.53 9.94 35.41 9.39
First degree Educational level: 1=First degree (undergraduate), 0.13 0.11
0=otherwise
Higher degree Educational level: 1=Higher degree (postgraduate), 0.04 0.03
0=otherwise
Married Marital status: 1=married, 0=otherwise 0.74 0.62
Living as couple Marital status: 1=living as couple, 0=otherwise 0.16 0.15
Widowed/other Marital status: 1=widowed/other status, 0=otherwise 0.00 0.01
Divorced Marital status: 1=divorced, 0=otherwise 0.02 0.06
Separated Marital status: 1=separated, 0=otherwise 0.01 0.03
Never married Marital status: 1=never married, 0=otherwise 0.08 0.13
Self-employed Employment status: 1=self-employed, 0=otherwise 0.15 0.04
In paid employment Employment status: 1=in paid employment, 0=otherwise 0.73 0.62
Unemployed Employment status: 1=unemployed, 0=otherwise 0.06 0.03
Retired Employment status: 1=retired, 0=otherwise 0.01 0.00
Family care Employment status: 1=family care, 0=otherwise 0.00 0.06
FT student Employment status: 1=ft student, 0=otherwise 0.01 0.18
Long-term sick/disabled Empl. status: 1=long-term sick/disabled, 0=otherwise 0.02 0.03
Maternity leave Employment status: 1=maternity leave, 0=otherwise 0.03 0.03
Gov’t training scheme/other Employment status: 1=government training scheme/ 0.01 0.01
other, 0=otherwise
Ln HH income Natural logarithm of household income 7.83 0.69 7.72 0.73
Variables used in robustness checks
Attitude: contribution to Both the husband and wife should contribute to the HH 3.41 0.91 3.50 0.93
HH income income. 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neither agree
nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree
Only daughters (youngest 0 to 5) 1=Only daughters in the HH, with the youngest aged 0 0.11 0.11
to 5; 0=otherwise
Only daughters (youngest 6 to 10) 1=Only daughters in the HH, with the youngest aged 6 0.04 0.05
to 10; 0=otherwise
Only daughters (youngest 11 plus) 1=Only daughters in the HH, with the youngest aged at 0.07 0.08
least 11; 0=otherwise
First daughter (0 to 5) 1=Oldest child in HH is female & 0 to 5; 0=otherwise 0.10 0.10
First daughter (6 to 10) 1=Oldest child in HH is female & 6 to 10; 0=otherwise 0.09 0.09
First daughter (11 plus) 1=Oldest child in HH is female & at least 11; 0=otherwise 0.19 0.20
AL 1 daughter (oldest 0 to 5) 1=At least one daughter in the HH, with oldest aged 0 0.17 0.16
to 5; 0=otherwise
AL 1 daughter (oldest 6 to 10) 1=At least one daughter in the HH, with oldest aged 6 0.14 0.14
to 10; 0=otherwise
AL 1 daughter (oldest 11 plus) 1=At least one daughter in the HH, with oldest aged at 0.26 0.28
least 11; 0=otherwise
Number of observations 20,851 27,971
Number of individuals 5,073 6,332
Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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Table 4.A.3: Alternative dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
Dependent variable: Both husband & wife should contribute to HH income




At least one daughter x female -0.0242 -0.0537*
(0.0258) (0.0313)
At least one daughter (youngest 0 to 5) -0.0589** 0.0011
(0.0253) (0.0288)
At least one daughter (youngest 6 to 10) 0.0785*** 0.133***
(0.0270) (0.0337)
At least one daughter (youngest 11 plus) 0.117*** 0.179***
(0.0267) (0.0376)
Daughter 0 to 5 x female 0.0059 -0.0284
(0.0296) (0.0319)
Daughter 6 to 10 x female -0.0622* -0.0923**
(0.0326) (0.0384)
Daughter 11 plus x female -0.0343 -0.123***
(0.0318) (0.0427)
Linear combination of estimates: effect for females
At least one daughter 0.0152 -0.0178
(0.0195) (0.0265)
At least one daughter (youngest 0 to 5) -0.0530** -0.0273
(0.0223) (0.0267)
At least one daughter (youngest 6 to 10) 0.0163 0.0411
(0.0238) (0.0312)
At least one daughter (youngest 11 plus) 0.0827*** 0.0563
(0.0234) (0.0355)
Observations 48,741 48,741 48,741 48,741
R-squared 0.070 0.072 0.032 0.033
Number of individuals 11,396 11,396
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for columns (1) to (2)). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Control variables in all columns: 4 dummies for number of total children, age, age
squared, 2 education dummies, 5 marital status dummies, 8 employment status dummies, ln household in-
come, wave dummies, region dummies. Dependent variable: Level of agreement with the statement that
husband and wife should both contribute to household income (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree).
Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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Table 4.A.4: Logit and fixed effects logit models with binary dependent vari-
able
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Fixed Effects Logit
Binary dependent variable
At least one daughter -0.169*** -0.124
(0.0511) (0.0966)




At least one daughter (youngest 0 to 5) -0.103* -0.0719
(0.0576) (0.0987)
At least one daughter (youngest 6 to 10) -0.242*** -0.259**
(0.0637) (0.115)
At least one daughter (youngest 11 plus) -0.189*** -0.368***
(0.0616) (0.131)
Daughter 0 to 5 x female -0.0662 0.112
(0.0709) (0.110)
Daughter 6 to 10 x female 0.140* 0.252*
(0.0785) (0.132)
Daughter 11 plus x female 0.169** 0.243*
(0.0758) (0.147)
Observations 48,822 48,822 26,306 26,306
Number of individuals 4,553 4,553
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (clustered by individual for columns (1) to (2)). ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗ p < 0.1. Control variables in all columns: 4 dummies for number of total children, age, age squared,
2 education dummies, 5 marital status dummies, 8 employment status dummies, ln household income, wave
dummies, region dummies. Sources: BHPS, UKHLS.
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Could robotization make the gender pay gap worse? We provide the first large-
scale evidence on the impact of industrial robots on the gender pay gap using data
from 20 European countries. We show that robot adoption increases both male
and female earnings but also increases the gender pay gap. Using an instrumental
variable strategy, we find that a ten percent increase in robotization leads to a 1.8
percent increase in the gender pay gap. We rule out the possibility that our results
are driven by mechanical changes in the sex composition of the workforce. Instead,
our results are driven by countries with high initial levels of gender inequality and
can be explained by the fact that men in medium- and high-skilled occupations
disproportionately benefit from robotization, through a productivity effect.
1This chapter is written jointly with Cevat Giray Aksoy and Berkay Özcan, and a version of it
is published as: Robots and the gender pay gap in Europe. European Economic Review, Vol. 134,
article 103693, May 2021. An earlier working paper version is published in IZA Discussion Papers,




Technological innovations are quickly shifting the frontier between tasks performed
by humans and those performed by machines, transforming the world of work. Ad-
vances in robot technologies and the increased adoption of industrial robots in pro-
duction processes have augmented interest in the impacts of robots on labor markets.
Specific focus on robots is warranted because rapid robotization is ongoing. The an-
nual sales volume of industrial robots increased by 114 percent in Europe since
2013 and is expected to continue double-digit growth (International Federation of
Robotics 2018). However, despite recent examinations of the impact of robots on
overall employment and earnings (Graetz & Michaels 2018, Acemoglu & Restrepo
2020), there has been little empirical research on how robot adoption might affect
gender equality.
In this paper, we provide the first large-scale evidence on the impact of indus-
trial robots on the gender pay gap in Europe, using data from 28 million workers
across 20 European countries for the period between 2006 and 2014. Specifically,
we examine how changes in the number of robots per worker between survey years
(henceforth, ‘robotization’) affect the gender gap in the monthly earnings of workers
in manufacturing and a few other sectors that employ robots.2 We are also able to
investigate the role of initial country conditions in terms of gender equality and to
test underlying mechanisms of our results.
An industrial robot is defined as an ‘automatically controlled, reprogrammable,
multipurpose manipulator, programmable to perform tasks in three or more axes,
which can be either fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation appli-
cations’ (International Federation of Robotics 2017). Industrial robots are mainly
employed in the manufacturing sector to perform tasks such as assembling, painting
and welding. We refer to the number of robots per 10,000 workers as ‘robot density’.
2Specifically, we have 12 industries: eight manufacturing (manufacturing of automo-
tive/transport, plastic/chemicals, metal, food/beverages, electrical/electronics, wood/paper,
textiles, and other manufacturing branches) and four non-manufacturing industries (min-
ing/quarrying, education/research/development, construction, utilities).
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Europe is an important setting because the exposure of its workers to industrial
robots in 2016 was 19 percent higher compared with workers in the USA (Chiacchio
et al. 2018). At the same time, the average gender pay gap is proving rather immune
to change and remains at around 15 percent (that is, women’s gross hourly earnings
are, on average, 14.8 percent below those of men), with some variation between
countries (Eurostat 2018). Therefore, studying the impact of robotization on the
gender pay gap in Europe is important as it has implications for the success of
ongoing policy efforts to reduce the pay gap. Progress from policies to increase the
number of women in the paid workforce and to increase women’s pay to equal that
of men may be removed if women are disadvantaged by the process of automation
(Brussevich et al. 2018).
There are several ways in which we may expect robotization to affect the gender
pay gap. On the one hand, robots perform physical tasks and replace ‘brawn’ skills,
weakening the comparative advantage of low-skilled men compared to women (Ren-
dall 2017). Similarly, low-skilled men are more likely to be employed in manual jobs
with higher robotization risks, whereas women are thought to have a comparative
advantage in services (Ngai & Petrongolo 2017, Muro et al. 2019). In line with these
arguments, we may therefore expect robotization to decrease the gender pay gap.
On the other hand, skilled male workers are more likely to benefit from robot-driven
productivity increases. This is not only because men disproportionately occupy
higher positions in the occupational hierarchy but also they are overrepresented in
relevant STEM (science, technology, engineering, maths) occupations. For these
reasons, we expect the effect of robotization to differ across skill-based occupational
groups.
We find that, overall, robotization increases both male and female earnings and
also increases the gender pay gap: a ten percent increase in robotization leads
to a 1.8 percent increase in the (conditional) gender pay gap. The conditional
pay gap is the pay gap after adjusting for a set of factors that may account for
differences between men’s and women’s earnings. In our paper, these factors include
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occupational category, industry, age group, country, year and firm size.3
Our results suggest that the underlying mechanism for our finding is that skilled
men disproportionately benefit from robotization, through a productivity effect. In
particular, we find that the increase in the gender pay gap due to robotization
is driven by those in medium- and high-skilled occupations. Put differently, the
underrepresentation of women in medium- and high-skilled occupations in specific
industries accompanied by robotization exacerbates the gender pay gap. This is in
line with recent research, which shows that firm-level adoption of robots coincides
with increases in value added and productivity (Acemoglu et al. 2020) and increases
wages of high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers while also increasing
average wages of manufacturing workers (Barth et al. 2020). We further show that,
in line with the findings of Freeman et al. (2020)4, our results cannot be explained
by changes in the sex composition of the workforce within industries, nor by inflows
or outflows from the manufacturing sector.
We also find that our results are driven by countries in which initial overall gender
inequality, measured by the Gender Gap Index (GGI) of the World Economic Forum,
is high. Conversely, in countries where initial gender inequality is low, robotization
does not have any statistically significant effect on the gender pay gap. Instead, it
increases the earnings of all workers.
There is a risk of potential endogeneity of robotization to the gender pay gap.
For example, some industries may be adopting robots in response to domestic shocks
to industries, which may directly impact the gender pay gap (e.g. industry-specific
minimum wage changes). To identify a causal effect, we therefore follow Graetz &
Michaels (2018) and instrument robotization with an industry level replaceability
index. In particular, our instrument specifies the fraction of each industry’s hours
worked in 1980 in the United States that was performed by occupations that became
3From a policy perspective, the conditional GPG is more important than the unconditional
(overall) pay gap because it is related to ‘equal pay’ legislation in Europe.
4Freeman et al. (2020) find that degrees of automation are only weakly related to subsequent
changes in occupational employment. The authors claim: ‘within-occupation impacts of technology
may offer a better path to projecting the future of work than forecasts of changing employment
levels or occupational shares.’ (p. 394).
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replaceable by robots by 2012 (Graetz & Michaels 2018). The replaceability index
strongly predicts the increase in robot intensity: as robot prices fell, industries with
a higher initial replaceability increased their use of robots.
Our paper makes three contributions. First, our paper contributes to the growing
literature on the labour market impacts of industrial robots by providing evidence on
the impact of robotization on the gender pay gap in Europe. Existing research points
to mixed impacts of robot adoption on labour markets in Europe. For example,
Graetz & Michaels (2018) find that robotization increases both labor productivity
and wages and has no effect on employment in 14 European and three non-European
countries. Evidence from Germany suggests that robot adoption has no effect on
total employment and also does not increase the risk of displacement for incumbent
manufacturing workers. Using a local labor market approach, which exploits vari-
ation in robot exposure across commuting zones in the United States, Acemoglu
& Restrepo (2020) show that industrial robot exposure reduces both employment
and wages. Existing evidence therefore varies across contexts, with generally more
positive effects in Europe compared to the United States. Our paper contributes to
this growing literature by focusing on the gender pay gap – a crucial but neglected
policy-relevant outcome.
Second, we contribute to the literature on the gendered labor market impacts
of robotization. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two existing studies
on the gendered impacts of industrial robots. They both exploit variation in robot
exposure across commuting zones in the US. Their results indicate that robotization
decreases both male and female earnings and also decreases the gender pay gap
(Anelli et al. 2019, Ge & Zhou 2020). These findings contrast those from our paper,
which is in line with the contrasting results across Europe and the US emerging
from the research on the overall impact of robots on employment and wages (Graetz
& Michaels 2018, Acemoglu & Restrepo 2020). There are also attempts to identify
the gendered impacts of task automation (not just robotization) through relating
data on task composition at work to occupation-level estimates of the probability
of automation. For example, Brussevich et al. (2019) find that female workers are
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at a significantly higher risk for displacement by automation than male workers,
albeit with significant cross-country heterogeneity. This is because “female workers
perform fewer tasks requiring analytical and interpersonal skills or physical labor,
and more tasks that are routine, characterized by lack of job flexibility, little learning
on the job, and greater repetitiveness” (Brussevich et al. 2018, p. 8). They also
show that the probability of automation is lower for younger cohorts of women, and
those in managerial positions.
Third, our paper also contributes to the broader literature on the determinants of
the gender pay gap. An extensive literature has studied the factors that explain gen-
der pay differences (see Kunze (2018) for a recent review). However, most research
focuses on supply-side explanations, such as gender differences in human capital fac-
tors, psychological attributes, or occupations (Blau & Kahn 2017). There is much
less evidence on how demand-side factors (such as automation) affect the pay gap
(see reviews in Ngai & Petrongolo 2017, Petrongolo & Ronchi 2020). Studies that
focus on computerization find that it contributed to the narrowing of the gender
pay gap (Weinberg 2000, Black & Spitz-Oener 2010, Yamaguchi 2018). Differential
changes in tasks can explain this finding: While women experienced a marked de-
cline in routine tasks, men did not (Black & Spitz-Oener 2010). While white-collar
workers directly work with computers, industrial robots are employed at the firm
level. Therefore, the underlying mechanisms for the gendered impacts of robots are
fundamentally different from those of computerization. We contribute to this litera-
ture by providing evidence on the impact of robotization, an important demand-side
factor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provides back-
ground information on robotization trends in our sample of European countries.
Section 5.3 describes the data, and Section 5.4 describes the empirical approach.
Section 5.5 presents our results, and Section 5.6 discusses heterogeneity across coun-
tries and potential mechanisms. The final section concludes.
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5.2 Background
Europe has seen tremendous growth in robotization over the sample period, both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of the number of workers employed. The number
of robots per 10,000 workers increased, on average, by 47 percent in our sample of
20 European countries between 2006 and 2014. However, Figure 5.1 shows that the
level and growth of robot density vary substantially across countries. With almost
50 robots per 10,000 employees in 2014, Germany shows the highest robot density.
On the other hand, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania have the lowest robot density
in our sample, with less than one robot per 10,000 workers. Furthermore, Figure
5.1 shows that many countries have seen high growth in the number of robots per
worker. For example, the Czech Republic saw rapid robotization, with robot density
growing from 6 per 10,000 workers in 2006 to 23 per 10,000 workers in 2014.
Figure 5.2A shows that industrial robots are mainly deployed in the automotive
and transport industry (about 390 robots per 10,000 workers in 2014), although
they have also begun to be used more widely in the plastic, chemicals, metals as
well as food and beverage sectors. Figure 5.2A highlights that the vast majority
of industrial robots are employed in industries that are part of the manufacturing
sector.
To understand whether there was a change in the sex composition of the work-
force over the sample period, we present the share of female workers by industry
and year in Figure 5.2B. The share of women is largest in the education/research/
development (women accounted for 68 percent of all workers in the sector in 2014),
the textile (63 percent), and food and beverages (47 percent) sectors. Women are
least represented in the automotive and transportation, metal, construction, and
mining and quarrying industries. Overall, within-industry sex composition changes
have been minimal (2 percentage points or less) between 2006 and 2014. Even in
industries in which sex composition changes have been largest, notably wood and
paper (7 percentage points), electrical/electronics (5 percentage points), and auto-
motive/transport sectors (4 percentage points), these are still relatively small.
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Figure 5.1: Industrial robots per 10,000 workers by country
Sources: IFR (2017), EU KLEMS, authors’ calculations.
Figure 5.3 shows the gender gap in median monthly earnings in 2010 for the 20
countries included in our sample. For part-time workers, the equivalent full-time
earnings are used. The size of the gender pay gap varies across economies: it ranges
from 4 percent in Romania and Bulgaria to 18 percent in Germany and 19 percent
in Estonia. Additional analysis suggests that there has been a downward trend in
the gender pay gap since 2006 and the average pay gap stood at 11 percent in the
manufacturing sector in 2014.
According to data from Eurostat, about two million enterprises were classified
as working in manufacturing and nearly 34 million people were employed in the
manufacturing sector in the EU-28, representing 15.4 percent of total employment
in 2014. Although the role of manufacturing in Europe has declined in recent years (a
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Figure 5.2: Robot density and share of females by industry
Sources: IFR, EU KLEMS, authors’ calculations. (M) indicates manufacturing industry.
Figure 5.3: Gender gap in median monthly earnings 2010 by country
Source: EU-SES, authors’ calculations. Notes: The gender gap in median monthly earnings is
defined as in equation 5.2: the difference between median male earnings and median female
earnings, divided by median male earnings. Earnings of part-time workers are adjusted to their
full-time equivalents.
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secular trend observed across advanced economies), the value of EU manufacturing
production has increased from $1.835 trillion in 2004 to more than $2.229 trillion
in 2014 in current prices (or by 11.4 percent in constant prices).5 This means that,
within the EU-28’s non-financial business economy, the manufacturing sector is the
largest contributor in terms of value added, and the second largest in terms of
employment.6
Collectively, these findings suggest that: (i) the extent to which robots are used
in industries varies significantly from country to country; (ii) the vast majority
of robots are used in manufacturing (particularly in the automotive sectors), and
within-industry sex composition changes have been limited over the sample period;
(iii) despite some convergence, the gender pay gap remains large; (iv) despite the
decline in recent years, manufacturing still provides a large share of employment in
Europe. These findings provide additional motivation for our analysis, validating
our predominant focus on manufacturing industries and highlighting the importance
of studying heterogeneous effects across countries.
5.3 Data and descriptive statistics
5.3.1 Data
We use data from four independent sources: the International Federation of Robotics
(IFR), the EU Structure of Earnings Survey (EU SES), the EU KLEMS database,
and the EU Labour Force Survey (EU LFS).
IFR provides information on the number of robots by country, industry, and
year (International Federation of Robotics 2017). It aims to capture the universe
5Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting in-
termediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated
assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is deter-
mined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Data are avail-
able at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.MANF.CD?locations=EU (last accessed:
3/7/2020).
6See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/10086.pdf, last accessed
3/7/2020.
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of industrial robots, and it is based on consolidated data provided by nearly all
industrial robot suppliers worldwide. Typical tasks performed by robots include
welding, assembly, packaging, and picking. Dedicated industrial robots that are
designed to perform only a single task are not included in the dataset.
The IFR dataset is provided at the country-industry level, with broad industry
categories outside of manufacturing, more detailed categories within manufacturing,
and a residual category ‘other non-manufacturing’, which comprises a large part of
the service sector. It also provides information on the operational stock of robots
based on annual robot deliveries with the assumption of the average service life of
12 years and full depreciation thereafter.
The second source of data is the EU-Structure of Earnings Survey (EU-SES)
from Eurostat.7 It covers the universe of enterprises with at least ten employees in
all sectors except public administration and aims to provide harmonized data on
labor market earnings from the EU Member States and Candidate Countries. EU-
SES provides harmonized data on earnings, demographic and firm characteristics,
and detailed industry classifications for 28 million individuals. The surveys have
been collected every four years since 2002 and are based on a two-stage sample. In
the first stage, a stratified random sample of local units is drawn, and in the second
stage, a random sample of employees is taken within each of the selected local units.
EU-SES is well-suited for our purposes because it covers the workers who may
be directly affected by robotization. Another advantage of the dataset is that the
information collected relates to the wages paid to each job, ensuring that wages of
the same person from additional jobs do not confound the analysis. Finally, it is the
only dataset that provides harmonized information on labor market earnings and
an industry classification at the 2-digit level of NACE (Statistical Classification of
Economic Activities in the European Community) for a large sample of European
countries. This feature is particularly important as it allows us to combine the
dataset with the industrial robot data at the country and industry level.
We match EU-SES and IFR data for 20 countries, 12 industries, and the years
7The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data lies entirely with the authors.
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2006, 2010, and 2014. The 12 industries comprise eight manufacturing (auto-
motive/transport, plastic/chemicals, metal, food/beverages, electrical/electronics,
wood/paper, textiles, and other manufacturing branches) and four non-manufacturing
industries (mining/quarrying, education/research/development, construction, and
utilities). Following prior research (Graetz & Michaels 2018), we exclude the residual
category, other non-manufacturing, which comprises the majority of service sectors.
The 20 countries comprise Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.8
The level of analysis is at the ‘demographic cell’. More specifically, we restrict
our sample to those aged 20 to 59 with positive earnings information and a positive
number of work hours. We then collapse the data at (i) country, (ii) industry, (iii)
year, (iv) age group (20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59); (v) broad occupational
group (managers, professionals, associate professionals, clerical support workers,
sales and service workers, craft and related trade workers, plant/machine operators
and assemblers, and elementary occupations); and (vi) firm size (smaller and larger
than 250 employees) level. We exclude the ‘armed forces’ and ‘agricultural workers’
occupational groups and any cells with missing values for any of the variables used
in the analysis.
Our main sample consists of 24,215 demographic cells. On average, a demo-
graphic cell contains 342 observations. We drop demographic cells with fewer than
ten respondents so that the smallest cell contains at least ten respondents, of which
at least five are female and at least five are male. We use survey weights when
collapsing the data to ensure averages are representative of the underlying target
population.
Additional industry-level data on employment counts and information and com-
munication technology (ICT) capital come from the EU KLEMS database.9 We use
data on total employment counts by country and industry to calculate the number
8In 2006, information for Germany, Romania, and Slovakia is not available and in 2014 infor-
mation for Greece is missing.
9Downloaded from http://www.euklems.net (last accessed: 3/7/2020).
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of robots per worker. Data on ICT capital are used as a control variable. ICT
capital is measured by the real fixed capital stock in computing, communications,
and computer software and databases equipment in 2010 prices, per 1,000 workers.
We use Eurostat’s EU-Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) to understand compositional
changes in the manufacturing sector. More specifically, we investigate movements
into and out of manufacturing by demographic cells (such as age, sex, educational
attainment, and skill level) using EU-LFS data from 2006, 2010, and 2014.10 Data
for our instrumental variables come from Graetz & Michaels (2018), and more details
are provided in subsection 5.4.2.
Our key variable of interest is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS)
of the change in the number of robots per 10,000 workers between the current and









where t refers to a year. We use four-year changes as the EU-SES is a four-yearly
survey. Robotization is calculated based on a constant base year, so that changes
in robotization do not arise because of changes in the number of workers employed
in an industry. Since the distribution of the change in robotization is highly skewed
with a few large outliers, but also a substantial number of zeros and some negative
values, the natural logarithm is an unsuitable transformation. We, therefore, follow
common practice and apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Bellemare
& Wichman 2020).
The main dependent variable is the gender gap in median monthly earnings in
each cell, which we refer to as the gender pay gap. It is calculated as:
10The EU LFS (European Union Labour Force Survey) is the largest European household sample
survey, currently including information from 35 European countries. Its main objective is to
classify the working age population into employed, unemployed, and economically inactive. The
responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data lies entirely with the authors.
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Gender Pay Gap =
median male earnings−median female earnings
median male earnings
(5.2)
Median earnings are based on gross monthly earnings in the reference month.11
In some countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, it is very common for
women to work part-time, and therefore including full-time workers only would lead
to a very selective sample. To avoid the possibility that the difference in men and
women’s monthly earnings can be attributed to the fact that women are more likely
to work part-time, we adjust the earnings of part-time workers to their pro-rata
full-time equivalents. The gender gap in median monthly earnings for all workers
is larger than either the full-time or part-time pay gaps. This is because women
are more likely than men to be in part-time employment, and part-time workers
tend to earn less per hour than those working full-time. However, our results are
robust to using alternative measures, namely (i) the gender gap in median monthly
earnings without adjusting part-time earnings pro-rata; (ii) the gender gap in median
hourly earnings. Again, we also find very similar point estimates (see Table 5.A.4
in Appendix 5.A).
To understand why robotization may affect the gender pay gap, in a first step
we also study whether robotization increases or decreases male and female earnings.
In line with the transformation of the robotization variable, we use the IHS trans-
formation of male and female median monthly earnings in the analyses. Robustness
checks using a logarithmic transformation of earnings return qualitatively similar
results. All earnings are given in Euros and in constant 2015 prices.12
11We chose to use monthly earnings information over hourly earnings, given the differences across
countries in regulating work hours. In a robustness check shown in Appendix 5.A, we show that
using an hourly earnings measure does not substantially alter our results.
12We use exchange rates and CPI information from the Eurostat database (last accessed:
3/7/2020).
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5.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis, according
to the skill-level of the occupation. Column 1 is high-skilled occupations; medium-
skilled occupations are in Column 2; low-skilled occupations in Column 3; and the
full sample in Column 4. The gender gap in median monthly earnings in the full
sample is 11 percent. The median monthly gross male earnings are EUR 1,781,
and female earnings are EUR 1,559. The mean robotization (that is, the change
in robots per 10,000 employees between survey years) is 9.6. The share of women
employed across the industries studied is 44 percent, which is consistent with the
predominant focus on manufacturing industries in our paper.
The gender pay gap is 10 percent among individuals who work in high-skilled
occupations, and 11 (13) percent among individuals who work in the medium (low)-
skilled occupations. Both men and women also earn substantially more in high-
skilled occupations (relative to medium- and low-skilled occupation groups). There
are other notable differences: workers in high-skilled occupations are less likely to be
exposed to robotization, more likely to be men, more likely to be in full-time work,
and more likely to work in education, research and development, and construction
sectors. There are no large differences when it comes to working for a large firm
(that is, 250 workers or above).
5.4 Empirical strategy
5.4.1 OLS estimation
To assess the relationship between robotization and the gender pay gap, we start by
estimating a series of OLS models which take the form:
GPGcid = β0 + β1robotizationci + β2controlscid + δ + θ + ucid (5.3)
where GPGcid is the gender pay gap in country c, industry i, and demographic
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
High-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled Total
occupations occupations occupations
Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Gender pay gap (monthly median earnings) 0.1 0 0.11 0 0.13 0 0.11 0
IHS male median monthly earnings 8.13 0.01 7.65 0.01 7.52 0.01 7.83 0.01
IHS female median monthly earnings 8.01 0.01 7.52 0.01 7.37 0.01 7.69 0.01
Female median monthly gross earnings (EUR) 2,049 19 1,265 13 1,087 13 1,559 11
Male median monthly gross earnings (EUR) 2,312 22 1,453 15 1,281 15 1,781 12
Overall median monthly earnings (EUR) 2,211 21 1,358 14 1,212 15 1,689 11
IHS of change in robotization 0.97 0.02 1.1 0.02 1.25 0.03 1.08 0.01
Change in robotization (per 10,000 workers) 8.5 0.47 9.87 0.57 11.19 0.71 9.6 0.32
Share of females 0.41 0 0.51 0 0.4 0.01 0.44 0
Change in share of females 0.01 0 -0.01 0 0 0 0 0
Gender gap in monthly hours paid 0.03 0 0.04 0 0.06 0 0.04 0
Share of full-time workers 0.9 0 0.87 0 0.88 0 0.88 0
IHS of change in ICT density 0.9 0.02 0.94 0.02 0.97 0.03 0.93 0.01
Dummy firm size > 250 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47
Age 20 to 29 0.2 0.22 0.21 0.21
Age 30 to 39 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.26
Age 40 to 49 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27
Age 50 to 59 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.26
Industry: food and beverages (manuf.) 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.1
Industry: textiles (manufacturing) 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05
Industry: wood and paper (manufacturing) 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Industry: plastic and chemicals (manuf.) 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.1
Industry: metal (manufacturing) 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.13
Industry: electrical/electronics (manuf.) 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07
Industry: automotive/transport (manuf.) 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
Industry: other manufacturing (manuf.) 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Industry: mining and quarrying 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Industry: electricity, gas, water supply 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Industry: construction 0.16 0.14 0.1 0.14
Industry: education, research, development 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.23
Elementary occupations 0 0 0.57 0.14
Managers 0.27 0 0 0.11
Professionals 0.35 0 0 0.15
Technicians & associate professionals 0.38 0 0 0.16
Clerical support workers 0 0.44 0 0.15
Service & sales workers 0 0.24 0 0.08
Craft & related trade workers 0 0.32 0 0.11
Plant & machine operators, assemblers 0 0 0.43 0.1
Notes: Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. Sample size is 24,215 and average
number of observations within a demographic cell is 342. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS.
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cell d, as defined in equation 5.2. Robotizationci (that is, the change in the number
of robots per 10,000 workers) is our main parameter of interest as defined in equation
5.1 and captures the effect of robotization on our gender pay gap measure.
In our fully saturated specification, we control for three age groups, seven occu-
pational groups, sex composition (the share of females and the change in share of
females between last and current survey year), labor market factors (share of full-
time workers and a dummy variable for a firm size greater than 250 employees), as
well as our measure of changes in information and communication technology (ICT)
capital.
To account for factors that vary systematically across countries or over time,
such as macroeconomic conditions or gender equality policies, we include a full set
of country and year fixed effects.13 The country dummies, δ, control for any time-
invariant difference in unobserved factors that vary cross-nationally. Year dummies,
θ, capture the impact of shocks that affect all countries simultaneously. We use
robust standard errors, two-way clustered by country and industry, and adjusted
for cases with few clusters. All regressions are weighted by within-country industry
employment shares, giving more weight to larger industries within each country
while giving equal weight to each country independent of population size.
Alongside the regression coefficients, we report elasticities for the models using
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation on the independent variable to ease inter-
pretation. The elasticities are calculated from the regression coefficients following
Bellemare & Wichman (2020). The formula used for regressions with the gender pay
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5.4.2 Instrumental variable estimation
To identify the causal effects of robotization on the gender pay gap, we need to
address the issues of omitted variables bias and reverse causality. Shocks to relative
13We cannot include industry fixed effects since our robotization variable is varying at the in-
dustry level.
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female labor demand in an industry, such as industry-specific policies on gender-
equal pay, may affect firms’ decision making on whether to adopt robots. Further,
firms may adopt robots in response to larger shocks to specific industries, which
may also directly impact the gender pay gap.
To account for these possibilities, we use an instrumental variables strategy fol-
lowing Graetz & Michaels (2018). The first instrument, which we call ‘replaceable
hours’, measures the share of each industry’s hours worked in 1980 (that is, be-
fore robotization takes place) that were performed by occupations that were later
susceptible to replacement by robots. This industry-level measure takes advantage
of two key facts. First, robots perform a specific and limited set of tasks, such
as welding, painting, and assembling. Second, each industry differs in the extent
to which these tasks are performed. The data on our instrumental variable comes
from Graetz & Michaels (2018). It is constructed using data on robot applications
from the IFR, and US Census occupational classifications and distribution of hours
worked by occupation and industry. If an occupation’s title from the 2000 Census
three-digit occupational classification contains at least one of the IFR application
categories such as welding, painting, etc., it is labeled as replaceable.
The rationale for using this instrument is based on the assumption that firms
employ robots when it is more profitable than employing workers. This is the case
when the share of tasks in an industry that can be performed by robots exceeds a
certain threshold (Graetz & Michaels 2018). Therefore, the instrument filters out
robot adoption due to demand-side industry shocks. Instead, it only captures robot
adoptions that are driven by technological advances in robots. Within this context,
identification is achieved by an exclusion restriction that the replaceability measure
should affect the gender pay gap only through robot adoption.
The validity of this instrument is strengthened by the findings in Freeman et al.
(2020), who show that occupational attributes, such as ‘replaceable tasks’ have little
predictive power for employment changes. To the extent that robotization affects
pay gaps, our instrument ensures that this is consequent on the automation itself
rather than compositional changes also associated with differences in pay between
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men and women. While they do not fully address all possible endogeneity concerns,
the instrumental variable analyses provide us with an additional check and help
support our findings from our OLS estimations.
We also combine our ‘replaceable hours’ instrument with a second instrument,
again following Graetz & Michaels (2018), called ‘robotic arms’. It measures the
extent to which industries employed occupations that required reaching and handling
tasks, compared to other tasks in 1980, prior to robot adoption. This instrument
takes advantage of the fact that robotic arms are a widespread and supply-side
characteristic of robots. We use this instrument together with replaceable hours
and also separately as an additional check reported in Appendix 5.A. The results
using this instrument point in the same direction as the findings from the OLS
estimation and ‘replaceable hours’ instrument.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Main findings from OLS and IV estimations
Table 5.2 presents the main OLS results on the relationship between the gender pay
gap and robotization. We report five model specifications: the baseline specification
with no controls (column 1); Column 2 adds country and year fixed effects, Column
3 adds demographic (three age group and seven occupational group dummies) and
job controls (share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size larger than
250), Column 4 adds sex composition controls (share of females and change in share
of females), and Column 5 adds a control variable for changes in ICT capital to
ensure that changes in other technologies are not driving our results.
Without controls, we find that higher robotization is associated with a higher
gender pay gap: our elasticity estimate suggests that a ten percent increase in
robotization is associated with a 0.68 percent increase in the gender pay gap. After
adding various controls (Columns 2 to 5), the coefficient size decreases to 0.004 with
an elasticity of 0.035.
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Table 5.2: Effect of robotization on gender gap in monthly earnings, OLS
Dependent variable Gender pay gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Robotization 0.007*** 0.006* 0.004* 0.004** 0.004**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Elasticity 0.068 0.054 0.035 0.035 0.035
Observations 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Job controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition No No No Yes Yes
ICT capital No No No No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions of the gender gap in median monthly
earnings on the robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes in
number of robots per 10,000 workers). All regressions include a constant. Demographic
controls include three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job
controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy variable indicating firm size
is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and
the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital is the IHS of changes in ICT capital.
The elasticity estimate is calculated following Bellemare and Wichman (2020). Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted
for small number of clusters. Within-country industry employment shares used as survey
weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own cal-
culations.
These results suggest that robotization and the gender pay gap are positively
associated. But to address potential endogeneity, we turn to our IV model, and
results are presented in Table 5.3. Panels A and B report first- and second-stage
results from the replaceable hours instrument, respectively, and Panels C and D
show results from the combined instrument of replaceable hours and robotic arms.
The coefficients from the first stage regressions of the replaceable hours instrument
in Panel A show that replaceable hours strongly predict robotization. In Panel
B, we find that the first-stage F-statistic is between 16 and 20 in all specifications,
indicating that the replaceability measure is a strong instrument. Our fully saturated
specification in column 5 suggests that a 10 percent increase in robotization leads
to a 1.8 percent increase in the gender pay gap. The average gender pay gap in our
sample is 11 percent.
Panels C and D show the first- and second-stage estimates with two instrumental
variables. We find that robotic arms do not predict robotization. The first-stage F-
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Table 5.3: Effect of robotization on gender gap in monthly earnings, IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: IV replaceable hours 1st stage – outcome: robotization
Replaceable hours 5.879*** 5.601*** 5.522*** 5.389*** 5.363***
(1.391) (1.260) (1.287) (1.336) (1.326)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours 2nd stage – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.023*** 0.026** 0.018* 0.019* 0.019*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Elasticity 0.208 0.238 0.169 0.175 0.177
First stage F-stat 17.87 19.75 18.41 16.27 16.37
Panel C: IV replaceable hours and robotic arms 1st stage – outcome: robotization
Robotic arms -6.884 -5.791 -5.898 -5.909 -6.100
(6.510) (5.537) (5.478) (5.673) (5.616)
Replaceable hours 7.754*** 7.215*** 7.285*** 7.291*** 7.315***
(2.190) (1.853) (1.907) (2.020) (1.997)
Panel D: IV replaceable hours and robotic arms 2nd stage – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.019** 0.021* 0.021*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Elasticity 0.213 0.240 0.177 0.189 0.191
First stage F-stat 9.147 10.73 9.869 9.189 9.352
Observations 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Job controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition No No No Yes Yes
ICT capital No No No No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from IV regressions of the gender gap in median monthly earnings on the
robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes in number of robots per 10,000
workers). The instrumental variable is a measure of the share of hours in an industry performed by occu-
pations prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic controls include
three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-
time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls
include the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of
changes in ICT capital. The elasticity estimate is calculated following Bellemare and Wichman (2020).
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small
number of clusters. Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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statistic is around 7 in all models and the second-stage coefficients are very similar to
those using the replaceable hours instrument only (Panel D): a ten percent increase
in robotization leads to a 1.9 percent increase in the gender pay gap.
We also estimate results using the robotic arms instrument only, which are re-
ported in Table 5.A.1 of Appendix 5.A. The coefficients are slightly smaller with
larger standard errors but remain positive in sign. This is consistent both with our
OLS estimates and with our replaceable hours instrument. Given the lack of predic-
tive power of the robotic arms instrument, we focus solely on the replaceable hours
instrument for the rest of the paper.
Our estimates for IV are larger than the OLS ones. This is in line with attenua-
tion bias; that is, in the presence of omitted variables there could be a tendency to
underestimate the impact of robotization on the gender pay gap.
While these results indicate that women lose out compared to men due to the
adoption of robots, it is also important to understand whether this is driven by
rising male or falling female earnings. Therefore, in Table 5.4, we present the effect
of robotization on median male earnings (columns 1 and 2) and median female
earnings (columns 3 and 4). In line with the robotization measure, we use the
inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (IHS) of earnings as a dependent variable.
Panel A shows OLS estimates and Panel B coefficients from the IV model, using the
replaceability measure as an instrument for robotization.
When controlling for country and year fixed effects in column 1, OLS estimates
in Panel A show a positive association between changes in robotization and male
earnings. The coefficients remain similar when adding the full set of controls in
column 2. Turning to female earnings, we can see that they are also positively
associated with robotization. However, the size of coefficients is slightly smaller
compared to those from the male earnings regressions. The coefficients from the
IV model in Panel B remain positive but the coefficient on robotization is only
significant for the full specification with male earnings as an outcome variable (Panel
B, column 2). These results suggest that the increase in the gender pay gap due to
robotization is driven by the larger positive effect on male earnings, compared to
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Table 5.4: Effect of robotization on male and female earnings, OLS and IV
Outcome Male earnings Female earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS
Robotization 0.019** 0.015*** 0.012** 0.011**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Elasticity 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.011
Panel B. IV replaceable hours
Robotization 0.046 0.047* 0.015 0.023
(0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.021)
Elasticity 0.046 0.046 0.015 0.023
First stage F-stat 19.75 16.37 19.75 16.37
Observations 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No Yes No Yes
Job controls No Yes No Yes
Sex composition No Yes No Yes
ICT capital No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the IHS (inverse hyperbolic sine trans-
formation) of male (columns 1 and 2) and female (columns 3 and 4) earnings on the robotization (that
is, IHS transformation of changes in number of robots per 10,000 workers). All regressions include a con-
stant. Demographic controls include three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies.
Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy variable indicating firm size is larger
than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of
females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. The elasticity estimate is
calculated following Bellemare and Wichman (2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered
two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry
employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR,
EU KLEMS, own calculations.
female earnings.
5.5.2 Robustness checks and alternative specifications
We conduct a range of checks to ensure the robustness of our results, and the tables
are included in Appendix 5.A. Our definition of a demographic cell distinguishes
by skill-based occupational groups. This is necessary to be able to test heteroge-
neous effects across occupational hierarchies. However, we show that the positive
relationship between robotization and the gender gap in earnings remains (and even
becomes stronger) when we use an alternative demographic cell definition that does
not distinguish across occupational groups (Table 5.A.2). This suggests that our
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findings are robust to a demographic cell definition in which movements between
occupations due to robotization cease to be relevant and cells contain information
from individuals with more heterogenous skill levels.
Next, we show that our results are robust to the exclusion of Germany from
the sample, as well as to the exclusion of the automotive and transport industry
(Table 5.A.3). This alleviates concerns that our results are driven by the country
or industry with the highest robotization. We adjust part-time earnings to pro-rata
full-time earnings since part-time work for women is common in a few European
countries. We show that our results are robust to gender pay gap definitions that
are based on alternative earnings measures, (i) the gender gap in median monthly
earnings without adjusting part-time earnings pro-rata, and (ii) the gender gap in
median hourly earnings (Table 5.A.4). We also show that our results are robust to
using the natural logarithm of robotization, instead of using an IHS transformation
(Table 5.A.5). Finally, we report bootstrapped standard errors and find that the
results do not change substantially (Table 5.A.6).
In Table 5.4, we showed that the increase in the gender pay gap due to robotiza-
tion is driven by the fact that male earnings increase more strongly than female ones.
We show that the positive association between robotization and (male and female)
earnings holds across the earnings distribution by conducting quantile regressions
at different percentiles of the distribution of median earnings of each demographic
cell (Table 5.A.7).
5.6 Country heterogeneity and mechanisms
5.6.1 Heterogeneity across countries
The sample of countries included in our analysis differs in terms of each country’s
gender equality. If initial levels of gender inequality are high, this indicates that a
country’s institutions and policies are weaker with respect to fostering gender equal-
ity. It is therefore possible that the impact of robotization on an increased gender
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pay gap could be driven by countries with high initial levels of gender inequality.
To test this, we use the Gender Gap Index (GGI) of the World Economic Forum,
which ranks countries’ performance in economic, educational, health, and political
dimensions of gender equality (see Hausmann et al. (2006)). We split our sample
into two groups: the top ten countries with a high GGI score, hence higher levels
of gender equality, and the bottom ten countries with a low GGI score, that is,
lower levels of gender equality. The countries with high gender equality levels are
Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands,
Sweden, UK. Low GGI countries include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia.14
Results presented in Table 5.5 indicate that our main findings are mostly driven
by countries with low levels of initial gender equality. This suggests that robotization
exacerbates existing inequalities in these countries. On the other hand, robotization
has no effect on the gender pay gap in countries with high initial gender equality.15
We also performed additional analyses in which we split the countries into Eastern
and Western European subsamples. We find that robotization increases the gender
pay gap to a similar extent in both groups (see Appendix 5.A, Table 5.A.8). This
suggests that initial gender equality per se, rather than regional grouping, mediates
the impact of robotization on the gender pay gap.
Our sample of countries also varies in terms of the robotization experienced over
the study period. Countries that have experienced high levels of robotization are
not the same countries that have always enjoyed a high robot density. We therefore
study results across levels of initial gender equality for the subsample of the ten
countries that have had the highest changes in robots per worker over the study
period (Table 5.6). We find that our main results are driven by countries with low
overall gender equality but which experienced high robotization (Columns 4 and
6), such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Slovakia. With the
14The GGI scores are shown in Appendix 5.A, Table 5.A.9.
15We also tried to classify the 20 countries into 4 groups based on their GGI ranking, and the
take-away remains the same. Robotization increases the gender pay gap among the two country
groups with the lowest GGI rankings but has no effect on the two groups with higher GGI rankings.
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Table 5.5: Heterogeneity by Gender Gap Index scores
Subsample High GGI score Low GGI score
(Higher gender equality) (Lower gender equality)
(1) (2)
Panel A: OLS – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.001 0.006**
(0.001) (0.003)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.006 0.027**
(0.010) (0.012)
First stage F-stat 8.57 16.62
Observations 10,401 13,814
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes
Notes: The World Economic Forum (WEF) Gender Gap Index (by Hausmann et al., 2006) ranks countries’ perfor-
mance in economic, educational, health, and political dimensions of gender equality. High GGI countries include
Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK. Low GGI countries
include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. The
table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in median monthly earnings in Panels A1 and
A2, median male earnings in Panels B1 and B2, and median female earnings in Panels C1 and C2 on the robotization
(that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes in number of robots per 10,000 workers). The instru-
mental variable is a measure of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced
by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age group dummies and
seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm
size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of
females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry
employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS,
World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index by Hausmann et al. (2006), own calculations.
exception of Italy, these are a subset of the Eastern European countries. The size of
the coefficient for this group of countries is almost identical to the effect we found
for the full sample of countries (Table 5.3, Column 5). In line with results presented
in Table 5.5, robotization had no effect on the gender pay gap in countries with high
overall gender equality (and high robotization), which includes Belgium, Germany,
the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden.16
16Germany has a unique position, with high levels of robotization and robot density as well
as a dominant automotive/transport industry. Dauth et al. (2018) analyzed German data to
investigate how robotization affected the outcomes of individual workers, but did not examine
potential gendered impacts. We therefore reran our models just on the German sample to check the
consistency of our results with theirs. Our findings are compatible: we find both male and female
earnings in Germany modestly increased due to robotization in comparable amounts, keeping the
gender pay gap relatively unchanged (not shown here but available upon request). As discussed
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Table 5.6: Heterogeneity by Gender Gap Index for high robotization countries
Sample High robotization and High robotization and
high gender gap equality low gender equality
Outcomes Gender gap IHS male IHS female Gender gap IHS male IHS female
in earnings earnings earnings in earnings earnings earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
IHS Robotization 0.002 0.008** 0.006* 0.005* 0.021*** 0.015**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours
IHS Robotization 0.005 0.023 0.018* 0.019** 0.040* 0.017
(0.005) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.023) (0.019)
1st stage F-stat 21.07 21.07 21.07 18.57 18.57 18.57
Observations 5,428 5,428 5,428 8,219 8,219 8,219
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demogr. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Countries with high robotization and high GGI include Belgium, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and
Sweden. Countries with high robotization and low GGI include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and
Slovakia. The instrumental variable is a measure of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations
prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age
group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a
dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and
the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-
country industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES,
IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
In sum, robotization exacerbated the gender pay gap in countries in which overall
gender inequality was already high. These are predominantly Eastern European
countries (but do not include all Eastern European countries in our sample). In
contrast, in countries where initial gender inequality was low, robotization did not
increase the gender pay gap. These results also hold when focusing only on the
countries that experienced higher increases in robotization.
in the robustness checks section, we also show that our results are not affected by exclusion or
inclusion of Germany nor of automotive industry.
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5.6.2 Potential mechanisms
In this section, we analyze two potential mechanisms underlying the observed rela-
tionship between robotization and the gender pay gap. First, robotization may lead
to differential earnings increases at different parts of the occupational ranking, where
men and women are disproportionately present (or they benefit differentially from
earnings increases). Second, robotization may lead to compositional changes at the
industry level, and employment levels of men and women are affected differentially
leading to an increase in the gender pay gap.
To test the first mechanism, we explore heterogeneity by skill-based occupational
groups. The results presented in Table 5.7 show that robotization leads to an in-
crease in the gender pay gap for medium- and high-skilled occupations. In contrast,
there is no effect of robotization among those in low-skilled occupations.
Table 5.7: Gender pay gap by skill-based occupational groups
Subsample Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: OLS – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.001 0.008** 0.002**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization -0.001 0.037*** 0.014*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008)
First stage F-stat 14.77 19.15 16.09
Observations 6,399 7,991 9,825
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in median monthly earnings on the
robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes in number of robots per 10,000 workers).
The instrumental variable is a measure of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to
be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age group
dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy
indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the
change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country
industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU
KLEMS, own calculations.
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Next, we explore whether the heterogeneous results across occupational ranking
can be explained by the fact that men higher in the occupational hierarchy dispro-
portionately benefit from robotization, through productivity effects. Skilled male
workers may be more likely to benefit from robot-driven productivity increases. This
is because men disproportionately occupy higher positions in the occupational hier-
archy. Moreover, they are overrepresented in skilled, high-paid STEM occupations
where we would most likely expect to see benefits from robot-driven productivity
increases for workers.
Building on results from Table 5.6, which demonstrated the importance of the
initial gender inequality situation of the country, we focus on the subsample of coun-
tries with high initial gender inequality and high robotization. The results in Table
5.8 confirm that robotization is associated with statistically significant earnings pre-
mia for male workers in medium- and high-skilled occupations. This is in line with
the observation that women are under-represented in high-paying occupations and
with Goldin (2014), who shows that within-occupation wage differentials actually ac-
count for a larger proportion of the gender wage gap than between-occupation wage
differentials. On the other hand, the results also show that robotization positively
impacts female earnings only for those in low-skilled occupations. Our results sug-
gest that the underlying mechanism for the impact of robotization on an increased
gender pay gap is that skilled men disproportionately benefit from robotization,
through a productivity effect.17
17For completeness, results by skill-based occupational groups for countries with high robotiza-















Table 5.8: Heterogeneity by skill-based occupational groups for countries with high robotization and low levels of gender
equality
Occupational group Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
Outcomes Gender gap IHS male IHS female Gender gap IHS male IHS female Gender gap IHS male IHS female
in earnings earnings earnings in earnings earnings earnings in earnings earnings earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: OLS
IHS Robotization 0.002 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.011* 0.025*** 0.012** 0.005*** 0.016* 0.011
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours
IHS Robotization -0.002 0.033* 0.037** 0.037*** 0.052* 0.009 0.022** 0.024 -0.005
(0.009) (0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.028) (0.022) (0.010) (0.021) (0.025)
1st stage F-stat 23.47 23.47 23.47 22.20 22.20 22.20 17.60 17.60 17.60
Observations 2,139 2,139 2,139 2,914 2,914 2,914 3,166 3,166 3,166
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Sample consists of high robotization and low GGI countries, which are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Slovakia. The instrumental variable is a
measure of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include
three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250
employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry employment shares used as
survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
5.6. Country heterogeneity and mechanisms 199
We also examine to what extent our results can be explained by compositional
changes (in terms of sex, sex-age, sex-education, and sex-occupation) in the manu-
facturing industry as well as movements in and out of the labor force. Ideally, one
would need a large panel of data that follows individuals for a long period to obtain
job-cycle profiles of workers. Since such data are not available in a cross-country set-
ting, we examine to what extent workers whose previous job was in manufacturing
are still employed in the manufacturing industry. To do so, we turn to the EU-LFS
and restrict our attention to workers who are between 20 and 59 years of age for the
20 countries included in our sample.
We present the share of workers in manufacturing (that is, current job in man-
ufacturing industry) whose previous job was also in manufacturing by sex and skill
level for all countries included in our sample in Table 5.9.18 We present outflows
from manufacturing (that is, the previous job in manufacturing) to other industries
(that is, current job in any other industry) by sex and skill level for all countries
included in our sample in Table 5.10. These mobility tables provide descriptive evi-
dence and an indication whether the movements in and out of a given industry due
to robotization can drive up the gender pay gap.
The tables show that nearly all workers who used to work in manufacturing
are still in the same sector. This is true for all survey years – 2006, 2010, and
2014 and when we construct similar shares by sex and age, sex, and education level
nexus. Similarly, few workers whose previous job was in manufacturing moved to
other industries, while most moved to another job in manufacturing. We also check
this pattern for Germany as it has the highest robotization rate in our sample. The
patterns we observe in Germany remain the same (see Appendix 5.A, Table 5.A.11).
Collectively, we conclude that compositional changes in the manufacturing sector are
negligibly small.
18Overall, around 95 percent of workers whose previous job was in manufacturing stay in em-















Table 5.9: Share of workers currently in manufacturing whose previous job was also in manufacturing, by sex and skill level
2006 2014
Male Female Male Female
Manufacturing Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
inflows skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled
Belgium 96.2 97.4 98.0 95.8 95.2 95.6 97.8 97.9 97.5 95.5 96.5 96.3
Bulgaria – – – – – – 98.0 99.6 100.0 98.9 98.8 99.3
Czech Republic 96.4 97.3 97.9 96.8 97.2 97.0 98.0 98.3 99.0 97.2 97.3 96.3
Estonia 95.3 94.1 96.4 94.6 94.6 96.6 95.1 97.0 95.4 97.0 96.7 94.1
Finland 98.3 95.9 97.3 95.9 94.7 95.1 98.6 96.7 95.4 98.7 93.8 96.5
France 98.2 98.2 98.2 97.5 97.7 97.6 93.3 96.4 98.0 94.7 92.9 97.2
Germany 98.3 98.9 99.1 98.7 98.5 98.7 97.0 97.6 98.0 96.7 96.9 96.4
Greece 98.5 98.3 99.3 97.6 99.0 98.4 97.9 99.5 100.0 99.0 98.4 98.4
Hungary 95.6 96.6 98.1 97.3 97.5 98.7 96.3 97.1 97.8 97.2 96.1 97.9
Italy 96.6 96.0 95.7 96.8 95.2 94.8 99.0 99.2 99.1 98.5 98.7 98.7
Latvia 88.2 93.6 96.1 94.7 95.2 93.4 96.5 98.1 97.3 95.9 96.7 97.1
Lithuania 94.7 92.6 96.8 93.8 97.5 98.0 93.5 93.7 95.9 97.0 95.4 97.8
Netherlands 97.7 97.7 96.8 97.8 96.0 95.0 96.5 96.9 97.1 92.5 98.8 93.5
Poland 94.7 96.0 96.4 95.8 97.9 97.4 96.5 97.3 98.6 96.4 97.7 98.2
Portugal 96.9 98.0 98.3 98.3 98.9 99.0 98.3 99.1 98.3 99.2 98.2 97.0
Romania 97.4 98.7 98.9 98.5 98.6 98.4 99.1 99.1 99.3 99.4 99.1 99.6
Slovakia 96.3 97.3 97.9 97.6 99.3 97.6 97.8 99.3 99.1 98.9 99.8 98.6
Spain 95.1 96.1 97.4 95.2 91.9 95.4 95.8 97.2 96.2 96.2 94.6 95.4
Sweden – – – – – – 99.3 99.2 99.3 98.7 98.9 99.4
United Kingdom 92.8 93.5 92.9 92.1 92.9 90.6 93.2 96.2 96.0 95.7 87.6 93.9
Notes: This table shows the workers whose previous job was in manufacturing, as a percentage of the workers currently in manufacturing, by sex and skill level. The sample
is restricted the employees in Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom who are between 20 and 59 years of age. The industry classification is NACE-1. Skill level is defined
using the ISCO 1-digit level: the low-skilled category is comprised of elementary occupations and plant, machine operators and assemblers; the medium-skilled category is
comprised of clerical workers, service and sales workers, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishing workers and craft and related trade workers; the high-skilled category is















Table 5.10: Outflows from manufacturing to other industries by sex and skill level
2006 2014
Male Female Male Female
Manufacturing Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
outflows skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled skilled
Belgium 2.3 3.4 2.5 3.5 4.2 2.1 1.8 2.8 1.5 1.4 3.2 3.0
Bulgaria – – – – – – 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.2 3.7
Czech Republic 2.1 2.0 2.1 1.1 4.5 2.3 1.5 1.1 1.0 0.4 2.7 0.7
Estonia 6.9 8.7 4.1 2.7 8.8 2.9 4.9 5.0 3.6 1.2 7.2 3.4
Finland 3.1 4.1 2.2 2.3 2.8 2.2 2.8 3.3 5.7 1.4 7.1 4.2
France 1.3 2.3 1.9 1.0 3.5 3.6 4.8 5.6 3.3 3.4 6.1 6.5
Germany 1.0 0.6 0.6 4.7 1.7 1.3 1.9 2.0 1.5 3.1 2.7 3.1
Greece 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.8 3.6
Hungary 3.7 3.0 2.3 1.6 3.8 3.7 2.9 2.6 1.8 1.8 4.0 4.1
Italy 3.2 4.5 5.1 2.8 6.2 8.5 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.7
Latvia 15.1 9.7 11.6 5.3 8.4 19.8 5.7 3.0 5.8 1.7 2.1 0.6
Lithuania 5.1 4.8 1.1 6.5 3.3 4.5 5.3 4.5 5.9 1.4 3.5 1.3
Netherlands 1.9 2.7 3.4 2.5 5.3 4.3 2.2 1.1 2.1 3.9 4.7 4.0
Poland 3.2 2.2 2.4 1.6 1.6 2.0 2.4 1.7 2.0 0.5 2.1 2.2
Portugal 1.6 2.0 1.7 2.5 1.3 2.9 1.3 0.9 1.3 0.5 2.3 1.9
Romania 4.3 1.1 1.1 3.7 1.3 2.7 0.7 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.5 2.1
Slovakia 2.3 1.6 1.3 1.0 2.1 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.1 0.7 2.0 2.3
Spain 3.6 4.0 3.1 3.6 8.5 5.8 3.2 3.0 3.7 4.1 4.5 3.8
Sweden – – – – – – 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.2
United Kingdom 1.7 1.5 1.0 0.5 3.1 1.5 3.5 3.4 2.2 3.3 7.4 4.7
Notes: This table shows the percentage of workers whose previous job was in manufacturing and who currently work in another industry by sex and skill level. The sample
comprises those workers whose previous job was in manufacturing, and is restricted to employees in Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom who are between 20 and 59 years
of age. The industry classification is NACE-1. Skill level is defined using the ISCO 1-digit level: the low-skilled category is comprised of elementary occupations and plant,
machine operators and assemblers; the medium-skilled category is comprised of clerical workers, service and sales workers, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishing workers
and craft and related trade workers; the high-skilled category is comprised of managers, professionals and technicians and associate professionals. Source: EU-LFS and own
calculations.
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In addition to the descriptive evidence we draw from the EU-LFS, we provide
further evidence on the sex composition of our sample in Table 5.11. In particular,
we analyze whether robotization impacts the sex composition in the demographic
cells in our data. The outcome variable is the gender pay gap in the hours worked
in the last month, which measures the intensive margin of labor supply of women
relative to men. Column 1 reports the results for the full sample, columns 2 to 4
report the results for subsamples of the low-, medium-, and high-skilled occupational
groups, respectively. The point estimates are small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant, suggesting that robotization did not affect the sex composition in the
sample.
Table 5.11: Effect of robotization on the gender gap in hours worked last month
Sample Full sample Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS – outcome: gender gap hours worked
Robotization 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours – outcome: gender gap hours worked
Robotization 0.006 -0.008 0.011 0.006
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005)
First stage F-stat 16.37 14.77 19.15 16.09
Observations 24,215 6,399 7,991 9,825
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in hours worked on the robotization
(that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes in number of robots per 10,000 workers). The instrumental
variable is a measure of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by
robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age group dummies and seven
occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is
larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of females
in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. The elasticity estimate is calculated following
Bellemare and Wichman (2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry,
and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
In summary, our results are likely to be explained by an increase in male earn-
ings in medium- and high-skilled occupations, which is primarily to do with the
male predominance in the higher occupational hierarchy. In other words, women’s
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underrepresentation in higher-skilled occupations accompanied by robotization ex-
acerbates the gender pay gap.
5.7 Conclusions
We provide the first large-scale evidence on the impact of industrial robots on the
gender pay gap using data from 28 million individuals living in 20 European coun-
tries and covering the period from 2006 to 2014. For identification, we follow prior
research and instrument robot adoption with a measure of the fraction of each
industry’s hours worked in 1980 that was performed by occupations that became
replaceable by robots by 2012 (Graetz & Michaels 2018).
We find that, overall, robotization increases the gender pay gap. Our IV es-
timates suggest that a 10 percent increase in robotization leads to a 1.8 percent
increase in the gender pay gap. We further present evidence that these results are
driven by countries with high initial gender inequality. Moreover, our results appear
to be explained by disproportionate increases in male earnings, compared to female
earnings, in medium- and high-skilled occupations. This suggests that skilled men
disproportionately benefit from robotization, through a productivity effect.
Automation sets important challenges for labor market policy. While much at-
tention has focused on the overall labor-replacing consequences of technological
developments, our findings highlight that automation may have important distri-
butional consequences, which depend on country context and occupational hierar-
chies. Specifically, our findings suggest that countries that have been less successful
in promoting gender equality are also worse equipped to deal with technological
developments that may exacerbate gender inequalities.
At a time when policymakers are putting increased efforts into tackling gen-
der gaps in the labor market, our evidence is important. Our results suggest that
governments not only need to ensure that education and vocational training sys-
tems provide people with the right skills demanded in the future, but also need to
pay attention to specific groups of people. They need to increase efforts to make
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sure that women and men are equally equipped with the skills most relevant for
future employability and that women are equally represented in positions across the
skill-based occupational hierarchy.
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5.A Appendix tables
Table 5.A.1: Effect of robotization on gender gap in monthly earnings, IV robotic
arms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: IV robotic arms 1st stage – outcome: robotization
Robotic arms 9.103** 8.725*** 7.834*** 9.099*** 9.002***
(3.787) (3.300) (2.933) (2.830) (2.786)
Panel B: IV robotic arms 2nd stage – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.021* 0.025 0.015 0.014 0.014
(0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
First stage F-stat 5.778 6.988 7.135 10.34 10.44
Observations 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Job controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition No No No Yes Yes
ICT capital No No No No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in median
monthly earnings on the robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes
in number of robots per 10,000 workers). All regressions include a constant. Demographic char-
acteristics include three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job con-
trols include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250
employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of fe-
males in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. The elasticity estimate
is calculated following Bellemare and Wichman (2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-
country industry employment shares used as survey weights. Significance levels: * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.2: Robustness check: alternative demographic cell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.011** 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours – outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028)
First stage F-stat 15.37 15.98 13.22 11.76 11.87
Observations 4,927 4,927 4,927 4,927 4,927
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Job controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition No No No Yes Yes
ICT capital No No No No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in median
monthly earnings on the robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes
in number of robots per 10,000 workers). The instrumental variable is a measure of the share of
hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions
include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age group dummies. Job controls
include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 em-
ployees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of females
in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clus-
ters. Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.3: Robustness check: variation of sample
Outcomes Male earnings Female earnings Gender pay gap
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A1: OLS, sample without Germany
Robotization 0.015*** 0.010** 0.004**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Panel A2: IV replaceable hours, sample without Germany
Robotization 0.046 0.021 0.021*
(0.029) (0.022) (0.011)
First stage F-stat 15.99 15.99 15.99
Observations 23,031 23,031 23,031
Panel B1: OLS, sample without automotive/transportation industry
Robotization 0.015*** 0.010** 0.005**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Panel B2: IV replaceable hours, sample without automotive/trans. industry
Robotization 0.047 0.020 0.022*
(0.031) (0.023) (0.013)
First stage F-stat 12.72 12.72 12.72
Observations 22,519 22,519 22,519
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in me-
dian monthly earnings on the robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of
changes in number of robots per 10,000 workers). The instrumental variable is a measure of
the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots.
All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age group dum-
mies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time work-
ers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls
include the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes
the IHS of changes in ICT capital. The elasticity estimate is calculated following Bellemare
and Wichman (2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country
and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry employ-
ment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR,
EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.4: Robustness check: alternative measures for outcome variable






Panel B: IV replaceable hours
Robotization 0.025* 0.018*
(0.011) (0.010)
First stage F-stat 16.37 16.92
Observations 24,215 23,719
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions of the gender gap in median monthly
earnings on the robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of changes in number of
robots per 10,000 workers). The instrumental variable is a measure of the share of hours in an industry
performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demo-
graphic characteristics include three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job
controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 em-
ployees. Sex composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of females in a
cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. The elasticity estimate is calculated fol-
lowing Bellemare and Wichman (2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by
country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry employment
shares used as survey weights. Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES,
IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.5: Alternative functional form: regressor ln + 1 in robotization
Outcome ln (Male earnings) ln (Female earnings) Gender pay gap
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: OLS
ln ( robotization + 1) 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.007*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.003)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours
ln (robotization + 1) 0.046* 0.023 0.019*
(0.027) (0.021) (0.011)
1st stage F-stat 21.97 21.97 21.97
Observations 22,458 22,458 22,458
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports results from OLS and IV regressions. The instrumental variable is a measure
of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots. All re-
gressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age group dummies and seven
occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indi-
cating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include the share of females
and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital.
The elasticity estimate is calculated following Bellemare and Wichman (2020). Robust standard errors
in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters.
Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.6: Bootstrapped standard errors
Outcome Male earnings Female earnings Gender pay gap
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Standard errors two-way clustered
Robotization 0.010*** 0.008** 0.002*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Panel B: Standard errors bootstrapped and two-way clustered (400 repetitions)
Robotization 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.002**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 24,215 24,215 24,215
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Comparison of results with bootstrapped standard errors (400 repetitions) vs standard er-
rors clustered two-way (both unweighted). Demographic characteristics include three age group
dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time
workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls
include the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes
the IHS of changes in ICT capital. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU
KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.7: Quantile regressions
Quantile 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Quantile regressions – outcome: male earnings
Robotization 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.915 0.922 0.924 0.921 0.909 0.925
Panel B: Quantile regressions – outcome: female earnings
Robotization 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003* 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.924 0.931 0.932 0.931 0.922 0.933
Observations 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215 24,215
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports results from quantile regressions of the IHS (inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) of
male (columns 1 and 2) and female (columns 3 and 4) earnings on the robotization (that is, inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation of changes in number of robots per 10,000 workers). All regressions include a constant. Demographic
controls include three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of
full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls include
the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT
capital. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. Data unweighted. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.8: Heterogeneity across Eastern and Western Europe
Subsample Western Europe Eastern Europe
(1) (2)
Panel A: OLS - outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.004** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours - outcome: gender pay gap
Robotization 0.019* 0.023*
(0.011) (0.012)
1st stage F-stat 16.37 10.53
Observations 24,215 12,870
Country and year FE yes yes
Demographic and job controls yes yes
Sex composition yes yes
ICT capital yes yes
Notes: Western European countries include Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, and UK. Eastern European countries include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The instrumental variable is a measure of the share of hours in an
industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic
characteristics include three age group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the
share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex composition controls
include the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in
ICT capital. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for
small number of clusters. Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
Table 5.A.9: Gender Gap Index (GGI) scores





















Source: World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index by Haus-








Table 5.A.10: Heterogeneity by skill-based occupational groups for countries with high robotization and high gender equality
Occupational group Low-skilled Medium-skilled High-skilled
Outcomes Gender gap in IHS male IHS female Gender gap in IHS male IHS female Gender gap in IHS male IHS female
earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: OLS
IHS Robotization 0.002 0.011*** 0.009** 0.005* 0.009* 0.003 -0.001 0.006 0.007
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Panel B: IV replaceable hours
IHS Robotization -0.005 0.015 0.026** 0.019*** 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 0.024** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.013) (0.000) (0.012) (0.010)
1st stage F-stat 21.44 21.44 21.44 18.99 18.99 18.99 23.68 23.68 23.68
Observations 1,341 1,341 1,341 1,861 1,861 1,861 2,226 2,226 2,226
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demogr. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Job controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ICT capital Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Sample consists of high robotization and high GGI countries, which are Belgium, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The instrumental variable is a measure
of the share of hours in an industry performed by occupations prone to be replaced by robots. All regressions include a constant. Demographic characteristics include three age
group dummies and seven occupational group dummies. Job controls include the share of full-time workers and a dummy indicating firm size is larger than 250 employees. Sex
composition controls include the share of females and the change in share of females in a cell. ICT capital denotes the IHS of changes in ICT capital. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, clustered two-way by country and industry, and adjusted for small number of clusters. Within-country industry employment shares used as survey weights. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sources: EU-SES, IFR, EU KLEMS, own calculations.
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Table 5.A.11: Inflows to manufacturing by sex, age and education level
Year Category Previous job in Moved to another
manufacturing industry
2006 Male, 20-39 yrs., high school or less 98.23% 1.05%
2006 Male, 20-39 yrs., degree-level education 98.87% 0.75%
2006 Female, 20-39 yrs., high school or less 98.24% 1.26%
2006 Female, 20-39 yrs., degree-level education 100.00% 1.06%
2006 Male, 40-59 yrs., high school or less 98.73% 0.68%
2006 Male, 40-59 yrs., degree-level education 99.77% 0.68%
2006 Female, 40-59 yrs., high school or less 98.75% 1.1%
2006 Female, 40-59 yrs., degree-level education 98.73% 2.5%
2010 Male, 20-39 yrs., high school or less 98.27% 1.6%
2010 Male, 20-39 yrs., degree-level education 98.50% 1.5%
2010 Female, 20-39 yrs., high school or less 97.14% 2.55%
2010 Female, 20-39 yrs., degree-level education 98.36% 1.64%
2010 Male, 40-59 yrs., high school or less 98.98% 0.94%
2010 Male, 40-59 yrs., degree-level education 99.61% 0.39%
2010 Female, 40-59 yrs., high school or less 98.32% 1.49%
2010 Female, 40-59 yrs., degree-level education 100.00% 0%
2014 Male, 20-39 yrs., high school or less 96.17% 3.89%
2014 Male, 20-39 yrs., degree-level education 95.71% 1.47%
2014 Female, 20-39 yrs., high school or less 94.43% 4.37%
2014 Female, 20-39 yrs., degree-level education 87.80% 0%
2014 Male, 40-59 yrs., high school or less 97.97% 1.18%
2014 Male, 40-59 yrs., degree-level education 98.95% 0%
2014 Female, 40-59 yrs., high school or less 96.98% 1.91%
2014 Female, 40-59 yrs., degree-level education 91.18% 6.06%
Notes: The third column of the table shows workers whose previous job was also in manufacturing, as a share
of the workers currently in manufacturing. The fourth column shows workers who moved out of manufacturing,
that is, workers currently working in any other industry as a share of the workers whose previous job was in
manufacturing. The sample is restricted the employees in Germany who are between 20 and 59 years of age. The
industry classification is NACE 1-digit level. Source: EU-LFS.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
The aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the persistent gender
gaps in labour market outcomes. The four papers explore questions relating to key
areas and sources of these gaps. In this chapter, I summarise the main results of the
papers and discuss how the findings contribute to existing knowledge. I then discuss
the main limitations of the research. Finally, I consider implications for policy and
describe useful areas for future research.
6.1 Summary of findings and contributions
Do gender roles matter for young adults’ university major choices?
In Chapter 2, I estimate to what extent and why the degree of femininity of moth-
ers’ occupation and the degree of masculinity of fathers’ occupation affect whether
their adult children choose typically male or female majors at university. To do
so, I introduce a novel measure to operationalise the extent to which majors and
occupations are ‘typically female’ or ‘typically male’.
I find that sons choose more typically male majors if their fathers worked in more
typically male occupations. Daughters choose more typically female majors if their
fathers worked in less typically male occupations and if their mothers worked in more
typically female occupations. However, mothers’ occupation only matters under
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certain conditions. The findings suggest that a large part of the intergenerational
associations is driven by children choosing a major that is closely related to parental
occupation. This provides support for the ‘direct transfer of resources’ as a relevant
transmission channel. This channel includes the transfer of occupation-specific skills,
resources, and networks from parents to their children. The results also suggest that
some of the father-son associations are due to the transmission of gender roles.
This paper makes three contributions to existing literature. First, it improves
the understanding of gendered major choices by providing the first country-specific
analysis on the role of parental socialisation, a previously unexplored determinant
in Germany. Second, the paper uses a new rank-based measure, which defines
the degree of masculinity or femininity relative to others of the same cohort and
gender. Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on the intergenerational
transmission of gender norms by distinguishing between two main channels through
which intergenerational transmission occurs. These channels are the transmission
of parental resources and the transmission of gender roles.
Are gender role attitudes sensitive to context and experiences?
The main conclusion from Chapters 3 and 4 is that gender role attitudes are sensi-
tive to context and life-course experiences. In Chapter 3, I study the impact of the
2007 paid parental leave reform in Germany on the gender role attitudes of affected
parents; specifically, attitudes towards (i) the gender division of work, (ii) the conse-
quences of the labour force participation of mothers for children’s wellbeing, and (iii)
fathers’ appropriate roles. I find that the reform increased support for traditional
gender roles for fathers among parents affected by the reform, compared to parents
before the reform. I find no effect on the other two outcomes: attitudes towards
the gender division of work, and attitudes towards the consequences of the labour
force participation of mothers. I further find that the effect on increased support for
traditional gender roles for fathers is driven by a change in attitudes of men, and
not women.
This paper makes three contributions: First, it improves our understanding of
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the possible effects of parental leave policies on the gender role attitudes of parents
by providing the first analysis of the impacts of the 2007 parental leave reform on
parental attitudes. Second, it adds to the empirical literature on the effects of the
German reform by providing a potential mechanism for the economic effects that
previous research has identified. In particular, the paper finds that the reform was
successful in achieving increased leave-taking among fathers and a quicker return
to work among mothers, but did not lead to significant changes regarding gender
equality in paid and unpaid work. Third, results inform the broader literature on
whether individual attitudes change over the life course, suggesting that impres-
sionability may not always run in the ‘right direction’ but may have unintended
consequences.
In Chapter 4, jointly written with Mireia Borrell-Porta and Joan Costa-Font, I
study the effect of parenting daughters on attitudes towards gender roles in the UK;
specifically, attitudes towards the traditional male breadwinner norm in which it is
the husband’s role to work and the wife’s to stay at home. We find robust evidence
that parenting daughters decreases fathers’ likelihood to hold traditional attitudes.
This result is driven by fathers of school-aged daughters, for whom the effects are
robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects. The effect on mothers’ attitudes
is generally not statistically significant.
The paper makes several contributions to existing literature. It is the first pa-
per to explore the impact of having daughters across daughters’ ages on individual
changes in attitudes towards gender norms. This is important because our findings
suggest that it is when daughters are of school-age - and not before - that fathers’
attitudes become less traditional, thus coinciding with the period in which children
experience a stronger social pressure to conform to gender norms (Lane et al. 2017).
The paper also contributes to expanding the evidence beyond the US, being the
first paper to explore the impact of a child’s sex on attitudes towards gender norms
in the UK. Finally, and unlike previous studies, we draw on data that covers very
recent years - up to 2012 - which is important given the large changes in patterns
of gender inequalities during recent decades.
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Chapters 3 and 4 study different contexts. However, some conclusions on the
impressionability of attitudes can be drawn from a joint look at the chapters’ find-
ings. First, the results suggest that context can affect attitudes, even among adults.
Therefore, the findings oppose the view that attitudes are formed in childhood and
youth and remain stable thereafter. Second, in both papers the exposure affects
the attitudes of men but not those of women. In both papers, one can argue that
the change in experience is stronger for men than for women. Therefore, it seems
plausible that attitudinal change occurs for men but not women. In line with iden-
tity theories, the new experiences may have altered the parenting identities of men.
Especially given that Chapter 2 showed that the transmission of gender roles seems
to matter most for young men’s gender-typical university major choices, the impres-
sionability of men’s attitudes is an important finding.
Does technological change make gender inequality worse?
In Chapter 5, jointly written with Cevat Giray Aksoy and Berkay Özcan, I study the
effect of one specific type of automation, industrial robots, on the gender pay gap in
a sample of 20 European countries. We find that robot adoption increases both male
and female earnings but also increases the gender pay gap. These results are driven
by countries with high initial levels of gender inequality and can be explained by the
fact that men at medium- and high-skilled occupations disproportionately benefit
from robotization, through a productivity effect. These findings suggest that tech-
nological change may exacerbate existing gender inequality, especially in contexts
where gender differences are already large. This paper contributes to existing litera-
ture by providing the first large-scale, cross-country evidence on the gender-specific
labour market impacts of industrial robots.
Overall contributions
Each of the four papers addresses its own research question in a different context,
using the best available data sources. However, a joint look at the papers yields
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additional insights.
First, the papers highlight the importance of focusing research and policy efforts
on men as well as women to address gender gaps. Chapter 2 showed that the asso-
ciations between gender-typicality of parental occupation and gender-typicality of
children’s university majors are most apparent between fathers and sons. Chapters
3 and 4 confirmed the well-established finding that on average, men hold more tradi-
tional attitudes towards gender roles. The chapters also revealed that the experience
of parenting daughters and the eligibility for a new parental leave benefit affected
the attitudes held by fathers, while leaving those held by mothers unchanged. Fi-
nally, Chapter 5 showed that the increase in the gender pay gap due to robotisation
was likely explained by the disproportional gains from productivity increases that
skilled men can reap.
Despite this, attention often concentrates on the notion that women need to
change their behaviour. For example, arguments focus around getting more women
into STEM fields, and getting women to return to the labour force relatively quickly
after childbirth. However, findings from my papers illustrate the need to consider
women’s as well as men’s behaviours and attitudes. Therefore, one contribution of
my thesis is highlighting the importance of focusing research and policy efforts on
men as well as women to close remaining gender gaps.
Second, my papers contribute to the literature in cultural economics by con-
firming the importance of social context, including social norms and gender role
attitudes. Chapter 2 demonstrated that the transmission of gender roles plays part
in the major choices of young men. Moreover, the findings were at least partially
driven by sons who defy gender-stereotypical major choices and suggested that fa-
thers in gender-atypical occupations can help break gender stereotypes. Chapter 3
highlighted that family policy can affect gender role attitudes, which in turn may
be a mechanism for the policy’s effectiveness to achieve its aims. Chapter 4 revealed
that the experience of parenting daughters affected fathers’ attitudes as well as be-
haviours concerning the gender division of work. Chapter 5 showed that the effect
of robotisation on the gender pay gap depended on existing gender inequality in a
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given country.
Therefore, the thesis contributes to an improved understanding of some of the
multifaceted ways in which contextual factors matter, specifically how gender norms
and beliefs are formed, and how they interact with gendered behaviour.
6.2 Limitations
I discussed limitations in the relevant sections in each chapter. In this section,
I highlight the key limitation of each paper and also discuss limitations that are
common to more than one chapter.
In Chapter 2, an important limitation is the extent of information available
on parents. Specifically, information on employment histories of parents such as
the number of hours worked would be useful to test potential channels for why
fathers’ occupation matters more for children’s choices than mothers’ occupation.
It is plausible to assume this is because fathers often have the ‘more successful’
career while mothers only work few hours part-time. However, it is not possible to
test this given the data limitations.
The key limitation of Chapter 3 is the small sample size. Because of this con-
straint, I could not use a strictly causal identification strategy, and I could not
conduct separate analyses for East and West Germany, and potentially other rele-
vant subgroups. I conducted a number of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses
to increase confidence that my results were not a product of a selected sample or
endogenous selection into treatment.
In Chapter 4, an important limitation is that the paper does not test any poten-
tial mechanisms through which attitudinal change occurs. However, being the first
paper to identify an age-of-daughter specific effect is an important contribution to
existing literature.
In Chapter 5, a key limitation is that longitudinal data or data containing the
work history of individuals does not exist for the large sample of European countries
that we study. Because of this, the sample consists of employed individuals only
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and it is not possible to assess how robotisation affects employment. To address
this, we endeavour to rule out that gender differences in employment effects are
driving our results on earnings. Another limitation common to existing research
on the labour market effects of industrial robots is that they are largely quiet on
underlying mechanisms.
The aim of my thesis is to improve knowledge concerning some of the important
sources of gender gaps in labour market outcomes that were discussed in Chapter 1.
It is important to acknowledge that I did not consider all areas of gender gaps in the
labour market, for example, gender gaps in self-employment or wealth. Moreover,
I did not provide a complete discussion of all factors that contribute to gender
differences, including important factors such as labour market discrimination.
Relevant to Chapters 3 and 4, I assumed in this thesis that self-reported gender
role attitudes are accurate reflections of individuals’ beliefs. However, with the
high public awareness of the importance of gender equality, it is possible that social
desirability bias affects stated attitudes (Krumpal 2013). Moreover, it is possible
that such a potential bias differs systematically across groups. For example, higher-
educated individuals may be more aware of issues of gender inequality in the labour
market and therefore more susceptible to underreport gender-traditional attitudes.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that gender social norms may affect
behaviour subconsciously and this may not necessarily be reflected in stated gen-
der role attitudes. However, despite their limitations, gender role attitudes remain
important indicators of the social climate concerning gender equality (Blohm & Wal-
ter 2018). Moreover, in Chapters 3 and 4, they are the best available measures to
capture individuals’ beliefs about the appropriate roles of men and women.
6.3 Implications for policy
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to give specific policy recommendations. How-
ever, the findings of the papers feed into debates on policy design.
The findings in Chapter 2 confirmed the relevance of gendered behaviour of
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parents for the gendered university major choices of young adults, especially for
young men. This affirms the importance of measures to combat gender stereotypes
and norms through a variety of means. Such policies are now widely discussed,
and international organisations and policy makers recognise the relevance of social
norms for gendered behaviour, and their consequences on labour market outcomes
(e.g. OECD 2017, Unterhofer et al. 2017). Consequently, an increasing number of
policy initiatives aim to tackle existing gender norms and stereotypes. For example,
the German Ministry for Education launched the ‘National Pact for Women in
MINT Careers’, to increase girls’ interest in STEM courses.1 Similarly, the Institute
of Physics (IOP) launched the ‘Opening Doors’ project, to foster good practice in
countering gender stereotyping in schools (OECD 2017).
Results from Chapter 2 also demonstrate that policy needs to focus on boys and
girls equally, and address male stereotypes as well as female ones. Direct exposure
to gender-atypical role models and to gender atypical fields at school are possible
ways to do so. Additionally, public campaigns should encourage boys to consider
occupations in which men are underrepresented, such as teaching (OECD 2017).
Given the importance of gender social norms, the question whether attitudes
towards gender roles are formed early in life or are perceptive to context and ex-
periences is relevant for the design of family policy. The findings from Chapters
3 and 4, highlighting that new experiences can change the gender role attitudes
held by parents, are therefore encouraging from a policy perspective. Policy design
that considers the normative messages it carries and the potential consequences of
new experiences provided through policy incentives on parenting identities may be
more effective in achieving desired outcomes. Policy could use normative messages
specifically aimed at changing specific norms as a tool.
However, these need to be carefully considered, as conversely, the interaction of
policy incentives with parenting identities may produce unintended outcomes. The
increase in what I considered ‘traditional attitudes towards the role of fathers’ due
1MINT is the German equivalent of STEM and stands for Mathematik, Informatik, Naturwis-
senschafen, Technik.
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to the 2007 parental leave reform is one such example. Another example is the
finding of a recent study from Spain, which shows that the introduction of paternity
leave reduced men’s fertility intentions (Farré & González 2019). Moreover, family
policy that does not take into account the social norms context is often ineffective.
For example, while Japan provides the longest paid parental leave entitlements for
fathers among OECD countries, only five percent of eligible fathers in 2017 took
paid leave (Chzhen et al. 2019).
Attitudes towards gender roles are mainly used to monitor the societal climate
and trends at large. An additional implication of my findings is that such attitudes
may also be used alongside behavioural outcomes to monitor the effects of gender
equality policies.
I discussed evidence that a large part of remaining gender inequalities in labour
market outcomes are due to the gendered consequences of parenthood. Therefore,
the debate needs to focus on why we see large motherhood penalties. Evidence
suggests that an increased provision of childcare and early education helps produce
more gender equal outcomes (Olivetti & Petrongolo 2017). However, while some
argue that it is crucial that fathers need to be more involved in unpaid work and
childcare activities, others argue that the most important step is to enhance temporal
flexibility in labour markets (Goldin 2014).
What these arguments have in common is that to achieve gender equality, we
need to take into account fathers’ behaviour. For example, the expectation in many
professional careers to work long hours is an obstacle to achieving gender equality.
Enhancing temporal flexibility and reducing disproportionate rewards for long hours
and overwork needs to target both men and women. In line with this, Chapters 2
to 4 highlighted the importance to move away from the notion that getting enough
women in to STEM fields and increasing incentives for mothers to return to work
early is not enough. Instead, there needs to be a more holistic consideration of the
changes needed in both women’s and men’s behaviour to remove systematic gender
inequalities.
Finally, the results from Chapter 5 reinforce the importance of gender equality.
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Countries with higher occupational segregation, with fewer women in high-skilled
occupations, and higher levels of gender inequality may be more susceptible to po-
tentially negative impacts of technological change on gender equality.
To summarise, the findings presented in this thesis alongside related research
have several important implications. First, focusing on changing the labour market
behaviour of women without addressing that of men and some of its sources –
gender stereotypes, norms, and beliefs – will not achieve gender equality. Second,
family policy may consider more explicitly the normative messages it carries as
well as the effects on parenting identities in order to be most effective. Efforts to
close remaining gender gaps in labour market outcomes would benefit from taking a
holistic approach which targets both men and women and which considers not only
direct financial incentives but also more indirect consequences of policy on social
norms and attitudes towards the appropriate roles of men and women.
These considerations are particularly relevant at present, when reactions to the
global coronavirus pandemic may be pushing men and women back into their gender-
traditional roles, with the potential to erode years of progress.
6.4 Future research
The results of this thesis have implications for research on gender inequality in the
labour market. Chapter 2 introduced a rank-based measure of gender-typicality in
university majors and occupations. I argued that this constitutes an improvement
over previous measures of gender-typicality which are based on gender shares. Rank-
based measures could be used in future research on field and occupational choices
as well as occupational aspirations. Moreover, the rank-based measure is a first step
towards further innovating measures of gender-typicality, and could be adapted and
improved based on experimental research on perceptions of gender-typicality.
Chapters 3 and 4 provided evidence that gender role attitudes are sensitive to
experience. This is relevant as gendered beliefs seem to guide behaviour particu-
larly in the context of parenthood. There is little research to date on impacts of
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policy on attitudinal change and this is an important area for future research, given
the increasing recognition of the importance of traditional norms and attitudes for
remaining gender gaps.
Research on gender role attitudes involves attitudes towards the gender division
of work and attitudes towards the consequences of the labour force participation
of mothers for their young children. More research is needed that incorporates
more contemporary survey items, such as attitudes towards the role of fathers, and
attitudes towards more modern divisions of roles within households. This implies a
need for new items in social surveys that account for the changing gender roles. More
generally, given the importance of norms and attitudes, attitudes towards gender
roles should be incorporated in large longitudinal datasets such as the GSOEP
(German Socio-Economic Panel). Survey items should also be extended to cover
all key areas of remaining gender inequalities, such as occupational segregation.
Chapter 5 provided the first large-scale, cross-country evidence on the impact of
industrial robots on the gender pay gap. More gender-specific empirical evidence on
the effects of ongoing technological change is needed and future research that can
identify underlying mechanisms is important.
Finally, a point relating to arguments made throughout this chapter is that more
research on men and how male gender norms limit their perceived choices is needed.
Much policy focuses on changing the choices and behaviour of women and girls. For
empirical research to follow this focus, arguably contributes to the problem. This
thesis can inform future research that jointly studies the choices, constraints, and
norms faced by both men and women, to further improve our understanding of how
to achieve gender equality in the labour market.
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in Economics 85, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
Brandt, G., Briedis, K., Fabian, K., Klüver, S., Rehn, T. & Trom-
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Seguino, S. (2007), ‘Plus Ça Change? Evidence on Global Trends in Gender Norms
and Stereotypes’, Feminist Economics 13(2), 1–28.
Shafer, E. F. & Malhotra, N. (2011), ‘The Effect of a Child’s Sex on Support for
Traditional Gender Roles’, Social Forces 90(1), 209–222.
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